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Editorial 
 
Dr. Eligar Sadeh  
  
 
There is a strong case to be made that space is in 
the national security interest, but a much weaker 
case is to be made that space is in the national 
economic interest. In the United States (U.S.), 
national security tends to trump commercial space 
concerns leading to policies and laws, like in the 
area of export control, that undermine space 
commercial development. 
 
This special issue of Space and Defense is 
focused on the current approach to export control 
of commercial space technologies, namely the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 
Simply put, ITAR is obtrusive, broken, and 
obsolete. ITAR has prevented international 
partnerships in commercial space, or made them 
exceedingly more difficult and bureaucratic to 
implement. It has dramatically reduced U.S. 
domestic manufacturing capabilities for vital 
space-related hardware and components. 
 
The great irony is that ITAR, in stark contrast to 
its intended goal of retaining domestic 
preeminence for the U.S. in the aerospace and 
defense fields, is having exactly the opposite 
effect. America’s leadership in commercial space 
capabilities has eroded, while Russian, European, 
and Asian entities have expanded and deepened 
their growing dominance. The U.S. has fallen 
behind in the global space commerce competition 
due in no small part to its counterproductive 
export control regime. 
 
ITAR is not only harmful to commercial space, 
but it also damages national security by placing 
legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the U.S. 
military use of commercial space assets that rely 
on a robust satellite industry and space industrial 
base. ITAR has led to the problem that “we are 
denying our allies access to space protection 
capabilities” significantly impacting how the U.S. 
deals with national security space issues. 
There is a need to address this export control issue 
at the level of policy by reforming the “rule set” 
for how ITAR is applied. The current Presidential 
Directive on export control reform is a start. The 
Directive calls for reducing the export licensing 
time to no more than sixty days, and for 
streamlining the process on how a technology is 
looked at in regard to the ITAR Munitions 
Control List (MCL). More congressional funding 
is needed to push through the ITAR reforms 
suggested by the Presidential Directive on ITAR. 
The new Directive is a good step to help fix the 
competitiveness and licensing problems 
associated with ITAR. 
 
Further ITAR reforms are needed. This 
encompasses a reassessment of what technologies 
need to be controlled, and dealing with issues of 
timing, review processes, transparency, and cost. 
Congress needs to take on the issue by updating 
export control laws to better match 21st Century 
global space commerce. This starts with 
reforming the current approach to ITAR by 
moving jurisdiction on all dual-use commercial 
space technologies from the Department of State 
to the Department of Commerce, to legislating 
new export control laws that update and replace 
the antiquated “Cold War” legislation that is still 
in place, e.g., Arms Export Control Act and 
Export Administration Act. 
 
The articles and documents published in this 
special issue of Space and Defense address many 
of the issues highlighted above. This includes the 
historical development of the U.S. export control 
regime within the context to address Cold War 
foreign policy concerns, how ITAR is 
implemented today, and finally, what are the 
problems with ITAR implementation and how can 
those problems be addressed through policy and 
law. 
 
Dr. Sadeh is Associate Director of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
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The History of United States Weapons Export Control Policy 
 
Taylor Dinerman 
 
All nations regulate Arms sales, but the United 
States (U.S.) has traditionally gone further than 
most. After World War I, a conspiracy theory 
made its way into popular culture that blamed the 
war, and specifically the U.S. intervention in 
1917, on the so called “merchants of death.” Ever 
since, this has been a powerful and enduring 
theme in politics and culture throughout the 
world. Yet, nowhere have the effects of this 
theory been more enduring than in U.S. policy 
and law. 
 
At the time, arms sales were seen by European 
governments as tools of statecraft. Referring to 
the efforts by Britain and France to sell ships to 
the Baltic states, one recent study explained: 
 
...winning the orders became 
important to the economic health 
of both nations, but they also 
believed other benefits fell to the 
power winning the bids. To the 
British and the French navies, 
selling warships became a means 
of propping up their respective 
naval industries. To the British and 
French governments, and their 
naval leaders, sales meant 
influence. And influence meant 
control. And control meant more 
orders. But this assumption proved 
as wrong as much of British and 
French thinking between the wars.1 
 
In contrast, the U.S. refused to sell ships and 
submarines to these small states both because of a 
policy of not wanting to sell ships at all and due to 
                                                
1Donald Stoker, Britain, France and the Naval 
Arms Trade in the Baltic 1919-1939 (Frank Cass, 
London, UK, 2003). 
a fear that they “…might eventually fall into the 
hands of the Bolsheviks.”2 As long as the U.S. 
stayed more or less isolated from world power 
politics, its decision on whether or not to export 
weapons or technology mattered little, except to 
the foreign states involved and to the U.S. firms 
that were affected. During the interwar period, 
when U.S. technology slowly began to overtake 
that of Europe, especially in the aeronautical field, 
these decisions became more significant. 
 
Before World War II, export restrictions were 
often informal, such as the case in 1932 when the 
Army Air Corps pressured Boeing into refusing to 
sell their advanced technology Model 247 airliner 
to Japan. “In confidential correspondence, Boeing 
officials expressly reassured the Air Corps that 
none of the company’s advanced airliners would 
be sold abroad unless the government approved.”3 
The Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s were an 
attempt to prevent the U.S. from getting 
embroiled in the wars of Europe and Asia due to 
arms exports. However, due to the depression, 
few in the U.S. Congress wanted to cut all 
weapons exports off entirely. So, the U.S. 
continued to export weapons to a few selected 
belligerent nations such as Nationalist China, 
while denying them to others, such as Ethiopia or 
Spain. 
 
From the beginning of World War II in September 
1939 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941, the Roosevelt Administration 
faced numerous legal and political obstacles in its 
efforts to aid first Great Britain and later the 
                                                
2Ibid. 
3Roger Bilstein, The Enterprise of Flight: The 
American Aviation and Aerospace Industry 
(Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington DC, 
2001). 
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
Occasionally, the administration flat out broke the 
law as when it delivered half a million surplus 
rifles to the British in the early summer of 1940. 
 
Driven by sympathy with China and by Japan’s 
aggressive overall policy, the Roosevelt 
Administration began to increase pressure on 
Japan in 1938. While this policy failed to deter 
Japan from attacking Pearl Harbor, it did serve to 
weaken the Imperial War machine. The State 
Department began with what was termed a “Moral 
Embargo.” On July 1, 1938, Charles W. Yost, 
chief of the Department’s Office of Arms and 
Munitions Control, notified the 148 U.S. aircraft 
manufactures and exporters who had registered 
with his office that only with “great regret” would 
he issue export licenses for warplanes and their 
munitions without naming Japan specifically.”4 
 
The policy evolved into full scale economic 
warfare culminating in the dollar freeze of July 
1941, which effectively cut Japan off from 
purchases of oil and other essential commodities. 
It is important to note that much of the impetus 
for this policy came from relatively low level 
diplomats and military men, such as Assistant 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. These men 
were ready to punish Japan much harder then their 
superiors wanted to. 
 
During the war, ideas about the role of science 
both in the war itself and in the post war era were 
an important part of the intellectual discourse. On 
the left, it was often assumed that science would 
automatically make the world a more socialist 
place. Others such as George Orwell had their 
doubts. Writing in October 1945, more than a 
month after the Japanese surrender, he asked: 
 
But is it really true that a scientist, 
...is any likelier than other people 
to approach nonscientific problems 
in an objective way? There is not 
                                                
4Edward Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy -The US 
Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor 
(Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007). 
much reason for thinking so. Take 
one simple test, the ability to 
withstand nationalism. It is often 
said that science is international, 
but in practice the scientific 
workers of all countries tend to line 
up behind their own governments 
with fewer scruples than are felt by 
the writers and artists. The German 
scientific community, as a whole, 
made no resistance to Hitler. Hitler 
may have ruined the long-term 
prospects of German science, but 
there were still plenty of gifted 
men to do the necessary research 
on such things as synthetic oil, jet 
planes, rocket projectiles, and the 
atomic bomb. Without them the 
German war machine could never 
have been built up.5 
 
After 1945, U.S. leaders were led to assume that it 
would take the USSR at least ten years or more to 
develop their first atomic weapon “Truman and 
his advisors knew that sooner or later the Russians 
would develop their own bomb, but they were all 
surprised at how 
soon it actually 
came.”6 This was 
the first of many 
intelligence failures 
involving nuclear 
weapons. In fact, 
the Soviet regime gave the development of these 
weapons the highest priority, their program also 
benefited from an excellent espionage network in 
the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK) 
as well as from several home grown men of 
genius, notably Andrei Sakharov. The U.S. 
reaction to the first successful Soviet nuclear 
weapons test in 1949 and the subsequent war in 
Korea, where the U.S. was surprised by the 
                                                
5George Orwell, Orwell in Tribune, As I please 
and other writings 1943-1947, Paul Anderson ed. 
(Politicos, London, UK, 2006). 
6John Ranelagh, The Rise and Decline of the CIA 
(Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1987). 
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excellent performance of the MIG-15 fighter and 
its British-designed engine was to try and insure 
that such leaks did not happen again. Stalin was 
skeptical that Britain would sell these engines– 
“What kind of a fool would be willing to sell his 
secrets!” he had reportedly said.”7 
 
The late 1940s and early 1950s were the heydays 
of large-scale managerial research. Norbert 
Wiener wrote that “I consider that the leaders of 
the present trend from individualistic research to 
controlled industrial research are dominated, or at 
least seriously touched by, distrust in the 
individual that amounts to distrust in the human.”8 
This environment, which engendered more 
secrecy than the previous generation of academic 
scientists, became a subject of controversy. Much 
of this was caused by political, or specifically left 
wing, concerns rather than any real desire to 
promote the free circulation of ideas. The battles 
between Robert Oppenheimer with his 
conventionally leftist sympathies and Edward 
Teller whose anti-Communism and unabashed 
patriotism, based in part on his immigrant 
experience, was mirrored by debates over how 
much to trust the Soviet Union. As one 
protagonist put it: 
“As President Reagan never tired 
of saying, ‘nations do not develop 
mistrust because of arms. Rather, 
they develop arms because of 
mistrust’. Western mistrust has 
been based on the Soviets’ seventy 
year record of repression within 
and aggression beyond its 
borders”9 
 
These debates continued to one degree or another 
until the end of the Cold War. One example was 
the 1948 controversy surrounding Edward 
                                                
7David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1994). 
8Norbert Weiner, Invention, The care and feeding 
of ideas (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993). 
9Kenneth Adelman, The Great Universal 
Embrace Arms Summitry, A Skeptics Account 
(Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1989). 
Condon who had been director of the National 
Bureau of Standards and was accused of having 
ties to the American Soviet Science Society. 
While the publicly available evidence against 
Condon was never released, Vannevar Bush made 
clear that he had showed a “lack of proper care in 
the types of remarks he has made and the type of 
associates he has sometimes had.”10 
 
The U.S. not only lacked the skills needed to 
effectively locate and neutralize, in a timely 
fashion, Soviet spy networks, but it was also 
helpless in the face of a world wide propaganda 
campaign that was aimed at “McCarthyism.” Of 
course, there were legal abuses in the 1940s and 
1950s, but the Soviet goal was not to protect U.S. 
Civil Liberties, but to make life as hard as 
possible for America’s counterintelligence 
operations. It also became a powerful political 
issue that helped discredit and drive apart liberals 
and conservatives. 
 
In the same period, the U.S. was providing Europe 
with reconstruction aid under the Marshall Plan 
and with military aid as well. At the same time, 
European states did not want to give up their trade 
relations with the states on the other side of the 
Iron Curtain. The danger for them was that 
Americans, who were engaged in a global cold 
war and had little patience with those who 
accepted U.S. aid and protection while flirting 
with the enemy, would react in a negative fashion. 
 
Europeans and Americans needed a way to make 
certain that U.S. political support for the Marshall 
Plan and for Europe’s security remained intact. 
“The conservatives claimed that Marshall Aid, 
taken together with other commitments, exceeded 
the limits of American resources and discouraged 
Europeans from putting their own house in 
order.”11 The Coordinating Committee for 
                                                
10 G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier Vannevar 
Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Free 
Press, New York, NY, 1997). 
11Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan America, 
Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe 
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Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was 
established in 1949; the U.S., UK, and France and 
the Benelux states were the first members. 
Norway, Denmark, Canada, and West Germany 
joined in 1950, with Portugal and Japan joining in 
1953, and Australia in 1989. CoCom was never a 
formal organization. It is often described as 
nothing more than a Gentleman’s Agreement, yet 
it was one of the most effective tools of U.S. 
economic diplomacy throughout the Cold War. 
“Confidentiality was a necessary part of the early 
Cold War compromise that created CoCom; for 
several west European states, participation in a 
system of economic discrimination targeted 
against communist states was of dubious legality 
and potentially explosive politically.”12 Europe 
and Japan were concerned about the restrictions 
that CoCom put on their trade, and the U.S., while 
often inconsistent and arbitrary, kept up the 
pressure for more and more restrictions. 
 
U.S. economic 
warfare against the 
USSR and vice-versa 
was a fact of the Cold 
War. At some times, 
U.S.-USSR politics, 
such as détente, 
placed inhibitions on 
the effort, but the economic warfare never fully 
stopped and was ready to be activated when 
political circumstances changed. One key turning 
point was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979. The economic pressure put on 
the USSR in the 1980s by the Reagan 
Administration was not simply confined to export 
controls, but included a wide variety of actions, 
including urging the Saudis to ramp up oil 
production to drive down the price. This savaged 
the Soviet’s main source of hard currency income 
and pushed the price of their operations in Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia up to unsustainable 
                                                                               
1947-1952 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1989). 
12Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment, 
CoCom and the Politics of East West Trade 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1992). 
levels. In his memoirs, Reagan wrote that in the 
early days of his Administration “It seemed clear 
to me that in time Communism would collapse of 
its own weight, and I wondered how we as a 
nation could use these cracks in the Soviet system 
to accelerate the process of collapse.”13 
 
Export controls, even though they were a source 
of U.S.-European friction, made life extremely 
difficult for the Soviets. The U.S. effort changed 
the trading environment, and instead of being 
offered credits at below market rates and price 
discounts on their purchases, the Soviets had to 
pay premiums to middlemen working through 
intelligence organizations to buy essential modern 
industrial equipment. A 1982 U.S. government 
report said that: “The overwhelming majority of 
what the United States considers militarily 
significant technology acquired by and for the 
Soviets was obtained by the Soviet intelligence 
services and the East European intelligence 
services.”14 
 
Having to work through intelligence services not 
only made the technology acquisition process 
expensive and vulnerable, but it also slowed it 
down at the very moment when computer 
technology development was accelerating in the 
West, particularly in America. It was the Soviet 
system itself that failed to keep up with its foes. 
One former senior U.S. intelligence officer 
expressed that: 
 
…the computer’s power is useless 
unless the data it processes is 
accurate. And this means that any 
political or economic system which 
wishes to stay abreast of the surge 
in technology must give millions of 
people access to a broad range of 
accurate data. Any system based 
heavily on state control of 
                                                
13Ronald Reagan, An American Life (Simon and 
Schuster, New York, NY, 1990). 
14Douglas McDaniel, United States Technology 
Export Control, An Assessment (Praeger, 
Westport, CT, 1993). 
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information or that permits its 
bureaucracy to provide skewed 
data must reform itself or slip 
backwards technologically and 
economically.15 
 
The more difficult the U.S. and its allies made it 
for the USSR to buy technology in the West, the 
more they had to depend on their own flawed 
system. This lead to such things as the well 
known “exploding television” phenomena and 
often to integrated weapon systems that failed to 
defeat Western ones. This was particularly evident 
during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967, 1973, and 
1982. For example, Syria’s Russian-supplied air 
defense system, and a good part of its air force, 
was wiped out by Israel during the1982 Israeli 
war in Lebanon. 
 
On June 9th, during a major attack on the SA-6 
batteries, the technological competition between 
East and West, in a clash of investments valued at 
billions of dollars, ended with a conclusive 
victory by the West. At least twenty-two Soviet 
MIGs, of both models, were shot down, (in 
addition to seven others that had been downed 
since that morning), constituting between one-
quarter and one-third of the Syrian force. Not a 
single Israeli aircraft was downed.16 
 
For the U.S., the interest to open new markets in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s was strong. The 
U.S. trade deficit was always a problem, but it 
was the politics of the time that ended up 
determining the fate of U.S. export controls. At 
the time, the center-left opposition in America 
was, naturally, looking for themes that could be 
used to discredit the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. The trade deficit was a good one, 
combined with the ease with which they could 
generate a fear that the world was going to be 
                                                
15Daniel O. Graham, Confessions of a Cold 
Warrior (Preview Press, Fairfax VA, 1995). 
16Eliezer Cohen, Israel’s Best Defense, The First 
Full Story of the Israeli Air Force (Orion Books, 
New York, NY, 1993). 
taken over by export oriented “neo- mercantilist” 
powers such as Japan and West Germany. 
 
This theme, reiterated in articles, studies with 
titles like “Japan as Number One”, and novels and 
movies, lead to a mild form of paranoia vis-à-vis 
Japan and a feeling that America’s computer 
industry needed to be supported the same way that 
Japan or other Asian nations supported theirs. “At 
the growth rate of 1963-73, Japan would overtake 
the United States in real per capita income by 
1985, and total Japanese output would exceed that 
of the United States by 1998.”17 This fear 
combined with the cultural affinity that many 
industry leaders had with leading Democrats 
made the whole question of export controls an 
important issue in the 1992 election. 
 
When it comes to strategic sales, politics is never 
far away. In 1975, there were the Lockheed 
bribery scandals coming on top of Watergate. 
This was followed by the congressional 
investigations into the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). It was then revealed that contracts 
to some foreign countries were designed to have, 
as a part of their price, a series of payments to 
consultants who had helped to facilitate the deal. 
These consultants, in turn, allegedly paid bribes to 
people in positions of responsibility. Among the 
more notorious of those who were alleged to have 
received the bribes were Japan’s Yoshio Kodama 
and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.18 
 
These revelations lead to the enactment of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (CPRA), which put 
the U.S. in the forefront of the international 
struggle against corruption, even though this was 
to handicap the U.S. economically over the years. 
“As a practical matter, the U.S. remains virtually 
the only country that vigorously prosecutes its 
                                                
17Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism (MIT 
Press, Cambridge MA, 1997). 
18Walter Boyne, Beyond the Horizons, The 
Lockheed Story (St. Martins Press, New York, 
NY, 1998). 
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companies for bribing foreign officials.”19 
Nevertheless, this law has become in part, the 
model for international anti-corruption legislation. 
American pressure on its trading partners was 
partly responsible for this as was pressure from 
international civil society including non-
governmental organizations and the media. 
 
In 1992, the CPRA was perceived as a U.S. 
government obstacle to America’s need to export. 
The idea that the U.S. should suppress imports by 
means of taxes on consumers and should promote 
its exports “by any means necessary” gained 
ground. What was odd about this was that those 
who promoted this in the name of “industrial 
policy” saw it as aimed against military allies, in 
particular against Germany and Japan, and they 
saw America’s foes such as the USSR as being 
nothing more than targets for a new export drive. 
 
Between 1989 and 1993, much of the focus of 
U.S. economic sanctions activity had switched 
from the Soviet Union, which ceased to exist in 
December 1991, to China, 
whose 1989 Tiananmen 
Square “crackdown” caused 
the U.S. and other Western 
nations to cut-off weapons 
exports and to restrict 
China’s access to sensitive 
technology. China, however, 
was not the USSR, the 
economic reforms of the 
Deng era had profoundly 
changed its economy, which 
became in many ways a conventionally 
mercantilist one on the Asian model, while still 
remaining politically a one-party Communist 
state. From a U.S. standpoint, China does not 
believe in supporting a universal Communist 
revolution and has pursued a strategy that is closer 
to that of pre-1914 Germany than to anything that 
ever came out of the Soviet politburo. 
 
                                                
19Michael Marinelli, “Policy perspectives: is U.S. 
business hampered by foreign corrupt practices 
ban?” World Trade Magazine, 1 September 2007. 
Complicating relations was the heritage of the 
U.S. quasi-alliance with China aimed at the 
USSR. American support for China in the 1970s 
and 1980, had rarely involved arms sales, a few 
helicopters and other items. The U.S. had 
encouraged others, notably in Europe and in 
Israel, to help to update the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), whose forces had not received any 
serious injections of new technology since the 
Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. 
 
In his memoir, President Reagan’s Secretary of 
the Navy, John Lehman, wrote that “the most 
functionally important was the fourth and final 
agreement to undertake a program to modernize 
Chinese destroyers and frigates with modern 
technology, enabling them to carry out effective 
antisubmarine warfare.”20 While the U.S. had to 
be careful not to overtly state that the relationship 
was aimed at the USSR, this was in fact the case. 
There was also the pull of the Chinese market; 
American businessmen have been trying to 
develop a Chinese customer base since the late 
18th century. China meanwhile has centuries of 
experience in exploiting foreigners for their own 
purposes. The Chinese from necessity had made 
manipulation of the strong by the weak into a fine 
art.”21 
 
It should be recognized that neither Americans 
nor Chinese have a very good record of being able 
to achieve their national goals through trade. In 
the 1960s, China tried hard to develop a 
privileged position for itself in the newly 
independent states of Africa through a 
combination of trade, aid, and military assistance. 
For the most part, this failed since most African 
states preferred to trade with the West and to 
obtain their weapons from the USSR. China’s 
relatively successful mercantilist export policy 
combined with its technological espionage effort, 
gives it advantages that the USSR never had. 
                                                
20John Lehman, Command of the Seas (Scribners, 
New York, NY, 1988). 
21Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and The American 
Experience in China (Grove Press, New York, 
NY, 1971). 
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These include: unimpeded access to the capitalist 
world’s banking system; and to the higher 
education establishments of the U.S. and to a 
lesser extent, Europe. 
 
For the U.S., trying to contain China’s military 
growth and at the same time to integrate it into the 
world community is a tough balancing act. 
Unfortunately, politics tends to undermine any 
attempt to build a sensible and balanced long term 
strategy. This problem has lead directly to the 
current situation. America’s current export control 
system is the direct result of politics. The Clinton 
Administration abolished the CoCom in late 1993 
as a relic of the Cold War.22 Concomitantly, many 
of the export control functions that had been 
handled by the State Department and by the 
Department of Defense (DOD) were transferred to 
the Commerce Department. Commerce strived for 
mercantilist trade promotion, limited only by the 
Constitution and by the structure of the American 
economy. This policy led to high-technology trade 
with China that involved the launching of U.S. 
commercial satellites on the Chinese Long March 
rocket. 
 
The Chinese Long March failures between 1992 
and 1996 and the U.S. made communications 
satellite they were carrying were compromised. 
Loral and Hughes assisted with the accident 
investigations and in the process leaked valuable 
technological information that supposedly helped 
China to improve the performance of its ballistic 
missiles.23 A Pentagon report quoted by one critic 
of the U.S. trade policy towards China said: 
 
                                                
22Under CoCom rules, the West experienced the 
greatest period of prosperity and economic growth 
in the history of the human race. The new set of 
international export rules that replaced CoCom, 
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls 
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, is more loosely organized with 
more limited institutional structures. 
23Eligar Sadeh, “Bureaucratic Politics Run Amok: 
The United States and Satellite Export Controls,” 
in this issue of the journal. 
The provision of technical 
assistance in connection with the 
failure investigation to the Chinese 
by Hughes in the design, 
engineering, and operation of the 
Chinese launch vehicle and the 
Hughes satellite constitutes a 
“defense service” within the 
meaning of the State Department’s 
International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) under the 
Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA).24 
 
Combined with revelation of Chinese espionage 
aimed at U.S. nuclear weapons labs this set off a 
political firestorm. In March 1999, a 
congressional investigative panel was about to 
announce China’s theft of information on nearly 
every U.S. nuclear weapons design, due in part to 
the incompetence of the Clinton administration 
Justice Department.25 
 
In the end, the Congressional investigation was 
inconclusive. Congress did, however, find 
evidence of a very large Chinese espionage 
program aimed at U.S. military and technological 
secrets.26 In order to counter this program, they 
recommended strengthening the U.S. export 
control regime. “In addition the panel called for 
stricter Defense Department controls on satellite 
                                                
24Bill Getz, Betrayal, How the Clinton 
Administration Undermined American Security 
(Regnery, Washington, DC, 1999). 
25Dan Stober and Ian Hoffman, A Convenient Spy, 
Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear 
Espionage (Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 
2001). 
26Any improvement in the ability of a state, such 
as China, to land thermonuclear weapons onto 
American cities is something that no politician 
can afford to ignore. No matter how ambiguous 
the intelligence information the merest hint that 
such an improvement in the nuclear weapons that 
could be aimed at the U.S. homeland required 
some sort of response from the U.S. Congress. 
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launches in China.”27 In a divided government, 
there are limits on what the legislative branch can 
do to force a President of a different party to do its 
will. In the absence of any possible effective 
cooperation from the Administration, the 
Republican majority in Congress ordered in 1999 
that communications satellites and all their 
components be placed on the munitions control 
list and thus, fall under ITAR regulations. This 
was a blow to U.S. policy that sought to promote 
U.S. exports with fewer national security 
limitations. The Commerce Department would no 
longer be able to issue export licenses for 
commercial satellites and their components. The 
impact of this change was both far reaching and 
unexpected. 
 
Over the last eight years, the ITAR regulations 
have done serious damage not only to U.S. efforts 
to sell commercial satellites, but also to NASA’s 
science and human spaceflight programs. “They 
have also proven a wonderful stimulator of 
international cooperation without U.S. 
participation.”28 This damage is due to the way the 
U.S. government works. The State Department’s 
enforcement of ITAR regulations is a good 
example. The delays in processing space-related 
ITAR paperwork was due to a lack of trained 
personnel, and the people needed to deal with the 
paperwork were not engineers or people with a 
military background who could recognize when a 
certain bit of technology was dangerous and when 
it could be exported.  These were lawyers who, by 
the nature of their training, would impartially and 
blindly enforce the law, no matter how much 
damage they were doing to the nation. “Scott Pace 
noted that U.S. ITAR regulations were an inartful 
response to globalization that created the risk of 
losing satellite manufacturing capability and 
influence.”29 
 
                                                
27Bill Getz, Betrayal, How the Clinton 
Administration Undermined American Security 
(Regnery, Washington, DC, 1999). 
28The Space Report (The Space Foundation, 
Colorado Springs, 2006). 
29Ibid. 
ITAR, as currently practiced, is a form of 
economic warfare practiced by the U.S. to try and 
achieve broad national security interests. 
“Evidence is beginning to emerge that it harms 
the sector and undercuts and erodes our economic 
competitiveness and forces international partners 
to go it alone.”30 Even though the domestic 
satellite industry and its component suppliers have 
been hurt, the U.S. will not give up the use of 
sanctions and other forms of economic pressure. 
They are an essential part of American statecraft, 
even if they are often used in crude ways and lead 
to outcomes that are increasingly 
counterproductive. 
 
                                                
30Ibid. 
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The American Bubble: 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Space Commerce 
 
Professor Roger Handberg  
 
 
International space commerce in the United States 
(U.S.) has entered into a period of great 
uncertainty regarding its current and future 
competitiveness and marketability of its products. 
This question arises because the U.S. with regard 
to space commerce remains frozen in a posture 
established first during the Cold War. The 
concern then was that no critical technologies be 
made available to U.S. enemies and their fellow 
travelers. The former were obvious while the 
latter were more problematic since that group also 
included states with which the U.S. wished to 
establish more positive relations including 
international trade. The mechanism used to 
monitor and control that trade process is the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
regime applied by the U.S. Department of State. 
The issue is whether ITAR is still of the same 
value in a post-Cold War world and whether their 
enforcement might take a different approach. As 
will be discussed, changes in their application 
began especially toward the Cold War’s end, but 
those changes were largely reversed due to a 
combination of domestic politics and international 
uncertainty. The question is whether the ITAR as 
presently implemented meets the strategic 
interests of the U.S. or is their unintended effect 
one of undermining the U.S. ability to influence 
international trade with regard to space 
technologies. For other categories related to arms, 
the ITAR supports U.S. policy objectives even 
though their application is often characterized by 
excessive slowness and rigidity in application. 
 
 
ITAR and the Cold War 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. along 
with other states constructed a number of 
international and national institutions aimed at 
fostering international trade and economic 
growth. The Bretton Woods meeting during 
World War II led to agreements in 1944 
establishing a system of international financial 
institutions to govern monetary policy among 
states. U.S. national interests led to this effort, 
building strong trading partners and allies in the 
post-war world. However, subsequent political 
events in Europe and Asia raised concerns about 
the future, the Cold War. The Cold War was a 
global military-economic-ideological competition 
between the U.S. and its allies, and the Soviet 
Union and those states aligned with it. In this 
context, a third collection of states emerged who 
professed nonalignment with either antagonist; a 
group that grew in numbers with the 
dismemberment of the colonial empires. 
 
Trade between the U.S. and the Soviet block 
countries also incorporating the People’s Republic 
of China was at best minimal and usually virtually 
nil. For these other states that were not U.S. allies, 
the U.S. established trade relations based on 
demand for their products. That meant that most 
underdeveloped states had very limited trade with 
the U.S. except for extractive industries. Cold 
War competition often brought the U.S. and the 
Soviets into direct political competition - a 
competition in which trade relations became an 
important foreign policy tool. The argument made 
was that expanding trade with a nonaligned state 
would incline its leadership to favor the U.S. in 
other matters. The difficulty was that in many 
instances, the products desired by the 
underdeveloped state were such that they might 
have military value and could be forwarded on to 
U.S. adversaries. Such items included various 
electronic goods and services. The U.S. for 
Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida 
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reasons of national security and protection of its 
existing trade advantage wished to monitor and 
control these items sales and their future export. 
Allies were considered less of a problem, but 
there was the possibility that corrupted officials 
could facilitate export of otherwise forbidden 
items. The U.S. wanted to ensure that the 
prohibitions were enforced so recipients of 
otherwise controlled items would be on notice that 
forwarding those items to states otherwise 
forbidden would have consequences, no further 
exports to the offending state and criminal 
penalties for individuals violating the law. 
 
The mechanism used during the Cold War was the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export 
Controls (CoCom). Technology transfer questions 
were resolved through this process, which later 
was incorporated into the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976. This Act identifies those items that 
should be regulated because they are deemed 
defense articles and defense services. The result is 
the ITAR licensing process through the Munitions 
Control List (MCL) of space technologies that are 
explicitly covered under the Missile Technology 
Control Regime. MCL became the mechanism 
through which trade can be controlled and 
channeled. Evaluation of proposed sales was 
handled by the U.S. Department of State with 
significant input from the Department of Defense 
(DOD). This combination of reviewers, it was 
confidently expected, would provide the strongest 
control over leakage of military secrets since both 
departments define themselves as protectors of 
U.S. national interests as an institutional priority. 
What was more intrusive is the requirement that 
government monitors had to authorize and often 
attend any meeting where technical information 
was to be exchanged. 
 
The task before the regulators grew more 
complicated over time as dual use technologies 
became more prevalent. For example, computer 
technologies from their onset had clear military 
applications. As the commercial sector grew and 
information technology became more 
sophisticated, the commercial versions were often 
more powerful than the military ones, capable of 
ever more powerful operations. Their value to 
potential adversaries became more apparent with 
the implication that their dissemination needed to 
be monitored and regulated to prevent hostile 
parties gaining access. However, political realities 
were such that information technologies were 
more easily exported with few exceptions than 
space technologies. This reflected in part the 
reality that U.S. computer and chip makers were 
competing in a global market where their success 
was not guaranteed. Space technologies in the 
West were dominated by the U.S. until the 1980s 
and early 1990s as the Europeans first followed 
by the Japanese at a distance became strong 
competitors. As that occurred, rules became 
looser. 
 
In the early days of ITAR, friend or foe in 
principle was comparatively easy to determine. 
Over time the picture grew more complicated in 
that many states were friendly with the Soviets 
and Chinese. That included North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) members such as Great 
Britain who for example had diplomatic and trade 
relations with mainland China while the U.S. 
recognized the 
Republic of China 
(Taiwan) as the 
legitimate 
government. All this 
made applying ITAR 
more complicated 
since the evaluation 
becomes once 
removed. Clear 
language was placed in the regulations to prohibit 
transfer of certain exports to third parties, closing 
a backdoor method of technology acquisition. In 
principle, the loophole was closed, but clearly was 
not air-tight. Enforcement of indirect regulations 
remained an issue, but the disincentive for the 
foreign partners was that U.S. technology 
products were valued so that access to them was 
strongly preferred even if that mean enforcing 
U.S. rules seen as onerous: that was the price of 
access. 
 
Until the 1980s, ITAR met its purpose of denying 
militarily useful technologies from U.S. 
adversaries and their allies. Any hindering of U.S. 
information 
technologies 
were more 
easily exported 
than space 
technologies 
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trade was accepted as a necessary price to sustain 
national defense. Complaints arose in academic 
circles, but were generally discounted although a 
few exceptions were carved out to accommodate 
them, especially those doing scientific work 
employing spacecraft of differing types. Those 
objections by the academic community were met 
by Presidential National Security Decision 
Directive 189 dated 21 September 1985, that 
exempted fundamental scientific research from 
ITAR and MCL regulations.1 This exception was 
reaffirmed by the Bush administration on 21 
November 2001.2 Earlier, in the Reagan 
Administration in 1984, U.S. satellites could be 
launched by international companies, explicitly 
Arianespace at their French Guiana launch 
faculty. Gradually, application of the prohibitions 
lessened in their strictures as the Cold War waxed 
and waned in intensity. Less advanced products 
including older computer types were sold to states 
formerly prohibited. This occurred in response to 
the rise of economic competitors to the U.S. 
among its allies; primarily Europe and Japan. 
Their perspective was more purely trade oriented 
demonstrated by their willingness to sell products 
to states that the U.S. would not. These products 
were not controllable by the U.S. since they had 
developed independently. The actual degree of 
independence is unclear given the increasing 
internationalization of many areas of science and 
technology. In fact, in the late 1980s, the U.S. was 
lagging in certain technology areas, especially 
computer-based technologies. So, any U.S. trade 
restrictions were receding in importance given 
these alternative sources. 
 
 
                                                
1Rachel Lehmer Claus, “Space-Based 
Fundamental Research and the ITAR: A Study in 
Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Prior Restraint,” 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 2 
(2003). 
2Julie T. Norris, Restrictions on Research Awards, 
Troublesome Clauses. A Report of the 
AAU/COGR Taskforce. Washington: Association 
of American Universities, 2004, 
http://www.aau.edu/research/Rpt4.8.04.pdf (accessed 6 
September 2007). 
Cracks Within the “ITAR Wall” 
 
Given that national security drove the 
development and implementation of ITAR, 
changes in that environment could impact their 
application. Over time, the resurrection of Europe 
and Japan as major economic agents subtlety 
changed their role. The U.S. found that its 
strictures against export of various technologies 
were increasingly ignored. By the late Reagan 
administration, the general issue of how to treat 
such exports to formerly embargoed states had 
risen to levels within the U.S. government that a 
presidential decision was required. President 
Reagan agreed to the possibility of using Chinese 
or Soviet launch vehicles. This debate took place 
within a context in which the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union and China were moving toward more 
normal relations including economics. This 
included the possibility that their lift vehicles 
could be used to launch U.S. built communication 
satellites (COMSATs) into orbit. This presented 
an interesting situation since the U.S. was by far 
the dominant builder of communications 
satellites– a status the U.S. had aggressively 
defended for years.3 
 
Using other states’ launch vehicles was a major 
gesture toward globalizing the world economy. 
On the other hand, this willingness to reconsider 
the question reflected a perception that in the 
aftermath of the January 1986 Space Shuttle 
Challenger accident, the U.S. launch industry had 
fallen behind its international competitors.4 The 
debate whether to lessen ITAR to accommodate 
proved an extremely contentious debate. The 
debate was between what could roughly be 
described as the controllers and those interested in 
expanded world trade. The controllers were those 
who argued that national security should trump 
any trade considerations regardless of temporary 
lessening of tensions. The risks of transferring 
                                                
3Roger Handberg, International Space 
Commerce: Building from Scratch (Gainesville, 
Florida: University Press of Florida, 2006). 
4Roger Handberg, The Future of Space Industry: 
Private Enterprise and Public Policy (Westport, 
Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1995). 
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militarily relevant technologies to potential 
adversaries were still considered too great. 
 
Expanded trade supporters argued that the U.S. 
benefited from the opening up of this area of 
economic activity. That expanded economic ties 
would help ameliorate long term antagonisms and 
foster closer cooperative ties, a win-win situation. 
The risks of any inadvertent technology transfers 
could be mitigated by establishing certain 
procedures limiting what was made known to the 
launch operator. Clearly, some tech transfer 
would occur simply because U.S. companies 
would have to insure that Soviet or Chinese 
launch operations could properly handle the 
payloads. 
 
The then President Bush authorized the licenses to 
be issued as the trade advocates successfully 
argued that normalized trade relations were in the 
national interest. Licenses to export were 
authorized, but protective measures were taken.5 
The payloads traveled in sealed containers with 
U.S. security personnel constantly present to stop 
any attempts to examine the satellites. Sufficient 
information was provided to allow the satellite to 
be properly mounted for release once orbit is 
achieved. The understanding was that whatever 
information was released would not materially 
assist the Chinese or Russians. 
 
An integral part of 
the controversy was 
the growing schism 
between the satellite 
builders and the 
launch companies. 
The latter were 
under intense stress 
as the Europeans 
with the Ariane 4 
lifters were dominating the launch markets. The 
Chinese and Russians added even more 
competition since until the security restrictions 
were lifted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their 
                                                
5Eric Choi and Sorin Niculescu, “The Impact of 
US Export Controls on the Canadian Space 
Industry,” Space Policy 22 (2006). 
launchers were excluded from carrying U.S. 
payloads. The split also came over the question of 
costs – U.S. launchers were legacy carriers from 
earlier generation converted missiles and more 
expensive than their international competitors. 
Opening the doors to new launch vendors did not 
totally eliminate U.S. launch providers’ 
advantages since U.S. government payloads were 
still only flown on U.S. flag carriers. The new 
competitors also benefited from cost differentials 
between western prices and the artificial price 
structures of authoritarian states. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union further expanded this price gap 
when the Russian economy effectively went into 
free fall. 
 
U.S. launch providers may have lost the fight over 
entry of new competitors into the field, but other 
restrictions were imposed. Given the artificial 
pricing structures inherent in socialist political 
systems, the U.S. demanded that quotas be 
imposed on each– without such a quota, American 
COMSATs would be available as payloads. Since 
U.S. COMSAT payloads constituted ninety 
percent of those available worldwide, failure to 
agree to these quotas meant “de facto” no market 
because Arianespace handled most European 
payloads, the balance of the available payloads. 
The quotas differed with the Soviets-Russians 
being the most intense since their lifters were seen 
as the most reliable and competitive. Given the 
mystery associated with the Chinese space 
program, Chinese Long March boosters were 
thought less reliable, and thus less of a 
competitive threat. Both quotas were for a 
specified time period. In fact, neither competitor 
used up its quota with the collapse of the 
COMSAT boom in the 1990s, the quotas were not 
renewed.6 
 
Ironically, the schism between the satellite 
builders and the launch providers faded as 
mergers ended with Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
as the major vertically integrated players. Through 
their mergers and launch alliances, the two 
dominated American space industry. Their 
international alliances, Sea Launch (Boeing) and 
                                                
6Handberg, 2006. 
Chinese Long 
March boosters 
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International Launch Services (Lockheed Martin) 
tied various former Soviet launch providers into 
American space industry.7 Competition was not 
eliminated as Arianespace remained the industry 
leader, but was severely constrained. Over time, 
the Chinese through aggressive marketing and 
price competition became major players in 
launching U.S. satellites to orbit. This can be seen 
in their incorporation into the Iridium launches, 
sixty-six satellites plus six spares. All the major 
launch competitors were involved. 
 
Walls Fall, But Are Rebuilt 
 
With the arrival of the Clinton administration in 
office in January 1993, licensing under ITAR was 
eventually moved to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce in 1996. Earlier in October 1992, a 
subset of COMSAT technologies had been moved 
from the Department of State to the Department 
of Commerce for licensing purposes. This was in 
line with both administrations’ desire to foster 
trade relations in the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. The goal was engaging the 
world through strong economic linkages, 
especially former socialist states including Russia 
and China. Given the Department of Commerce’s 
mandate toward expanding trade, the obvious 
outcome was a general loosening of ITAR 
restrictions.8 These moves were not universally 
greeted with acclaim by the controllers who felt 
the U.S. was giving away the store while 
incurring great risks to national security. Their 
concerns were shared by many Republican 
conservatives whose views of the former Soviet 
Union and China were much more negative than 
was official policy. The situation was ironic in 
that the skeptics were among those who usually 
strongly supported business interests of which 
trade was a major component. 
                                                
7Andrew J. Aldrin, “Technology Control Regimes 
and the Globalization of Space Industry,” Space 
Policy 14 (1998). 
8This was heightened by the presence of Ron 
Brown, a close personal associate of President 
Clinton as Secretary of Commerce, whose 
primary mission was growing U.S. trade with 
other states. 
Reversal came disguised in the shape of launch 
accidents in which Chinese Long March vehicles 
failed during lift off. American COMSAT 
payloads were total losses. In addition, lives were 
lost in the villages just outside the spaceport; the 
exact total was never officially announced 
although twenty seven was the number given for 
one accident. As is customary with such flight 
failures, a post accident investigation was 
launched. For the Chinese, conducting this 
investigation successfully, meaning finding a 
cause for the accident that could be corrected, was 
absolutely essential. An incomplete or otherwise 
distorted investigation would fail to satisfy the 
insurance investigators, meaning Long March 
vehicles became uninsurable. No insurance meant 
any possible western payloads became 
unavailable. Government payloads are effectively 
self insured while commercial payloads owners 
normally purchase insurance on the open market. 
Flight failures raise future insurance rates or make 
the vehicle uninsurable.9 
 
The subsequent investigation included 
participation from all involved parties, meaning 
primarily the Chinese government as operators of 
the launch vehicle and the payload owners, 
meaning the satellite builders. Most satellite 
contracts give up control over the satellite after its 
safe arrival and check out on orbit to insure proper 
operations before the customer assumes control. 
Hughes Aerospace was the COMSAT builder and 
participated in the investigation – Boeing later 
bought Hughes and assumed its role in the joint 
investigation and its aftermath. Given the 
economic stakes, the investigation had to be 
thorough, which meant delving into technical 
aspects which raised flags among skeptics of trade 
with China. In the resulting process, technical 
information beyond that already made available 
was exchanged in part because the Chinese 
initially claimed the accident had been possibly 
caused by some defect with the payload itself. In 
order to refute this possibility, technical 
information was exchanged in greater detail. The 
resulting investigation indicated that launch 
vehicle operations were the cause. 
                                                
9Handberg, 2006. 
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However, as knowledge of the investigation and 
the extent of the technical information exchange 
became known, a drumbeat of criticism arose in 
the U.S. Congress fueled by the growing 
perception of China as a future military rival akin 
to the old Soviet Union. The argument was that 
the Chinese, in launching U.S. COMSATs, were 
obtaining knowledge that helped upgrade their 
missile capabilities.10 In addition, Republican 
politicians’ animosity toward President Clinton 
added to the intensity of the debate. The debate 
grew larger into a charge that Chinese industrial-
military espionage was penetrating the trade 
process and U.S. national weapons labs. In fact, a 
scientist, Wen Ho Lee, at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory of Chinese heritage was accused of 
nuclear espionage; the charges were ultimately 
dismissed. The political storm over China and its 
efforts to gain American secrets waxed in 
intensity. 
 
The U.S. House of Representatives established an 
investigatory commission to examine the entire 
question of Chinese spying. The Cox Commission 
report completed in 1998, but not made public 
until 1999, became the basis for congressional 
action.11 An amendment was added to the 1999 
DOD authorization act ending the Department of 
Commerce’s primary role in ITAR licensing. The 
Department of State was returned to its previous 
position as licensing agency with major input 
from the DOD. This change was aimed at 
increasing national security scrutiny of any 
license requests. There were no directions to stop 
or severely reduce trade with China specifically or 
any other state. However, the greatly heightened 
political sensitivity of license requests to export to 
China was obvious– a fact the bureaucracy was 
fully aware of and prepared to act on immediately. 
 
                                                
10Joan Johnson-Freese, “Alice in Licenseland: 
U.S. Satellite Export Controls since 1990,” Space 
Policy 16 (2000). 
11Report of the Select Committee on U.S. Security 
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People’s Republic of China (Cox Report), House 
Report 105-851, Washington: U.S. House of 
Representatives, 25 May 1998. 
United States Space Commerce in the Bubble 
 
Changing the approver meant at least a more 
restrictive or cautious view of export applications 
of space technologies to China regardless of any 
precautions taken. The crunch came almost 
immediately with an export license for a Chinese 
COMSAT built by Hughes was put on indefinite 
hold. That particular license had too many 
political negatives to allow immediate approval. 
In fact, the parties eventually gave up and the 
COMSAT was sold elsewhere. Symbolically, the 
political point was made almost immediately even 
though implementation of the new process proved 
more complicated than expected.12 
 
In addition, the Department of State encountered 
issues regarding its personnel and their 
competence and 
uncertainty as to 
what was 
politically 
acceptable. State 
lacked sufficient 
trained 
personnel able 
to process the 
license 
applications. Hiring and training staff represented 
a major challenge, which was only slowly 
overcome given federal hiring procedures. What 
proved more unsettling was the narrow view by 
the license examiners. The political sensitivity of 
the question heightened their caution with rules 
being interpreted in the closest manner possible. 
The result was a classic example of unintended 
consequences.13 
 
As indicated above, high-technology exports to 
China were immediately quashed generally with 
any exceptions carefully vetted. Other results of 
the change were more unsettling. First, there was 
a dramatic slowdown in the time necessary to gain 
approval.14 For U.S. space industry, this delay 
                                                
12Johnson-Freese. 
13Ibid. 
14Joan Johnson-Freese, “Life After the Cox 
Report: Technology Transfer and Export 
…the Chinese 
…were obtaining 
knowledge that 
helped upgrade 
their missile 
capabilities 
Space and Defense, Winter 2008 
 
 
15 
 
generally hurt their ability to compete globally. 
Each exchange of technical information or 
meeting to discuss such information with 
international personnel had to be sanctioned in 
advance through Technical Assistance 
Agreements, imposing significant disruptions 
upon normal business operations. These 
procedures made U.S. space technologies less 
competitive or not competitive as other states, 
such as the Europeans, aggressively moved in to 
fill the void. U.S. space technologies could now 
be replaced without degradation in performance, 
something not true earlier. 
 
Second, Great Britain, Canada, and NATO allies 
were placed under the same degree of scrutiny as 
China – the original impetus for the change. 
Beyond embarrassment, the treatment of class 
allies as adversaries put a temporary crimp in U.S. 
high-technology trade with them, a restriction that 
was quickly lifted but the political and trade 
damage was done.15 Given the perceived erratic 
nature of the ITAR process, at least one European 
space company removed any U.S. content from its 
products – removing U.S. ability to compete with 
other suppliers for that company’s COMSATs.16 
Other manufacturers of space technologies began 
to reduce the amount of American content in their 
products as a way to reduce U.S. interference in 
their ability to sell to whomever they wished. In 
fact, the European Space Agency advertises on its 
website regarding an “ITAR-free SpaceBus 
4000B2.”17 
Third, efforts by space industry to reverse this 
negative outcome by reusing the statute fell on 
deaf ears in Congress. Why these efforts failed is 
a mix of motives including reaction to events after 
                                                                               
Controls,” Pacific Telecommunications Review 
(August 1999),  web.ptc.org/library/ptr/3q99/ 
freese.html (accessed 15 August 2005). 
15Peter de Selding, "Satellite Buyers Blast US 
Rules," Space News (5 April 1999). 
16Antonella Bini, “Export Control of Space Items: 
Preserving Europe’s Advantage,” Space Policy 23 
(2007). 
17SeeThales-Alena, telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/ 
object/index.cfm?fobjectid=28086 (accessed 15 
September 2007). 
September 11, 2001 and heightened concerns 
about a resurgent Russia and surging China. The 
latter raised fears of possible future military 
confrontations in which space technologies would 
be major assets in the event of war. 
Administration policy emphasized a go it alone 
approach to many world issues– an approach that 
required the U.S. be dominant. Loss of its 
technological edge would leave the U.S. exposed 
to its enemies. Weakening the ITAR regime was 
seen as counterproductive to long term security 
interests. 
 
Ironically, ITAR from its initiation was premised 
on a world in which U.S. space technologies were 
the cutting edge. Successive presidential 
administrations worked to sustain that edge, 
which then could - with caution - be used in trade. 
The effect, it was thought, was to discourage other 
states with a few exceptions from competing with 
their own space technologies. U.S. policy 
consistently tried to keep its allies and others tied 
to the U.S. The costs of competition were 
sufficiently high that most states would not 
compete if they had ready access to high quality 
U.S. products. 
 
Beginning in 1986 with the Space Shuttle 
Challenger accident, that strategy has been 
chipped away. First in launch technologies, the 
U.S. fell behind in the global marketplace – that 
dominance had been artificially sustained by 
Space Shuttle subsidies that evaporated in the 
aftermath. Second, the changes in ITAR 
implementation cut U.S. trade ties with its 
existing customer base and rendered U.S. space 
technologies much less competitive in world 
markets. Customers lost are difficult to recover 
since satellite contracts come at intervals, not 
continuously. Assuming that the quality is roughly 
comparable customers are unlikely to return to a 
supplier thought more difficult and arbitrary. 
 
The Future, Such As It Is 
 
What has occurred is that the U.S. has succeeded 
in placing its space technology export trade in a 
“bubble.” Penetrating the bubble requires buyers 
to negotiate an often slow and arbitrary ITAR 
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16 
licensing process. Potential customers are being 
driven to other suppliers, and states capable of 
developing such space technologies, now as a 
result of U.S. actions, are encouraged to further 
develop their own equivalents. Once those steps 
are taken, it is difficult for those states to reverse 
their course. The reality is that choice, the U.S. 
has chosen to render its space industry less 
competitive.18 
 
By less competitive, we refer to the reality that 
other states are replacing the U.S. in the market 
place. In addition, U.S. policy, contrary to ITAR’s 
purpose, is forcing other states to become more 
heavily engaged in developing their own space 
technologies. The U.S. loses out when it becomes 
isolated within the global market place. Other 
states and their space professionals can no longer 
interact easily with U.S. professionals. Both sides 
lose, but the damage affects the U.S. more in the 
loss of cross-fertilization of ideas and 
technologies. 
 
                                                
18See Aldrin, 1998; and Taylor Dinerman, “Fixing 
ITAR: The Saga Continues,” The Space Review, 
16 May 2005, http://www.thespacereview.com/ 
article/374/1 (accessed 16 September 2007). 
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  Bureaucratic Politics Run Amok: 
The United States and Satellite Export Controls 
 
Dr. Eligar Sadeh 
 
  
The case of export controls of United States 
(U.S.) commercial satellites is characterized by 
bureaucratic politics leading to policy outcomes 
that are not rational, i.e., the desired outcome of 
national security is not met and commerce in the 
satellite sector is harmed. The constraints to 
rational policy making are a result of competition, 
conflict, and protectionism, the “bureaucratic 
politics,” among the relevant actors including the 
U.S. President and Congress, Department of State 
(State), Department of Commerce (Commerce), 
and Department of Defense (DOD). It is 
bureaucratic politics that result in policies for 
licensing the export of commercial satellites that 
are far from orderly, stable, and predictable.1 
 
The crux of the political issue revolves around 
bureaucratic control and jurisdiction over the 
licensing process for export of commercial 
satellites. Since commercial satellites represent a 
dual-use space technology,2 bureaucratic politics 
exist between the framing of export controls as a 
matter of national security versus a matter of 
business and commerce. The national security 
advocates, among them the president, congress, 
State, and DOD, view commercial satellites and 
the related technologies as items to be controlled 
for export within the same legal regime that 
controls export and trafficking of arms. State, 
through the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
Policy, is the bureaucratic entity that governs this 
                                                
1Joan-Johnson-Freese, “Alice in Licenseland: U.S. 
satellite export controls since 1990,” Space Policy 
16:3 (2000). 
2Commercial satellites are clearly intended for 
commercial use and applications, but do represent 
applications and technologies that could be used 
for military purposes and military satellite 
development. 
regime, known as the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the associated 
Munitions Control List (MCL).  DOD, through 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 
assists State in implementing its regulatory 
authority. 
 
The commercial space advocates, among them 
the president and congress, especially from 1988 
to 1998, Commerce, and the aerospace and 
defense industries, view commercial satellites as 
an indicator of U.S. leadership with a strong 
market share in the global commercial satellite 
sector. Logically, the way to regulate export of 
these satellites is through the legal regime that 
governs dual-use technologies used 
commercially. This is the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) administered by the 
Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security. 
Commerce governs exports through the 
Commerce Control List (CCL). From 1992 to 
1999, this regime applied directly to the export of 
commercial satellites. 
 
This commercially-oriented approach enabled 
China to compete within the U.S. market for the 
launch of commercial satellites. From 1992 to 
1996, the Chinese Long March rocket failed in 
launching commercial satellites manufactured by 
U.S. companies Hughes Space and 
Communications (purchased by Boeing in 2000) 
and Space Systems Loral. As required by the 
insurance companies covering these companies’ 
assets, investigations into the launch failures were 
concluded and submitted to Commerce for 
approval. Commerce then authorized Hughes and 
Loral to communicate the technical reports to the 
Chinese launch officials. The transfer of the 
reports sparked political controversy over the 
statutory authority of Commerce to allow such a 
Associate Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
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transfer without the proper review and oversight 
by the State Department. 
 
Specifically, the controversy focused on the 
export of knowledge dealing with the reliability 
of space launch vehicle technology, and more 
generally, was linked to the issue of ballistic 
missiles and U.S.-
Chinese relations. 
Congress 
investigated this 
issue of transfer 
through the 
Report of the 
Select Committee 
on U.S. National 
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with 
the Peoples’ Republic of China (known as the 
Cox Report), and determined that Hughes and 
Loral transferred to China, in violation of U.S. 
export control laws− the Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976 and the ITAR regime− missile design 
information and knowledge that improved the 
reliability of the Chinese Long March rocket 
useful for civil and military purposes.3 
 
The congressional response led to the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
that directed sole export control responsibility to 
the State Department using the ITAR/MCL 
regime for commercial satellites. State’s 
jurisdiction began in March of 1999, and 
continues through this writing in 2007. According 
to many space leaders, the application of ITAR to 
commercial space technologies is a 
                                                
3Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National 
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with 
the Peoples’ Republic of China (United States 
House of Representatives, 1999). See 
http://www.house.gov/coxreport (accessed 11 
December 2006). 
Both Boeing and Loral were fined by the U.S. 
federal government for the export violations and 
both companies paid fines in 2002. Boeing was 
also charged with similar export violations 
concerning Sea Launch− a joint venture with 
Russian, Ukrainian, and Norwegian companies− 
during this same period. 
misapplication of the regime and is one of the top 
space policy issues requiring congressional 
redress.4 
 
International and Domestic Environments 
 
To assess the case of export controls and 
commercial satellites, it is important to first 
explain how national security and commercial 
space advocates’ respective policy preferences, 
needs, wants, demands, and expectations, are 
influenced by the international and domestic 
environments. The international and domestic 
environments date back to the Cold War and the 
issue of how to control dual-use technologies. 
The concern, then and now, is that such 
technologies can be used for the development of 
arms that can lead to proliferation of ballistic 
missiles, and nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weaponry. Dual-use technologies with these 
potential applications are viewed by national 
security advocates as sensitive items to be 
controlled. 
 
One aspect of control lies with the statutory 
authority within the U.S. for dual-use 
technologies. This authority lies with the Export 
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 in which 
congress delegated to the executive branch the 
legal authority to regulate foreign commerce by 
controlling and licensing exports. EAA is the 
domestic environment from which the Commerce 
Department’s EAR regime emerged. Of note, the 
EAA expired in September 1990; reauthorization 
of EAA took place for short periods with the last 
incremental extension expiring in August of 
2001. Since then, no new congressional 
legislation has been passed to either reauthorize 
or rewrite EAA, and the regime functions on the 
basis of presidential authority under the 
International Emergency Economics Powers Act. 
 
                                                
4The Space Report: The Guide to Global Space 
Activities (Space Foundation, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, 2006); and Space 2030: Exploring the 
Future of Space Applications (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 
France, 2004). 
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Within the context of the post-September 11, 
2001 (9/11) environment and the resulting 
emphasis on national security, at times to the 
detriment of commercial interests, the 
congressional failure to act on the EAA further 
strengthens and maintains the State-led ITAR 
regime for control of commercial satellites. 
Furthermore, the origins of the EAA are Cold 
War related and originate from the Export 
Control Act of 1949. Even though the EAA of 
1979 represents a lessening of restrictive export 
control in comparison to the Export Control Act 
and subsequent amendments to that Act, the legal 
regime is a relic of Cold War international 
politics and national security rivalries.5 EAA has 
not been sufficiently adapted as an export control 
regime for the post Cold War international 
environment of non-traditional security concerns, 
developments in space technologies, capabilities 
and applications, and the emergence of global 
commercial space activities. 
 
A second aspect of control deals with the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, the basis for the 
ITAR export control regime. This regime was 
also established during the Cold War environment 
and has not undergone any statutory changes. 
Further, neither State nor DOD made any changes 
to the implementation modalities of any of these 
Cold War regimes.6 During 1999-2000, both the 
president and congress noted the need to review 
the arms export control regime to streamline the 
processing of applications for export licenses. 
Neither State nor DOD acted on these 
recommendations. The issue of delays and the 
cost of bureaucratic compliance in the granting of 
export licenses is one of the key concerns of the 
commercial space advocates; these concerns 
translate into an economic issue for the 
commercial satellite sector. The economic issue 
                                                
5Ian F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act: 
Evolution, Provisions, and Debate (United States 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, updated May 5, 2005). 
6Defense Trade, Arms Export Control System in 
the Post-9/11 Environment (United States 
Government Accountability Report, February 
2005). 
also posits a barrier to entry for new space 
commercial companies, often referred to as 
alternative space, that are attempting to enter into 
existing markets, such as space launch services, 
or to develop new markets, such as space tourism. 
A third aspect dealing with the control issue 
exists at the international level. In 1949, a 
multilateral export control regime called the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (CoCom), involving North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, was 
established. This regime mirrored U.S. domestic 
controls as established with the Export Control 
Act of 1949. CoCom advanced restrictive export 
controls on sensitive dual-use technologies at the 
multilateral level. The regime was dissolved in 
1994 and replaced in 1996 by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement, as 
compared to CoCom, lessened export controls of 
dual-use technologies at the international level 
and is more loosely organized with more limited 
institutional structures. It relies on consensus by 
state members, frequently resulting in a lowest 
common denominator approach for multilateral 
export control, minimal reporting requirements 
preventing pre-export consultations among state 
members, and a lack of authority among state 
members to block transactions of other state 
members.7 In addition, the liberal multilateral 
regime that emerged with Wassenaar no longer 
sought multilateral control over commercial 
satellite technology or expertise. This 
development influenced the U.S. environment 
and raised national security concerns when 
dealing with the export of dual-use technologies. 
In the end, the liberalization of the international 
legal regime is a factor that favors the national 
security space advocates’ position and their 
preference for ITAR as the regime to control and 
license exports of commercial satellites and the 
related technologies. 
 
                                                
7Ian F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act: 
Evolution, Provisions, and Debate (United States 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, updated May 5, 2005). 
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Communications Channels 
 
Given an understanding of the policy preferences 
of the relevant actors, what then are the 
communications channels through which the 
policy of export control is applied? This is largely 
a function of the relevant bureaucratic strategic 
cultures. The strategic cultures of the national 
security advocates versus the space commerce 
advocates frame the political debates and 
arguments. This framing represents the 
organizational lenses, images, and “rules of the 
game” regarding export controls of commercial 
satellites. 
 
Commercial space advocates frame the export 
control issue through the lens of foreign 
availability of technology. The contention is that 
the proliferation of technology cannot be 
effectively controlled and U.S. dominance of 
space technology cannot be assumed. The 
globalization of space commerce points to the 
fact that unilateral controls will not stop foreign 
states from acquiring the technologies. Thus, U.S. 
dominance in space commerce is diminished, 
while foreign businesses win new markets and 
gain incentives to enter into new markets.8 All 
this is complicated by the fact that as space 
commerce is increasingly global many 
components in the commercial satellite sector are 
manufactured worldwide and considered 
commercial commodities. ITAR is not designed 
to deal with the global nature of the industry and 
the outcome provides an incentive for foreign 
commercial satellite developers to reduce 
dependence on U.S. satellite components due to 
delays associated with the U.S. export licensing 
process. The emerging trend is one where U.S. 
satellite manufacturing companies, which must 
                                                
8Export controls on space commerce create risk 
through uncertainties, result in losses of markets 
because of impacts on space industry’s ability to 
serve international markets, and prevent efficient 
industry restructuring to the forces of 
globalization. See Space 2030: Exploring the 
Future of Space Applications (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 
France, 2004). 
adhere to ITAR restrictions, are at a growing 
disadvantage as inventory of “ITAR-free,” i.e., no 
U.S. manufactured components, satellites expand 
abroad.9 
 
In addition to the economic argument, space 
commerce advocates see a link between national 
security and robust export control industries, and 
favor an export control regime that is streamlined, 
less complex, and not an impediment to exports. 
As an example, Commerce presumes that the 
issuing of an export license is routine unless good 
cause can be shown otherwise. Space commerce 
advocates argue that national security is 
undermined when exports are impeded, resulting 
in the loss of U.S. market 
share. The limitation of U.S. 
satellite components through 
export controls leads to greater 
foreign research and 
development (R&D) 
investments in this area. In 
turn, these foreign R&D 
investments can be leveraged 
to achieve parity and even 
surpass the U.S. technological 
lead. In conclusion, space 
commerce advocates frame 
commercial satellite 
technology as possessing no inherent strategic or 
military relevance, a view shared with the state 
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement with the 
exception of the U.S.10 
                                                
9In Europe, Alcatel Alenia Space and the 
European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
Company have both made it company policy to 
build ITAR-free commercial satellites. 
10Wassenaar Arrangement state members in 
addition to the U.S., include: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and United Kingdom. 
 
ITAR is 
not 
designed 
to deal 
with the 
global 
nature of 
the 
industry 
Space and Defense, Winter 2008 
 
21 
 
In contrast, the national security advocates 
maintain that there is a need to control 
commercial space exports as sensitive military 
technologies. This control prevents the 
proliferation of technologies that could be used by 
hostile, rogue states against the U.S. or its allies, 
secures DOD’s reliance on the commercial sector 
for R&D as a result of declining defense budgets 
in the 1990s, and sustains the U.S. military use of 
commercial space assets for operations, including 
commercial satellites for telecommunications and 
remote sensing purposes. National security is 
framed in ideological and “war-fighting” terms− 
limiting the diffusion of technology advances U.S. 
foreign policy interests and enhances national 
security. The framing of export control as a 
national security issue compelled congress to 
place commercial satellites and related 
technologies within the authority of the 
ITAR/MCL regime.11 The Chinese Long March 
“satellite scandal” discussed earlier and the events 
of 9/11 served to strengthen this worldview and 
weaken political attempts to reform the export 
control regime. 
 
Conversion and Outputs 
 
Since the view herein is that the case of export 
controls is one of bureaucratic politics leading to 
policy outcomes that are not rational, how the 
relevant organizations interact, i.e., the U.S. 
President and Congress, and the relevant 
bureaucracies, is crucial to understand. A rational 
policy-making process suggest outputs that serve 
the desired communications channels of at least 
one group of advocates. In this case, the policy 
outputs, albeit unintended, do not ideally realize 
the policy preferences of either the national 
security or commercial space advocates. On one 
hand, ITAR can damage national security by 
placing legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the 
U.S. military use of commercial space assets that 
                                                
11It is the sense of the U.S. Congress that business 
interests must not be placed above national 
security interests. See Strom Thurmond National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. 
rely on a robust satellite industry.12 This includes 
risks to the military use of: commercial satellites 
for operational support; advanced satellite 
technologies developed in the commercial sector; 
and foreign suppliers for satellite components and 
services needed for military operations. On the 
other hand, export control of commercial 
satellites vis-à-vis ITAR has made the U.S. space 
and satellite component industry less competitive 
internationally and contributed to a weakening of 
U.S. market position.13 
 
How did the issue of export controls of 
commercial satellites result in policy outputs that 
are not desired? The answer to this question lies 
in the nature of how the relevant political actors 
serve as conversion structures. Prior to 1992, 
export control of commercial satellites fell within 
the purview of the ITAR regime, but beginning in 
1988 President Reagan began to loosen export 
restrictions on commercial satellites to keep U.S. 
                                                
12Thomas Moorman, U.S. Space Industrial Base 
Study (Booz-Allen & Hamilton: McLean, 
Virginia, 2000). 
13Since the application of the ITAR regime for 
export control of commercial satellites in March 
1999, U.S. global share of commercial satellite 
manufacturing revenues fell to 41% in 2005 from 
51% in 2000; U.S. commercial satellite 
component suppliers captured 90% of the global 
market in 1995, whereas by 2000 they retained 
only 56%; U.S. satellite firms lost approximately 
$5 billion between March 1999 and the end of 
2001; and, from 1999 to 2004, it is estimated that 
U.S. share of the lucrative geostationary satellite 
market declined by 16%. See State of the Satellite 
Industry Report (Futron Corporation, Washington, 
DC, June 2006); Robert D. Lamb, Satellites, 
Security, and Scandal: Understanding the Politics 
of Export Controls (University of Maryland, 
College Park, Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland, January 2005); 
Space 2030: Exploring the Future of Space 
Applications (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris, France, 
2004); and State of the Space Industry 
(International Space Business Council, 
Washington, DC, 2000). 
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industry competitive in global markets and to 
advance national space policy for the 
development of the commercial space sector. The 
following Bush and Clinton administrations 
shared these policy preferences and acted to these 
ends. Bush and Clinton used presidential legal 
authority to waive trade sanctions with China put 
in place through congressional legislation 
following the Tiananmen Square massacre. The 
sanctions waived included commercial satellites 
for export to launch on the Chinese Long March. 
The policy conflict between the president and 
congress set the stage for the Chinese satellite 
scandal and the resulting 1999 congressional 
legislation that reversed the loosening of export 
controls initiated by Reagan. 
 
The theme of policy 
conflict continued as 
Bush made use of 
presidential authority 
to extend EAA and 
pocket vetoed a 
congressional bill that 
would have amended 
and extended the full 
EAA on a permanent 
basis.14 In this bill, 
congress took more 
of a national security 
position on the export 
of dual-use items in conflict with Bush’s post 
Cold War commercial view for the increased role 
of economic power in national security. Bush 
sustained this view by removing all items from 
MCL that were on the CoCom dual-use list. This 
led to split jurisdiction, from 1992-1996, between 
State and Commerce for export controls. An 
interagency review process initiated by Bush 
determined which of the dual-use items listed on 
MCL could be transferred to CCL. Under the 
Commerce Department’s business-friendly 
licensing process, these transfers made it easier to 
export some commercial satellites for foreign 
launches. Less advanced commercial satellites 
                                                
14The congressional bill pocket vetoed by 
President Bush was the Omnibus Export 
Amendments Act of 1990. 
were exported as commercial goods under the 
EAR regime. Throughout the story of commercial 
satellite export controls, State and Commerce 
have both sought influence and authority, and 
split jurisdiction was viewed by the actors as a 
compromise way to resolve this dispute.15 
Nevertheless, the differences in strategic cultures 
of each bureaucracy sustained the struggle for 
political influence over export controls. 
 
As a result of split jurisdiction, the technical 
parameters for determining whether commercial 
satellites should be treated as munitions or dual-
use commercial goods became unworkable by 
1995. One of the issues that emerged was that the 
export regulatory bureaucracies at Commerce, 
State, and Defense lacked the requisite technical 
expertise to determine which technologies to 
control as munitions versus which could be 
exported as commercial commodities.16 This was 
exacerbated by the fact that regulatory monitors 
were asked to implement near impossible tasks− 
apply overlapping, self-contradictory rigid sets of 
rules and track all hardware for export without 
explicit guidance on what to protect for reasons of 
national security and what are commercial 
commodities. Consequently, split jurisdiction was 
abandoned as a policy preference by the actors. In 
October 1996, and until March 1999, congress 
assigned Commerce primary jurisdiction. Since 
then, commercial satellites and related 
technologies are listed on MCL and regulated for 
export by State. 
 
The moves undertaken by the political actors to 
transfer jurisdiction to Commerce were met with 
countermoves by State export officials 
determined to exert their full authority to the 
extent permissible by law. The political process 
                                                
15Marcia S. Smith, Space Launch Vehicles: 
Government Activities, Commercial Competition, 
and Satellite Exports (United States 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, updated 1 January 2006). 
16Preserving America’s Strength in Satellite 
Technology, A Report of the CSIS Satellite 
Commission (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, DC, 2002). 
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underlying the transfer to Commerce’s 
jurisdiction was characterized by bureaucratic 
politics and conflicts. Both export control 
bureaucracies sought regulatory authority and 
their self-interest to do so became a goal in-and-
of-itself. The bureaucratic politics concept that 
“where you sit defines who you are” applies 
directly in this case; State and Commerce 
regulators were explicitly tied to the strategic 
cultural perspectives of their organizations. As 
policy preferences for Commerce’s jurisdiction 
moved to fruition by 1996, State pursued 
enforcement regulations that made it increasingly 
difficult and costly for satellite companies to 
export if even a single component remained 
subject to State control through MCL. 
 
Congressional reaction to the Chinese affair and 
the sustained efforts of national security 
advocates advancing their case for export controls 
led to congressional legislation that resulted in 
sole State jurisdiction in 1999. This action was 
reactive rather than rational. One indication of 
this is that the export violations committed by 
Hughes, Loral, and Boeing did not damage U.S. 
national security in any material way; the 
expertise transferred to China only marginally 
benefited Chinese missile programs by improving 
launch reliability.17 Many of the breaches were 
little more than technical violations of State 
export control regulations dealing with services 
that could “in theory” be applied for national 
security purposes.18 
 
The policy output of State jurisdiction is 
suboptimal; rather than seeking a compromise, 
State countered the preferred policy preferences 
of the commercial space advocates. Given the 
drive for bureaucratic self-preservation, State 
                                                
17Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National 
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with 
the Peoples’ Republic of China (United States 
House of Representatives, 1999). 
18Robert D. Lamb, Satellites, Security, and 
Scandal: Understanding the Politics of Export 
Controls (University of Maryland, College Park, 
Center for International and Security Studies at 
Maryland, January 2005). 
took the congressional mandate for sole 
jurisdiction and unilaterally implemented its 
approach, through administrative rule making, to 
realize its national security perspective. 
 
This raises a number of issues. First is the issue of 
what was intended by the Cox Report 
recommendations, which had prompted congress 
to give State commercial satellite licensing 
authority. It is not clear whether the 
recommendations intended to control the export 
diffusion of technology from solely a national 
security standpoint, or to control the technology 
diffusion in a way to satisfy both national security 
and commercial advocates’ preferences. This 
ambiguity provided State the opportunity to 
advance their national security perspective. 
Concomitantly, officials at State expressed their 
desire to work with space commercial businesses 
by facilitating and approving ITAR applications, 
and viewed the political problem as rooted in the 
congressional mandate for State’s sole 
jurisdiction and enforcement of the export control 
law.19 In fact, State does approve the vast 
majority of export license applications.20 The 
issue with the export control of commercial 
satellites within the ITAR regime is not one of 
denial of licenses, but rather in how State 
enforces the law. Enforcement leads to excessive 
delays and bureaucratic compliance with export 
regulations that are a cost to the commercial 
satellite sector. 
 
What is also clear is that State is enforcing the 
law in ways that are not necessarily what 
congress intended, yet congress itself fails to act 
on this problem. To illustrate, the Cox Report 
called for: congressional reauthorization of EAA; 
continuous updating of the export control regime; 
and streamlining the licensing procedures to 
provide greater transparency, predictability, and 
                                                
19Interview, Ann Ganzer, Director of the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls Policy, Department of 
State, The Space Show, 12 February 2006. See 
www.thespaceshow.com (accessed 4 June 2007). 
20Since the listing of commercial satellites within 
the ITAR export control regime in 1999, only 1% 
to 2% of all export license requests are denied. 
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certainty. In all these areas, neither State nor 
congress took any substantive actions. Not only 
did State act unilaterally to do other than what 
was recommended by the Cox Report, but 
congress also failed in its basic oversight role to 
hold State accountable to congressional policy 
preferences. This dynamic, together with the 
events of 9/11, stalled reform advocates’ efforts. 
Although there is pending legislation in congress 
to follow through on the Cox Report 
recommendations, the advocates are in the 
minority. The proposed congressional Satellite 
Trade and Security Act of 2001 went as far as to 
restore Commerce jurisdiction, though the 
measure failed to advance, and through the 110th 
Congress of today there have been no serious 
attempts to introduce subsequent legislation or to 
put the issue on the agenda.21 Other barriers to 
reform include export risks and organizational 
constraints on expediting State’s process for 
exporting commercial satellites.22 These barriers 
stem from the fact that technical expertise at State 
and Defense is lacking. Even though some 
incremental advances in addressing these barriers 
have taken place, as recommended by the Cox 
Report, the policy lesson of spilt jurisdiction is 
that determining risk is in many ways unworkable 
and the control of satellite exports through the 
national security lens does not readily lend itself 
to streamlining the licensing process. 
 
A congressional bill to expedite the State 
Department process for exporting commercial 
satellites, particularly to states considered friendly 
to the U.S., such as NATO allies and other major 
non-NATO allies, was signed into law in 2004. 
With this bill, every effort was made to allay 
national security concerns, while attempting to 
find ways to not only sell commercial satellites 
                                                
21In addition to the Satellite Trade and Security 
Act of 2001, congressional sponsors have 
proposed amendments to the Export 
Administration Act and other separate bills that 
would return export licensing authority for 
commercial satellites to Commerce. 
22The inability to accurately measure risk to 
national security is one of the most serious 
problems for the system of export controls. 
abroad, but to allow the transfer of information 
necessary to bid on new projects as well as 
respond to business requests for information on 
existing systems. Of note is that in 2000, 
following the Cox Report recommendations, 
congress allocated additional funds to State to 
allow for addressing the issues of technical 
expertise and expediting the licensing process. At 
that time, State unilaterally acted to shift these 
funds within the bureaucracy away from the 
congressional intent. The 2004 mandate by 
congress is more closely monitored, and State is 
working to deal with the expertise and delay 
barriers. One significant effort underway is the 
development of an electronic filing system for 
export licenses at State. 
 
The policy dynamic discussed earlier, State 
countering Commerce, persisted under sole State 
jurisdiction. State unilaterally reversed the 
Commerce approach that exempted many items 
from requiring licenses,23 extended ITAR controls 
to U.S. allies for commercial satellites,24 and 
advanced regulations that required return of 
hardware to its state of origin for repair. State also 
issued retroactive regulations for the Technology 
Assistance Agreements (TAAs) governing 
technology transfers for satellites that had been 
licensed by Commerce. TAAs are required for 
marketing discussions and the exchange of basic 
                                                
23Commerce exempted basic items, like screws 
and knobs for example, from export control. 
24The Strom Thurmond National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 included 
language that MCL shall not necessarily apply to 
the “export of a satellite or related items for 
launch in, or by nationals of, a state that is a 
member of NATO, or that is a major non-NATO 
ally of the United States.” In implementing ITAR, 
State interpreted this exception to apply only to 
the mandated monitoring activities. Further, the 
expanded definitions of satellite related 
components, and the additions of defense 
technical services and space insurance business 
meetings as new areas needing export licenses, 
led to the bureaucratic “micro-regulation” of the 
U.S. commercial satellite industry in response to 
accusations initially related to China. 
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technical information with insurance companies 
and launch service providers for satellites 
exported and launched. State’s retroactive 
approach created a situation where new 
technology transfer licenses and TAAs had to be 
issued for satellites already operating in orbit. 
State even acted to reverse Reagan’s decision that 
exempted fundamental research information from 
an export license.25 Export directives to control 
such information affect the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), universities, 
and industry R&D as they require licenses for any 
collaboration with foreign nationals on 
fundamental research. In addition, State and 
Defense practice intrusive monitoring, allowing 
monitors’ access to proprietary knowledge. 
Despite this, industry has not objected in any 
direct way due to a fear of congressional reaction 
and their dependence on governmental 
contracts.26 
 
Conclusions 
 
The commercial satellite export case posits 
damaging consequences for U.S. technology and 
business leadership in space. The political process 
began with the incremental political liberalization 
of export controls in response to the changing 
international post Cold War environment and the 
rapid increase in space commerce globally. The 
process then transitioned to congressional action 
to overturn the then existing satellite export 
control regime in favor of Commerce jurisdiction. 
All the while, the process was driven by 
bureaucratic politics between Commerce and 
State. In the context of the post 9/11 world and 
the security concerns the attack generated, the 
                                                
25In 1985, President Regan issued an ITAR 
exemption for fundamental research conducted at 
U.S. universities. National Security Decision 
Directive 189, 21 September 1985. 
26In March of 2007, the Coalition for Security and 
Competitiveness, that does include a number of 
professional associations that represent the 
aerospace industry, began advocating for export 
control reform on dual-use items. See 
www.securityandcompetitiveness.org (accessed 
25 June 2007). 
general sense was that U.S. business and 
commercial interests should never trump national 
security interests. State succeeded in advancing 
their national security worldview as the U.S. 
national interest, a costly situation for commercial 
space and their advocates. 
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Chasing Satellites: Identifying Export Control Problems and Solutions 
 
John Douglass 
 
 
In a globalized world where the United States 
(U.S.) faces threats from terrorist groups, rogue 
states, and others, effective export controls remain 
essential to our national security. These controls 
keep our most advanced technologies, weapons, 
and equipment out of the hands of our adversaries 
and rivals— an increasingly difficult task. 
 
With these emerging security and economic 
challenges, however, technological cooperation 
with friends and allies is critical. Global trade can 
leverage the technological competitiveness and 
innovation of the U.S. industry and our foreign 
friends to build interoperability, trust, and 
capabilities critical to keeping the nation secure 
and advancing our interests abroad. This 
cooperation strengthens America’s technological 
edge, sustains the industrial base, and enhances 
economic security. 
 
Technology trade and cooperation, which is often 
subject to export controls, play a central role in 
supporting the aerospace and defense industry’s 
630,000 American jobs.1 According to Aerospace 
Industries Association (AIA) estimates, U.S. 
aerospace companies posted a $54.8 billion trade 
surplus in 2006, while the nation’s merchandise 
import-export deficit exceeded $600 billion.2 The 
                                                
1Aerospace Facts and Figures, www.aia-
aerospace.org/stats/stats.cfm (accessed 5 
November 2007). 
2The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) 
represents more than 100 regular and 180 
associate member companies, and operates as the 
largest professional organization in the United 
States across three lines of business: space 
systems, national defense, and civil aviation. AIA 
represents a total high-technology workforce of 
aerospace industry exports 40 percent of its total 
product and, during some economic quarters, 
nearly 70 percent of its civil aircraft and 
components.3 
 
The current U.S. export control system hurts the 
aerospace industry’s ability to effectively support 
the nation’s security and economic interests. This 
outdated system also increases costs and risk in 
our programs and closes off business 
opportunities with U.S. customers, partners, and 
allies. As a result, our friends abroad are losing 
trust in our ability to exchange technology in a 
timely and rational manner. These challenges are 
particularly acute in the space sector of the 
aerospace industry. Export control process and 
policy barriers continue to rise even as political, 
scientific, and business trends have led the U.S. to 
rely more heavily on foreign partners for cost-
effective technologies, scientific talent, and sales 
and opportunities to sustain the U.S. industrial 
base. 
 
Numerous studies, ongoing and recent, are aiming 
to establish a causal link between export controls 
and challenges facing the American space 
industrial base. These studies all focus on the 
impact of Section 1513(a) of the Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999, which shifted export control 
jurisdiction of commercial satellites and related 
items from the Commerce Department, which is 
responsible for licensing “dual-use” exports, to 
the State Department, which monitors the 
licensing of U.S. munitions list exports. 
 
                                                                               
640,000 that manufactures products for customers 
around the world. 
3AIA Aerospace Facts and Figures. 
Aerospace Industries Association President (Retired December 2007) 
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Challenges to the Export Control System 
 
The U.S. export control system was designed 
during an era of U.S. technological dominance, a 
time in our history clearly defined by a bipolar 
security environment and bilateral trade. 
Protecting access to U.S. technology, the system’s 
primary imperative, was much more easily 
accomplished under those circumstances. Trends 
in globalization, technology, and security threats 
have both redefined the system’s standard of 
effectiveness and made the job much more 
difficult. 
 
Globalization 
has created an 
interdependence 
between the 
U.S. and its 
foreign partners 
that is both 
valuable and 
irreversible. It is 
no longer 
possible, or even 
desirable, for American companies to have purely 
domestic supply chains or focus exclusively on 
the domestic market. Foreign-sourced technology 
is sometimes better and more cost effective, and 
foreign customers offer sales opportunities that 
can make up for shortfalls in U.S. public and 
private sector acquisition. The new flow of 
information and technology is no longer a 
bilateral exchange, but a multilateral network with 
each move often requiring an export license. 
These factors account for the eight percent annual 
growth rate in export license applications cited by 
the State Department in the last few years.4 
 
The export control system is tasked with 
evaluating the export of each element of 
technology, from data to components to entire 
                                                
4Opening Statement of Chairman Brad Sherman, 
House Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation and Trade, Hearing on Exports 
Controls: Are We Protecting Security and 
Facilitating Exports, 26 July 2007. 
weapons platforms, for security risks. The private 
sector drives today’s technological innovation at a 
level of complexity difficult to monitor, let alone 
thoroughly understand, by a government-operated 
export control system. Even modern 
“commercial” technology is increasingly 
sophisticated and arguably at some level capable 
of “military uses.” Taken together, these two 
dynamics force the government to rely on 
industry, from primes to the lowest supplier, to 
know what licenses they should apply for and 
when, and woe to the company that gets the 
answers to those questions wrong. Liability 
concerns of the regulator and the manufacturer 
result in risk-averse behavior from both parties, 
causing the proliferation of both arguably 
unnecessary license applications that clog the 
system and of inordinately stringent decisions on 
what can be exported and under what conditions. 
 
Changes in the global security environment 
exacerbate the risk-averse licensing behavior. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the U.S. has focused on addressing security 
threats from both traditional states and sub-state 
actors who can and do operate in the same places 
where the U.S. is sending technology. Moreover, 
our allies no longer share with the U.S. our 
position regarding the level or source of these 
threats, or the appropriate response to them. 
Consequently, licensing exports to even our 
closest allies can be viewed as risky to a 
government regulator. 
 
In the end, both the political and economic 
resources necessary to address these trends have 
been absent in the U.S. export control system. 
Companies have repeatedly voiced concern that 
processing times are unpredictable and often 
extend 60 to 90 days before the review process is 
even initiated. Decisions and conditions on similar 
licenses can vary considerably and can, at times, 
even contradict the regulations governing the 
export control process. 
 
All too often, discussions of the problems with the 
U.S. export control system move into esoteric 
realms of regulatory interpretation and legislative 
Changes in the 
global security 
environment 
exacerbate the 
risk-averse 
licensing behavior. 
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intent, relying on anecdotal rather than verifiable 
justification. While there may be a vague 
consensus that some problems exist within the 
export control system, industry has struggled to 
convince the administration or U.S. Congress to 
take action, let alone provide compelling 
solutions. 
 
Commercial Satellites and Why Studies on the 
Space Industrial Base Matter 
 
The application of export controls to commercial 
satellites illustrates the impact of these trends and 
the futility of past attempts to achieve substantive 
policy change. To address the transfer of data 
from U.S. companies to Chinese authorities after 
the failed attempt of a Chinese rocket to launch a 
U.S. commercial satellite, congress passed 
legislation in the 1999 Strom Thurmond National 
Defense Authorization Act placing commercial 
satellites and related items on the U.S. munitions 
list. The transfer of commercial satellites, their 
components and any technical data to a foreign 
entity is now subject to the most stringent 
licensing treatment of the federal government, the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
and its associated munitions list. 
 
As a result, U.S. commercial satellite 
manufacturers forego sales to China or use of 
Chinese launch vehicles and obtain licenses for all 
other foreign sales or launches. The time, effort, 
and cost of obtaining these licenses are onerous, 
but manageable, given the downturn in sales 
opportunities for commercial satellites in recent 
years.5 The consequences of this policy shift have 
been much more significant, however, for 
commercial satellite component manufacturers. 
 
To respond to any Request for Proposal (RFP) 
from a foreign commercial satellite manufacturer, 
a U.S. component manufacturer must first obtain a 
license to send relevant technical and marketing 
data.  While the queue for all munitions list export 
licenses has grown, each license in the queue has 
also become that much more complex and 
therefore takes that much longer to evaluate. 
                                                
5AIA Aerospace Facts and Figures. 
Assuming a U.S. component manufacturer gets a 
license in time to compete for and win a given 
contract, subsequent communications and 
hardware transfers between the U.S. manufacturer 
and its foreign customer are all subject to advance 
licensing requirements. Changes in the conditions 
of the transfer, such as allowing a new person in a 
foreign company to access the information or 
transferring information to another third-party, are 
commonplace in global manufacturing, but would 
result in a need for new licenses. Once a 
component on the U.S. munitions list is 
incorporated into any system, commercial or 
military, the government must give its approval, 
possibly with conditions, before that system is 
moved or sold. 
 
The mounting frustration of foreign commercial 
satellite manufacturers under these circumstances 
is both reasonable and unsurprising. The ability of 
U.S. component manufacturers to respond to 
requests for information or meet shipment 
deadlines can be called into doubt when export 
licenses are required. In practice, regulators often 
interpret ITAR to require licenses for all U.S.-
origin components, including nuts, bolts, washers, 
and hoses designed or modified for use in a 
commercial satellite, irrespective of how 
innocuous or low-tech they may appear. Since 
foreign manufacturers do not know who will 
eventually buy their satellites, they are wary of 
seeking permission from the U.S. government for 
the eventual movements of these components 
either to complete the manufacturing process or 
the eventual sale of what they believe is a purely 
commercial product. This is especially true if it 
means abandoning the Chinese market, to which 
foreign commercial satellite manufacturers have 
exclusive access in the absence of any U.S. 
competitors. 
 
Two responses to these frustrations have 
negatively impacted American satellite 
component manufacturers. First, the number of 
foreign commercial satellite component 
manufacturers who would otherwise not have 
been viable competition against U.S. 
manufacturers has grown steadily. These foreign 
component manufacturers, unencumbered by 
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licensing requirements and often with the 
financial support of their home governments, have 
successfully taken away market share from U.S. 
companies.6 The second response, a preference 
both state and unstated for acquisition of “ITAR-
free” components by foreign commercial satellite 
manufacturers and their customers, has 
compounded the impact on U.S. commercial 
satellite component manufacturers.7 
 
In the nine years since the Strom Thurmond 
National Defense Authorization Act, the 
aerospace and defense industry has been 
unsuccessful in arguing for a need to revisit the 
application of export controls on commercial 
satellites and related components. The external 
barriers to change can be traced, in part, to 
legitimate concerns about compromising U.S. 
national security interests with hasty policy 
adjustments and the strained relationship between 
the relevant congressional committees, the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and the State Department 
when it comes to addressing export control 
matters. These tensions have previously 
preempted any productive discussion of 
viewpoints, let alone identification of ways to 
improve the status-quo management of the export 
control system. 
 
The aerospace industry also shoulders part of the 
blame. The industry’s inability to provide 
definitive proof of the damage inflicted by the 
current system has been an obstacle to a 
successful campaign for this policy issue. 
Sympathetic officials within congress and the 
administration have, for years, asked for industry 
cooperation to quantify the impact of the 
regulations. The recent proliferation of 
government supported studies on export controls 
and the space industrial base are a response to the 
absence of reliable data.8 
                                                
6Ibid. 
7“China's Rocket Service Makes Inroads, Irks 
U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2007. 
8The Space Policy Institute, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Organization for 
The initial explanation for this data void was to 
point out the challenge of isolating the impact of 
export controls on a loss of sales compared to a 
general downturn in the commercial satellite 
marketplace. There are times when companies 
lose contracts without being given a reason why 
or choose not to bid on a contract because they 
know they cannot meet RFP deadlines, which 
have shrunk considerably over the years as 
customers embrace greater options among non-
U.S. component manufacturers, and no longer 
have to work with timetables convenient for U.S. 
manufacturers. 
 
The other challenge 
faced by our industry 
is the difficulty in 
acting collectively on 
such a sensitive issue. 
No company wants to 
be the “poster child” 
for export control 
problems, especially 
if it is trying to 
convince customers 
that it can be a 
reliable supplier in spite of export license 
requirements. In some cases, companies that may 
have faced enough challenges to overcome their 
hesitation to “testify” either decided to abandon 
the product line or went out of business. 
 
Despite these challenges, interest in export 
controls has recently surged within the 
administration and the U.S. Congress for three 
reasons. First, security and economic cooperation 
in the international arena is the new status-quo for 
the government, the military, and the private 
sector. Second, compliance challenges with export 
control policies and processes are more complex. 
Compliance-related delays or failing to conduct 
business because of compliance requirements 
                                                                               
Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Space 
Foundation have all completed studies on export 
controls and the space industrial base between 
2001-2007. 
the industry’s 
inability to 
provide 
definitive proof 
of the damage 
inflicted…has 
been an 
obstacle 
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have more apparent security, economic, and even 
civil impacts than ever before.9 Third, compliance 
challenges are no longer just the concern of a few 
large companies. Suppliers are becoming more 
internationally oriented, despite a lack of 
experience and resources to navigate the maze of 
U.S. export controls. AIA and its partners in the 
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness have 
spent the last year supporting and spreading this 
growing interest. In the process, the hope is to 
create a hospitable policy environment for the 
results and recommendations of these satellite and 
space industrial base studies.  
 
The Coalition for Security and 
Competitiveness 
 
AIA is a founding member of the Coalition for 
Security and Competitiveness, an alliance of 
eighteen industry and trade associations 
committed to developing a modernized export 
control system. The coalition is advocating the 
development of a modern export control system 
that: 
• accurately identifies and 
safeguards sensitive and 
militarily critical technologies; 
• enhances U.S. technological 
leadership and global industrial 
competitiveness through more 
responsive and efficient 
regulatory management;  
• facilitates defense trade and 
technological exchange with 
allies and trusted partners; 
                                                
9For instance, during a hearing in July in the 
House Science and Technology Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Tommy 
Holloway, chair of the congressionally-mandated 
International Space Station (ISS) Independent 
Safety Task Force warned that International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions 
and objections by NASA’s International Partners 
(IPs) to signing what the IPs believe are redundant 
Technical Assistance Agreements “are a threat to 
the safe and successful integration and operation 
of the Station.” 
• supports a strong U.S. 
technology industrial base and 
highly-skilled workforce; 
• and promotes greater 
multilateral cooperation with 
our friends and allies on export 
controls.10 
A predictable, efficient, and transparent export 
control system should enable America’s broader 
national security strategy. The coalition has 
argued that the current export control system lacks 
these three basic qualities. The government must 
do a better job of making decisions on export 
authorizations in a timely manner. The Coalition 
would like to see a system that can deliver 
decisions on 95 percent of all license applications 
in 30 days, not the current 55-plus days it often 
takes.11 The license process must also be 
predictably consistent with applicable laws, 
regulations, and policies. Comparable export 
applications under the same conditions should 
receive the same or similar approvals in the same 
or similar time frames. The rules governing the 
license process must be interpreted and used 
consistently, and the U.S. industry and its foreign 
partners should be able to quickly and easily 
access the status of their applications. The current 
system is paradoxically hurting national security, 
U.S. economic strength, and U.S. technological 
competitiveness, and the problems will only 
continue to worsen if no action is taken. 
 
The coalition has focused its first phase of action 
on improvements to the current system that could 
have an immediate, positive impact on 
predictability, efficiency, and transparency in 
license processing. These recommendations were 
intended to be measurable, attainable, and 
meaningful. The coalition also agreed to focus, at 
least initially, on process improvements that the 
administration could implement under existing 
statutes. Meanwhile, mindful of congressional 
                                                
10Additional information on the Coalition for 
Security and Competitiveness and its associated 
proposals can be accessed at 
www.securityandcompetitiveness.org (accessed 
15 November 2007). 
11Ibid. 
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interest in this issue, the coalition is organizing 
briefings with congressional committees and 
offices on the importance of this issue and how 
the coalition’s proposals will help pave the way 
for a complete reexamination of the system. 
 
Since commercial satellites and their components 
are regulated by the U.S. munitions list, the 
coalition’s defense trade proposals are profoundly 
relevant and cut across all parts of the federal 
government.12 The coalition has called on the 
White House to restate the strategic policy 
principles that govern the operation of the U.S. 
export control system. This statement should 
highlight the need to capture the full security and 
economic benefits of prudent technology 
exchange with our friends and allies. The 
coalition also recommends the appointment of a 
senior director at the National Security Council to 
focus on conventional defense and dual-use 
export controls by separating these issues from the 
non-proliferation portfolio. The coalition has 
called for the creation of a new presidential 
advisory body to establish a dialogue between the 
executive branch, congress, and industry on 
defense trade and technology cooperation. 
 
While the coalition is not challenging the 
administration’s national security determinations 
on transactions, decisions need to be made 
consciously, consistently, and clearly at the 
policy-making level. This is especially critical for 
the rules governing the commodity jurisdiction 
process, a process that determines whether the 
State Department or Commerce Department has 
jurisdiction over an export authorization. A 
significant number of export licenses that clog up 
the current system may, in fact, be unnecessary if 
the interagency process that evaluates such 
                                                
12Statement of U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), Director for Acquisition and 
Sourcing, Ann Calvaresi-Barr, House 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and 
Trade, Hearing on Exports Controls: Are We 
Protecting Security and Facilitating Exports, 26 
July 2007. 
transactions all follow the same regulatory 
interpretation. 
 
In commodity jurisdiction and other policy-related 
cases where the interagency process must come to 
a consensus decision, an interagency appeals 
process for precedent-setting decisions would help 
ensure that policy and process are consistent and 
relevant to changing circumstances. Such quality 
control, or a review of licenses denied or 
“returned without action” (RWA), would be 
helpful at the transaction level.The coalition has 
offered defense proposals that will primarily 
require the leadership of the State Department to 
implement. The most immediate of these 
proposals is funding the hiring of additional 
licensing and agreements officers to handle the 
eight percent annual growth rate in defense 
license applications and the license backlogs that 
have ranged from 5,000 to 10,000 licenses in 
recent years.13 In addition to advocating for extra 
personnel to handle this challenge, the coalition 
asked the administration to consider and develop 
new approaches to caseload management, 
particularly the licensing caseload generated by 
government programs with allies and partners. 
New management approaches are needed to 
reduce the number of authorizations related to a 
given program and to facilitate efficient 
interaction with program partners. 
 
Finally, the coalition called for a more robust 
electronic system for processing licenses that 
enhances transparency. The system should track 
not only the current status of license applications 
across the entire interagency process, but also 
their transit times and next steps against 
mandatory timelines. The industry is interested in 
tracking licenses that require congressional 
notification from when they are first submitted to 
the government to when they are sent to congress 
for review. 
 
 
                                                
13See 
www.securityandcompetitiveness.org/proposals/show/2241.
html (accessed 1 December 2007). 
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A New Approach to Export Controls on 
Satellite Components 
 
There is a short-term, medium-term, and long-
term way that the coalition’s efforts can directly 
support U.S. commercial satellite component 
manufacturers and, by extension, the space 
industrial base. Given the status-quo legislative 
situation that places commercial satellites and 
related items on the munitions list, any 
adjustments that improve the current processing 
of munitions list export licenses by the State 
Department will be useful. Satellite component 
manufacturers would have a much easier time 
meeting their customers’ deadlines and, almost 
equally as important, incorporating predictable 
timelines into communications and hardware 
deliveries to their customers. American and 
foreign satellite manufacturers using U.S.-origin 
components would also experience fewer delays 
in seeking approval for sales and launches 
involving third-party countries. Needless to say, 
all other space-related technologies controlled by 
the State Department would enjoy the same 
benefits. 
 
In the medium-term, the 
coalition’s call for a 
renewed dialogue on 
caseload management, 
specifically improved 
program licenses, could 
arguably be applied to 
the challenges faced by 
commercial satellite 
and component 
manufacturers. In the 
past, the aerospace 
industry has tried to 
take advantage of 
program licenses that grant pre-approval for a 
slate of transactions between U.S. and foreign 
customers and partners. Eligibility for these 
program licenses are currently restricted to major 
weapons programs. The paperwork required to 
prove compliance with the terms of a program 
license is more time-consuming than simply 
obtaining individual licenses for each transaction. 
Applying for a program license requires 
companies to lock in a significant amount of 
information on what and how they will be 
operating without much flexibility to address 
changes in export transactions. In the end, 
program licenses are less useful than continuing to 
apply for licenses for individual transactions. 
The coalition has proposed that program licenses 
expand to include more than major weapons 
programs. Ideally, these program licenses would 
cover transactions between U.S. companies and 
their foreign subsidiaries or parents, focused 
research and development (R&D) projects on 
critical technologies, such as anti-improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and missiles, and 
possibly even commercial satellite platforms. To 
be useful, these licenses must be more flexible 
and less onerous than the cumulative requirements 
for all license applications necessary for the same 
set of transactions. 
 
In the long-term, a legislative fix and a coalition-
supported regulatory fix will balance the national 
security and economic imperatives driving export 
controls on commercial satellites and their 
components. The legislative language currently 
references all commercial satellites and related 
items. To the surprise of congressional staff 
involved in the drafting of the original legislation, 
the State Department has chosen to interpret this 
language to eliminate any need to evaluate the 
risk of exporting a commercial satellite 
component. All commercial satellite components 
are instead licensed and treated as munitions list 
items: 
 
I feel some sense of responsibility 
for what happened,” said David 
Garner, a retired Air Force colonel. 
Garner had helped put together the 
1998 legislation that was designed 
to add commercial 
communications satellites— like 
those that had been implicated in 
the transfer of sensitive technology 
to the Chinese by a House 
committee led by then Rep. 
Christopher Cox— to the 
Munitions List, meaning that their 
export would be overseen by the 
The coalition 
has proposed 
that program 
licenses 
expand to 
include more 
than major 
weapons 
programs. 
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State Department rather than the 
more permissive Commerce 
Department. That was, Garner said, 
exactly what he thought the 
legislation did. 
 
Shortly after the bill became law, 
he recounted a meeting where he 
and other officials discussed the 
legislation. At that time, he said, 
“we all had a pretty good sense of 
what we were going to do, and 
then the legal office of political 
affairs at State said, “Well, you 
know, all the parts and components 
on those comsats are captured, 
too.” We all sort of looked at each 
other said, “I didn’t write that. Did 
you write that?” None of us around 
the table believed that that’s what 
we had done, but in fact that’s 
what ended up.”14 
 
A legislative change that either eliminates the 
reference to “related items” or even adds a 
qualifier like “related items that have significant 
military application” would clarify congressional 
intent. The structure of the munitions list allows it 
to capture all items designed or modified for use 
by a specific munitions list line item, like 
commercial satellites. With the legislative change, 
commercial satellite component manufacturers 
could make a case, specifically a commodity 
jurisdiction request, to transfer an item back to 
Commerce Department control without 
immediately being turned away because of the 
legislation. Convincing lawmakers to explore 
such a change would likely require credible 
studies and recommendations that link export 
controls and damage to the space industrial base 
affecting U.S. security and economic interests. 
 
A related and necessary step is adoption of the 
coalition’s recommendations on commodity 
                                                
14See 26 February 2007, The Space Review, article 
by Jeff Foust. 
jurisdiction evaluations.15 Existing export control 
commodity jurisdiction regulations, specifically 
sections 120.3 and 120.4 of ITAR, allow for 
flexibility in determining the risk of an export 
based on consideration of commercial availability 
as well as military and intelligence applicability. 
These ITAR sections are not being interpreted or 
implemented in a consistent and predictable 
fashion. Commodity jurisdiction decisions on 
components have been based on purely cosmetic 
modifications of commercial off-the-shelf 
technology. In addition, the Commerce 
Department’s expertise in analyzing commercial 
applications of technology is not always valued 
appropriately. The coalition has requested 
enhanced oversight of the interagency commodity 
jurisdiction process to ensure it correctly and 
consistently follows existing regulations, and 
clarifying guidelines on the proper use of 
regulations and interagency input during the 
evaluation process. 
 
The coalition is mindful that piecemeal 
improvements to the existing system will not 
allow it to effectively address the security and 
economic challenges and opportunities of the 21st 
century. For this reason, the coalition has begun 
discussing and identifying the key elements of a 
“model modern system” to compare with the 
existing system. The best long-term solution to 
addressing the negative impact of export controls 
on U.S. security and economic interests would be 
adopting key elements of this model system to 
better evaluate rationally, precisely, and 
efficiently the risks and rewards of U.S. 
technology exports. 
 
The Changing Face and Fate of Export 
Controls 
 
For years, export controls have been something of 
a “black art” in Washington, DC. Understood by 
few and misunderstood by many, the laws and 
regulations designed to keep sensitive U.S. 
technology in responsible hands have evolved 
                                                
15See 
www.securityandcompetitiveness.org/proposals/show/2241.
html (accessed 5 December 2007). 
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slowly, while the global market for aerospace and 
the need for strong military alliances have 
flourished. Export control laws still remain 
arcane, but the potential for modernization is 
emerging on the horizon. 
 
Through history, export controls were something 
one entity visited upon another. Whether it was 
the U.S. Congress placing restrictions on the 
administration, the administration on industry, or 
any one country on another, export controls have 
never been rooted in open political dialogue. That 
has changed noticeably in recent years, and the 
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness has 
expanded this dialogue through consultations at 
all levels of the interagency process and visits 
with almost every office of every member of the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction. 
 
The administration welcomed the launch of the 
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness in 
March of 2007 and has spent the last few months 
reviewing its proposals. By end of 2007, assuming 
successful completion of the interagency review 
process and the absence of major opposition from 
congress, the administration will likely announce 
its plans to move forward on a number of 
coalition recommendations to make the U.S. 
export control system more predictable, efficient, 
and transparent. 
 
The administration also recently proposed defense 
trade treaties with the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Australia that would reduce impediments to 
technology trade with those countries, while 
maintaining stringent security standards.16 The 
outreach and ongoing dialogue by the 
administration has recently ramped up, and the 
resulting reception from congress has been warm. 
As the experience of the U.S.-UK treaty indicates, 
                                                
16U.S.-UK Treaty text available at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/90740.htm, and U.S.-
Australia Treaty text available at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/91763.htm (both 
accessed 15 December 2007). 
congress is now more willing than ever to 
consider new concepts in export control.17 
Perhaps, the most compelling reason for this shift 
in congressional opinion is that the underlying 
justifications of export control have changed. 
America only benefits from its technological edge 
by sharing it prudently and can only sustain that 
edge by honing it with the innovations and 
contributions of our military allies and trading 
partners. Determining which countries and users 
get which pieces of that technology should vary 
not only according to their need, but also 
according to their demonstrated ability to protect 
what they get. The U.S. default position should 
hold that responsible states who work and fight 
alongside the U.S. should also benefit, when 
practical, from U.S. technology. 
 
Another evolution is evident in who has been 
advocating for modernization of export controls. 
Traditionally, the high-technology defense 
industry has been interested in export control 
because its products were most likely to be 
controlled. With global markets opening, though, 
that industry has been joined by representatives of 
                                                
17The U.S.-UK treaty referenced here deals with 
defense trade cooperation. This treaty permits the 
export of certain U.S. defense articles and services 
to the UK Government and select British 
companies that meet specific requirements, 
without U.S. export licenses or other prior 
approvals. It also ensures the continuation of the 
British policy of not requiring a license for the 
export of UK defense articles and services to the 
U.S. The Treaty will create an approved 
community of the two governments and selected 
defense companies. Most U.S. defense articles 
will be eligible to be exported into and within this 
community without prior U.S. Government 
licenses or other authorizations as long as the 
exports are in support of: combined U.S.-UK 
military or counterterrorism operations; joint 
U.S.-UK cooperative security and defense 
research, development, production, and support 
programs; specific security and defense projects 
that are for UK government use only; and U.S. 
government end-use. See U.S.-UK Treaty text at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/90740.htm. 
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every sector of American business. The Coalition 
for Security and Competitiveness brings together 
technology businesses as diverse as the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, who represent every 
sector of the economy. 
 
U.S. businesses have woken up to the extent to 
which outdated export control provisions hinder 
America’s ability to compete in the global 
marketplace. They have seen technologies widely 
available from competitors prosper, while we 
restrict U.S. companies from exporting 
functionally similar items. They see the reality of 
globalization in all facets of modern business and 
the pervasiveness of high-performance 
technologies in such transactions. In short, 
industry needs fewer licenses on no-risk and 
lowest-risk exports, with necessary licenses 
approved quickly enough to get the job done. 
 
Future discussions on export controls, commercial 
satellites, and the space industrial base, spurred by 
effective government studies, should take lessons 
from the success of the Coalition for Security and 
Competitiveness. The coalition’s proposals for 
export modernization focus on the crux of the 
issue: increasing predictability, efficiency, and 
transparency in the current system. The aerospace 
and defense industry is not looking to “de-
control” exports irrespective of legitimate national 
security concerns, but merely to add speed and 
consistency to the process. 
 
In the near-term, this can be done by increasing 
resources for export licensing agencies and 
finding more efficient ways to manage the risk of 
technology exchange. In the long-term, the 
challenge of increasing political resources, 
particularly oversight of policies and regulations, 
to ensure the quality and consistency of licensing 
and commodity jurisdiction decisions must be 
addressed. America’s foreign allies also play a 
role by recognizing that, to maximize the security 
and economic benefits of technology exchange 
with the U.S., they must accommodate and 
address legitimate security concerns. 
 
The U.S., and those joining the industrial push for 
export control modernization, is buoyed by the 
mounting recognition that improvements to the 
system will not interfere with legitimate national 
security concerns.18 Dialogue among the agencies, 
congress and the industry remains critical. In the 
absence of such a dialogue, it would be easy to 
mistakenly assume that common ground in 
seeking to address the risks associated with 
technology exchange is not sought. Export 
controls have traditionally been about denying the 
“bad guys” any access to the “good stuff.” That 
has to remain a core value. But, it is also more 
important than ever to make sure that the “good 
guys” have a pipeline to the “good stuff” and, 
when possible, that the “good stuff” is coming 
from U.S. manufacturers. 
 
                                                
18Baker Spring, A Step Forward in Reforming the 
United States Arms Export Control Process, 9 
April 2007 (accessed at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/NationalSecurity/wm1416.cfm). 
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Defense Industrial Base Assessment: United States Space Industry 
 
Final Report Summary, August 2007 
 
This report focuses on the health and 
competitiveness of the United States (U.S.) Space 
Industrial Base, including the associated impacts 
of U.S. export controls. The Department of 
Defense, through the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force and the Space Industrial Base Council 
directed this study. An Air Force Research 
Laboratory, Materials and Manufacturing 
Directorate representative led an industry-
government team and integrated the information 
gathered to prepare the study. The Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
developed and deployed the survey instrument 
and verified data provided by companies 
comprising the U.S. Space Industry. Team 
contractor support included the Universal 
Technology Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton, 
The Tauri Group, Nortel Government Solutions 
which operates the Air Force Industrial Base 
Information Center, and Northrop Grumman 
Technical Services. 
 
Executive Summary 
 
In October 2006, the National Security Space 
Office (NSSO) initiated this space industrial base 
assessment. The purpose was to assess the health, 
competitiveness, and ability of the space industrial 
base to continue support of national security space 
requirements. Specifically, the goals were to: (1) 
evaluate the industrial, economic, and financial 
factors affecting the U.S. Space Industrial Base; 
(2) determine if U.S. export controls and practices 
are impacting space prime contractors and 2nd / 3rd 
tier subcontractors; and (3) develop findings and 
conclusions for the Space Industrial Base Council. 
 
A team approach was taken to conduct the study. 
The government team project lead and integrator 
was the Air Force Research Laboratory Materials 
and Manufacturing Directorate (Industrial Base 
Program). The Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Industry and Security (BIS) developed, 
deployed, and verified data collection from a 
survey of space industry companies, and the 
NSSO served in an oversight capacity. 
 
The study involved a broad look at industrial base 
indicators and a detailed analysis of the BIS 
survey inputs. The BIS issued the survey 
electronically on 2 February 2007 and concluded 
it on 24 April 24 2007. The survey was sent to 
274 space industry company/business units— the 
BIS received and verified 202 survey inputs for a 
74% response rate. The team used tier levels 
aligned by typical business supply chain hierarchy 
to characterize the industry respondents. Prime 
contractors were Tier 1, subcontractors were Tier 
2, and commodity suppliers were Tier 3. The 
study focused on three analysis streams including 
Global Marketplace / Competitiveness, U.S. 
Industry Health, and Export Control Impacts. 
 
Global Marketplace and Competitiveness 
 
Foreign competition is real and growing. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that U.S. export 
controls give foreign competitors a perceived 
advantage in marketing to non-U.S. customers. 
Segments of the U.S. space industry feel 
threatened competitively and see export controls 
as the main factor undermining their ability to 
compete for sales in foreign markets. 
 
Sales and Market Share 
 
Total global and total U.S. space sales have 
increased, mostly in services, for the 2003-2006 
period surveyed. However, the U.S. share of the 
global market decreased. For example, the U.S. 
share of satellite manufacturing has decreased 
20% for all commercial communication satellites 
(COMSATs) sales and 10% for geosynchronous 
orbit COMSATs since 1999. Defense funding, 
domestic non-defense services, and ground 
equipment dominate U.S. space industry sales. 
Export sales represent less than 10% of total U.S. 
company revenues annually from 2003-2006. 
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Competition 
 
Industry’s view on its competitiveness in the 
2008–2012 timeframe is very positive with regard 
to the domestic market. In the foreign 
marketplace, there is a broad industry consensus 
on the difficulty in capturing sales. Industry 
identified strong foreign competition in spacecraft 
manufacturing, primarily in Europe, followed by 
the Asia-Pacific region. Companies also indicated 
U.S. export control requirements were the number 
one barrier to selling in foreign markets, followed 
by indigenous purchase preferences. 
 
United States Industry Health 
 
Overall, financial viability for the U.S. space 
industry is good based on publicly available 
company annual reports, with 70% of the 
companies considered at low risk. Twenty-five 
percent of the companies were considered at 
moderate or high risk (primarily commercial 
space services and manufacturers of materials for 
launch systems). Aggregate Research and 
Development expenditures grew an average of 8% 
per year since 2003, primarily in Tiers 2 and 3 as 
an investment in innovation by firms to remain 
competitive. The space workforce has grown 22% 
over the last 4 years. 
 
Export Control Impacts 
 
The industry survey captured information related 
to the added financial and labor costs associated 
with export sales, as well as, trends tied to 
processing International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration 
Regulations licenses. This analysis addressed 
process issues, cost of compliance, the unintended 
consequences of export controls, and suggested 
industry remedies. 
 
License Process Issues 
 
Impacts of export control processes vary by tier 
with more pronounced impacts at lower tiers. 
Although less than 1% of ITAR license 
applications were denied from 2003–2006, the 
reported loss of foreign sales due to ITAR was 
$2.35 billion, mainly due to lengthy processing 
times. The average processing time for Technical 
Assistance Agreements has grown to over three 
months. 
 
Cost of Compliance 
 
Export control compliance costs averaged $49 
million per year industry-wide. Compliance costs 
grew 37% during the 2003–2006 period with the 
burden of compliance significantly higher for 
firms in the lower tiers. 
 
Unintended Consequences 
 
Foreign competitors leveraged their countries’ 
more relaxed regulatory climate in marketing their 
products as “ITAR-free”— purportedly directly 
affecting U.S. companies’ ability to compete. 
Some U.S. companies claimed the European 
Space Agency (ESA) directed European 
companies to find non-U.S. sources for space 
products, and ESA has also funded development 
of competing products to either avoid ITAR 
requirements, develop indigenous capabilities, or 
both. 
 
Industry Remedies 
 
Almost 60% of the recommended industry actions 
were to update U.S. export control lists more 
often to accurately reflect current global 
technology and the competitive environment. 
Nearly 23% of respondents recommended specific 
actions for streamlining the U.S. export control 
licensing process. Some firms also made 
recommendations to reform the Congressional 
review process. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
The U.S. space industry has, in general, been 
healthy for the 2003-2006 period and very 
competitive domestically for both defense and 
commercial products and services; however, the 
global space market has changed significantly 
since 1998-1999 when the U.S. Government made 
major modifications to its overall export control 
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regulations for space-related products and 
services. The U.S. industry now faces strong and 
growing competition, primarily from European 
firms, and is losing market share in allied 
countries. Reportedly, ITAR has impacted U.S. 
competitiveness by encouraging other nations, in 
many cases our allies, to develop indigenous 
space capabilities and industries that now market 
globally. 
 
Survey respondents reported that ITAR changes 
and the cost of export control compliance have 
directly or indirectly precipitated this increased 
competition. To maintain and enhance the U.S. 
position in the global space market, ITAR 
processes need to be frequently reviewed and 
adjusted, as appropriate. ITAR staffing at the U.S. 
Department of State and the Department of 
Defense’s Defense Technology Security 
Administration should be reviewed and adjusted 
to ensure that personnel/funding levels align with 
the number of applications processed. Moreover, 
restrictions regarding sales to U.S. allies should be 
re-examined to reflect geopolitical and economic 
considerations. 
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President Issues Export Controls Directive 
 
Reform United States Defense Trade Policies and Practices, 22 January 2008 
 
 
President Bush issued an Export Control Directive 
today that will ensure that United States (U.S.) 
defense trade policies and practices better support 
the National Security Strategy. The package of 
reforms required under this directive will improve 
the manner in which the U.S. Department of State 
licenses the export of defense equipment, services 
and technical data, enabling the U.S. Government 
to respond more expeditiously to the military 
equipment needs of our friends, allies, and 
particularly our coalition partners. 
 
The Export Control Directive mandates the 
commitment of additional financial and other 
resources, as well as procedural reforms that will 
expedite the processing of export license 
applications for items controlled by the U.S. 
Munitions List. Although license processing times 
will be reduced as a result of this directive, the 
Administration is committed to ensuring that 
existing measures to prevent the diversion of such 
items to unauthorized recipients remain strong 
and effective. 
 
The specific actions directed by the President are 
listed below. 
 
More Effective U.S. Export Licensing 
 
• Additional financial resources and intelligence 
support will be made available for the timely 
adjudication of defense trade licenses. 
• Guidelines will be issued that require a 
decision by the U.S. Government on defense 
trade export license applications within 60 
days, absent a strong reason for additional 
time, such as a requirement for Congressional 
notification. Initial efforts in this regard have 
resulted in a nearly 50 percent reduction since 
April 2007 in the number of export license 
applications pending with the Department of 
State. 
• The electronic licensing system will be 
upgraded to permit the submission of all types  
•  
• of defense trade licenses and to enable all 
agencies to access the same electronic 
information.  
• The Secretary of State will update U.S. 
controls on exports involving dual and third 
country nationals from NATO and other allied 
countries. 
 
A More Efficient Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
 
• A formal interagency dispute mechanism will 
be created to allow for timely resolution of 
licensing jurisdiction issues involving the 
Departments of State and Commerce under 
the Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) process. The 
National Security Council will also undertake 
a review to make sure the CJ process is 
efficient and timely. 
 
Enhanced Enforcement 
 
• A multi-agency working group will be 
established to improve procedures for 
conducting export enforcement investigations. 
 
The directive reflects consensus recommendations 
from the National Security Council and the 
Departments of State and Defense. The Bush 
Administration is committed to working closely 
with U.S. industry to implement these reforms. 
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National Space Forum: 
Towards a Theory of Spacepower 
 
 
Summer Space Seminar 
 
 
China Working Group: 
China, Space, and Strategy 
 
 
Future of Space Commerce Workshop: 
Reducing Risks and Fostering Partnerships – 
Synergies between Civil, Military, Commercial, and New Space 
 
 
Space Based Solar Power Workshop 
 
 
Improving Our Vision II: 
Building Transparency and Cooperation – 
Workshop on Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing 
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National Space Forum 2007: Towards a Theory of Spacepower 
 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, January 2007 
 
Charles D. Lutes 
 
 
 
 
The Spacepower Theory Project seeks to gain 
insight into human behavior in outer space. The 
project’s overall objective is to develop a 
theoretical framework that helps to define, 
categorize, explain and anticipate ways in which 
“spacepower” may be pursued, how the various 
facets of spacepower connect to each other, and 
how they relate to the other instrumentalities of 
power that state and non-state actors may seek to 
achieve or retain. 
 
Since 1957, spacepower has evolved from the first 
space age, where prestige was a primary 
motivation of activity, to the second (current) 
space age where the primary commodity of space 
is information. The next space age may well be 
defined by the creation of wealth in space and 
other celestial bodies. Throughout these phases, 
outer space activities provide a means for 
enhancing sociocultural, economic, and political 
power. 
 
To reach the potential promise of space in these 
areas requires serious attention to the security 
aspects of the space domain. Security in space 
could be maximized by a situation in which 
unfettered access by spacefaring actors becomes a 
norm for amicable interstate relations; where such 
actors achieve a measure of protection against the 
aggressive or capricious acts of spoilers; and 
where real or perceived vulnerabilities among 
space actors are minimized. Creating a condition 
of enduring stability in outer space will depend 
upon how tensions between national interests are 
addressed and whether there emerges over time a 
convergent perception of what actions tend, on 
balance, to strengthen or undermine stability. 
 
The National Defense University’s Institute for 
National Strategic Studies (INSS) is conducting a 
study that seeks to develop a theory of 
spacepower– that is, a conceptual framework for 
explicating the fundamental aspects of 
spacepower and its relation to the pursuit of 
national security, economic, informational, and 
scientific objectives in a fashion that provides 
insight into the behavior of spacefaring actors. 
The project takes into account the views and 
perspectives of the principal users of space, and it 
attempts to assess the underlying assumptions 
regarding why and how a society, a nation, or a 
non-state actor might use space– either alone or, 
more likely, in tandem with other means– to 
accomplish specific ends. The resultant theory 
will provide policy specialists and space 
professionals from any nation– whether in the 
national security, civil, or commercial space 
sectors– with an intellectual foundation upon 
which to assess the conduct and impact of space-
related activities. This paper outlines initial 
insights generated by the project and serves as a 
vehicle for eliciting feedback from United States 
(U.S.) and international stakeholders. 
 
Through a series of seminars, workshops, and 
conferences, which includes a National Space 
Forum on the topic held in 2007 that was 
sponsored by INSS and the Eisenhower Center for 
Spacer and Defense Studies at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy, experts in the global space community 
provided and exchanged a rich set of viewpoints, 
ideas, and theories in an ongoing dialogue. 
Additionally, the Spacepower Theory Project 
team traveled to Japan, China, and India to 
capture views in a region of burgeoning space 
competition. The insights in this update will be 
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refined into a concise monograph for distribution 
among the space and policy communities. 
 
Additionally, the project team is in the final 
editing stages of a book length manuscript that 
was discussed at the National Space Forum 
mentioned above. The book contains thirty 
chapters, which are listed below, by various 
expert authors commissioned for this project. This 
book will be published by National Defense 
University Press (or a commercial press) in 2008. 
1. Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics 
2. Introduction to Spacepower Theory 
3. On the Nature of Theory 
4. International Relations Theory and 
Spacepower 
5. Old Thoughts, New Problems: Mahan and the 
Conception of Spacepower 
6. Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower 
7. Orbital Terrain and Space Physics 
8. Space Law and Governance Structures 
9. Building on Previous Spacepower Theory 
10. History of Commercial Space Activity and 
Spacepower 
11. Commercial Space Industry and Markets 
12. Merchants and Guardians 
13. Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space 
14. History of Civil Space Activity and 
Spacepower 
15. Affordable and Responsive Space Systems 
16. Competing Visions for Exploration 
17. Spacepower and the Environment 
18. History of Security Space Activity and 
Spacepower 
19. Increasing the Military Uses of Space 
20. Preserving Freedom of Action in Space 
21. Balancing Security Interests 
22. Russia 
23. China 
24. Europe 
25. Emerging Actors 
26. Evolving United States Structures 
27. U.S. Military Power: Conceptual 
Underpinnings and Practice 
28. Technological Drivers 
29. Building Human Capital for Spacepower 
30. The Future of Spacepower 
 
These works can only begin to capture a fraction 
of the thinking in the space community today and 
should be considered snapshots of progress 
towards developing a theory. This will not be a 
definitive work; the theory should be a living 
document that continues to evolve and progress 
with the human experience of space. Ultimately, 
this project is less about space itself, but rather 
about human, state, and societal behavior and 
their relationships to the space domain. 
 
Developing a Theory of Spacepower 
 
The overarching scope and definition of this 
spacepower theory requires a strategic perspective 
that transcends purely military, economic, 
political, or nationalistic perspectives. This theory 
strives to do the following things: 
• Define what spacepower is, what it is not, and 
what makes it unique in order to provide a 
common lexicon for all space actors. 
• Categorize the elements, constituent parts, and 
factors that yield a framework for thinking 
about spacepower. 
• Explain the ways in which spacepower has 
exhibited during its short history. 
• Connect elements within spacepower and to 
other means of national power. 
• Anticipate potential ways in which 
spacepower might be used in the future. 
 
A theory of spacepower should not be confused 
with a policy, strategy, or doctrine, though it may 
inform such efforts. Although written primarily 
from the perspective of the U.S., it is not intended 
to suggest specific courses of action for the U.S. 
or any other specific actor. The basic principles of 
the theory should be applicable across a broad 
range of space actors. 
 
The development of spacepower theory can be 
related to the development of sea power theory by 
Alfred T. Mahan in his work The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History, 1660-1783.1 Mahan 
addressed the importance of economic trade to the 
                                                
1A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, 1660-1783, 14th ed., (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1898). 
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prosperity of the American nation and the 
implications for maritime and naval activity in the 
advancement of this prosperity. He addressed the 
essence of sea power primarily through a 
historical lens by looking at the nature of the 
maritime activity of great powers in history. 
Writing from the perspective of what could be 
considered a second-tier naval power at the time, 
i.e., the U.S.; he drew important lessons for 
creating American economic strength by 
advancing its attention to sea power. A 
“Mahanian theory” for spacepower should 
consider the role of space activity in relation to 
the larger strategic and international environment. 
 
Spacepower theory, it should be stressed, is not a 
military theory. It is a strategic theory based upon 
human activity as applied to the space domain. 
Although the historical evidence for space activity 
is limited, theorizing about human behavior in a 
variety of disciplines provides a sufficient base 
upon which to draw. Theories of science, 
philosophy, human nature, politics, economics, 
and geopolitics have been incorporated in addition 
to theories of war and other military theories. 
 
A Short History of Spacepower 
 
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the world has 
seen two identifiable space “ages,” each distinct 
in its significance and influence on human affairs. 
A much longer pre-space age saw technological 
advancements enable the fulfillment of once 
fanciful visions of space travel and exploration. 
This rich history of space offer signposts that 
point to potential space ages of the future. 
 
The first space age, from 1957 to 1991, is often 
associated with the shorthand term “the space 
race.” Space activity became a microcosm of the 
global geostrategic environment that defined the 
era. The imperatives of the bi-polar Cold War 
accelerated the advancement of space technology 
and activities in space. For both the Soviet Union 
and the U.S., this competition played out in 
several important ways: 
 
• A geostrategic competition to showcase 
technological, economic, and military power. 
• A public civil competition to explore near-
earth space and ultimately the Moon. 
• A (largely) hidden military and intelligence 
competition for strategic advantage. 
• A slowly developing economic enterprise. 
 
The primary commodity of the first space age was 
prestige. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. 
viewed their space programs through the larger 
geostrategic competition. The prestige associated 
with the civil space programs afforded a new type 
of moral power to both nations as they vied to 
establish dominance of their cultural, political, 
and economic systems. 
 
Just as the Cold War was the defining context for 
the first space age, the fall of the Soviet Union 
and an era of U.S. unipolarity defined the second 
or “American space age.” This space age 
continues to be the dominant feature of the current 
space environment. This shift was exemplified by 
the 1991 Gulf War, sometimes referred to as the 
“first space war.” The predominant features of 
this space age include: 
 
• The rise of globalization, with greatly 
increased communications and information 
flows, enabled by the global perspective of 
satellite technology. 
• A shift in military emphasis from gaining 
strategic advantage in space to gaining 
operational and tactical advantage in terrestrial 
warfare. 
• A precipitous decline in the former emphasis 
on civil space. 
 
The primary commodity of the second space age 
has been information. While some new players 
entered the space arena to enhance their prestige, 
advanced spacefaring actors developed and used 
space to enable the transition into the 
“information age.” Today’s emphasis on 
information in space has greatly enhanced the 
military, economic, and political power of those 
actors, with the U.S. as the dominant power in the 
space-enabled information area. 
 
It is unclear what the dominant features of the 
next space age will be or when it will definitively 
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occur. Shifting features in the geopolitical context 
suggest that the shift to the next space age will 
occur within the scope of this theory (i.e., within 
the next 50 years). These features (to be explored 
in more detail in an additional section in the final 
report of this project) include a shift away from 
the unipolarity of today’s international system to a 
multipolar environment with a much broader and 
more diverse set of actors. As power is diffused 
among these actors, the nature of power in space 
will begin to change. Potential features of the next 
space age might include: 
 
• Great technological advancements which 
significantly lower the barriers to entry for 
potential spacefaring actors. 
• Shift from a geocentric perspective to a solar 
system perspective. 
• Renewed strategic competition in space. 
 
A primary commodity of the next space age may 
well be wealth. The dominant paradigm in space 
could become an economic one, as activities in 
space shift from enabling wealth creation on Earth 
to that of wealth creation in space. The economic 
value of space is currently but a small fraction of 
its potential. Beyond the impact space has in 
supporting earthly economic enterprises, the next 
space age will be marked by a boom in the 
economic value of space itself. Alvin and Heidi 
Toffler have suggested that the development of 
wealth creation in space would be revolutionary 
and signify a “fourth wave” of human 
development.2 
 
A brief look at the history of space activity 
suggests that humans go to space for a variety of 
reasons: geopolitical, military, economic, 
scientific, and human destiny. Regardless of the 
reasons for going to space, such activity conveys a 
variety of benefits to spacefaring actors: prestige; 
military advantage; economic competitiveness; 
and scientific prowess. Benefits accrued to the 
larger society have included: the advancement of 
scientific knowledge; stimulation of global 
economic activity; enhanced communications and 
                                                
2Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Revolutionary Wealth 
(New York: Alred A. Knopf, 2006). 
information flows; and awareness of the global 
environment. 
 
The Nature of Spacepower 
 
Power is perhaps the most important yet ill-
defined concept in the study of politics and 
international relations. Power is often associated 
with the specific instrument through which it is 
manifested such as economic, diplomatic, 
informational, economic, or military power. 
Major dimensions of power focus on how it is 
created, increased, decreased, stored, 
communicated, used, and measured. A key 
consideration is whether power is fungible, or 
easily transferable, between dissimilar instruments 
such as diplomatic and military power. Most 
dimensions of politics and international relations 
revolve around how states and other actors use 
power. 
 
This study builds from Joseph Nye’s simple 
definition of power as “the ability to achieve 
one’s purposes or goals.”3 It is therefore a natural 
extrapolation to define spacepower as “the ability 
to use space to achieve one’s purposes or goals.” 
In a further expansion of the definition of power, 
Nye suggests that it is the ability to influence 
others that creates this power. While that is true 
for spacepower, space capabilities may also be 
able to influence natural events as well as human 
behavior. An expanded definition of spacepower 
could then be derived as “the ability to use space 
to influence others, events, or the environment to 
achieve one’s purposes or goals.” 
 
In an increasingly complex and globalizing 
society, there are five important types of power:4 
                                                
3Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International 
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005). 
4See Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-
First Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006). Kay identifies these as state 
power; soft power; asymmetrical power; people, 
ideas, and information power; and the power of 
nature. 
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• Hard power. The classic application of power 
by state actors consists of the ability to use 
inducements or coercion through military, 
economic, or diplomatic applications. 
Spacepower contributes to an actor’s hard 
power by providing military and intelligence 
capabilities to threaten an adversary’s 
terrestrial or space-based activities. 
• Soft power. This concerns the overall 
attractiveness of an actor to others to attain its 
goals without threats or use of force. This 
“attractive power” is attained by setting the 
example and getting others to emulate 
favorable behavior. Spacepower provides 
prestige, technical and educational prowess, 
economic incentives, and cooperative ventures 
as means for enhancing soft power. 
• Asymmetrical power. The acceleration of 
globalization has created a diffusion of power 
that allows weak actors to challenge strong or 
dominate actors in asymmetric ways. 
Spacepower tends to be dominated by stronger 
actors, but can be threatened asymmetrically 
by weaker actors through means such as 
kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), 
jamming, or attacks on ground facilities. 
• Power of ideas. The diffusion of power from 
states down to the individual has occurred 
through the ubiquitous availability of 
information and ideas. Such power can either 
weaken or strengthen a state, society, or 
political system depending on the context. 
Spacepower plays a great role in the 
transmission of this type of power through 
communication, remote sensing, and 
navigation applications. 
• Power of nature. Nature itself wields power 
that can present security challenges. The 
power of humankind to mitigate or avoid the 
ravages due to natural disasters, pandemics, 
climate change, or collision by near-Earth 
objects is enhanced by spacepower 
capabilities. 
 
Spacepower contributes to all of these forms of 
power, including sociocultural power, economic 
power, and security power (see Figure below). 
 
 
 
Definitions 
 
Developing and applying a comprehensive and 
consistent set of definitions and categories are 
essential steps towards building spacepower 
theory. In addition to the discussion of power and 
spacepower above, key terms for this study 
include: 
• Space. There is no universally accepted 
definition of space or outer space. Disputes  
Hard 
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over sovereignty, the inability to precisely 
describe a spatial demarcation, need to distinguish 
from laws regarding airspace and other legal 
issues have stymied the development of an 
accepted definition. There has been a sort 
customary law that has developed to the effect 
that any object in orbit is considered to be in 
space.5 For the purposes of this study space begins 
when objects are able to achieve positions in 
stable orbits around the Earth or beyond. With 
current technology, this would describe space as 
beginning at an altitude of approximately 69 miles 
(and above the accepted end of aerodynamic 
limits, the von Karman jurisdiction line, which is 
approximately 55-62 miles in altitude). 
 
Astrographic. Everett Dolman provides a useful 
astrographic delineation of space into four 
regions: (1) terra (Earth and space to a point just 
below sustained, unpowered orbit); (2) terran 
space (lowest viable orbit to just beyond 
geostationary altitude); (3) lunar space (just 
beyond geostationary orbit to just beyond lunar 
orbit); and (4) solar space (everything else in the 
solar system).6 
 
• Spacefaring. Spacefaring is “the ability to do 
something in space.” Spacefaring activities are 
“activities conducted in space.” Spacefaring 
actors are “state and non-state actors engaged 
in spacefaring.” Spacefaring actors conduct 
spacefaring activities through indigenous 
production, collaborative efforts, or third party 
purchase of space systems or services. 
• Space Industrial Base. The space industrial 
base includes “those elements of industry and 
education that contribute to spacefaring.” 
 
Shaping Factors 
 
An actor’s spacepower capability is shaped by in 
variety of ways. The physical nature of the 
                                                
5Glen H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer 
Space: Problems of Law and Policy, (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998). 
6Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical 
Geopolitics in the Space Age, (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2002). 
domain both constrains and enables human ability 
to utilize space for specific applications. 
Technology is used to overcome these limitations 
but is itself constrained by costs and the state of 
scientific development. The appropriate resources 
to include wealth, access to materials, and 
industrial capacity are essential. The political and 
cultural environments within and among nations 
also determine the level of interest and 
motivations for developing space programs. 
Finally, governance issues, particularly with 
regard to international laws and regimes, play a 
role in determining the path of spacepower. In 
considering these shaping factors, some 
implications can be derived: 
 
Spacepower is unique because it can operate both 
in relation to earth activity and independent of it.   
 
• Certain physical phenomena in space (e.g., 
gravity wells, libration points, predictable 
Earth orbits) can provide strategic advantage 
(and disadvantage) to space powers. 
• Technology eventually lowers costs. 
• Space technology can be single or multi-use. 
• Maintaining the space infrastructure and an 
industrial base is not a free good. 
• Political will is required for the long haul. 
• Non-state actors may be hampered by 
domestic regulations, laws, and political 
constraints. 
• A spacefaring culture includes both technical 
prowess and ambition. 
 
Forms of Spacepower 
 
Almost all space activities can normally be placed 
into just one of the following sectors: civil, 
commercial, military, or intelligence activities. 
However, growth in commercial space activity, 
the increasing number of dual-use space systems, 
and digital convergence can also make it 
increasingly difficult to categorize certain space 
activities neatly into one of these sectors. Many 
spacefaring actors have separate government 
organizations dedicated primarily to performing 
only the activities within one of these sectors. For 
the purposes of this study, the military and 
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intelligence activities will be considered as a 
single sector, the national security space sector. 
 
Spacefaring actors include those operating at the 
surprastate, transnational, state, and substate 
levels. This raises a “levels of analysis” problem 
that makes consistent categorization and 
comparisons difficult. By considering an actor’s 
level of activity across the three spacepower 
sectors described in the previous section, a set of 
archetype space actors can be fairly described as 
follows: 
 
• Comprehensive space powers have robust, 
indigenous space capabilities that provide 
significant benefits through space operations 
in all space activity sectors: commercial, civil, 
and security. They have indigenous capacity 
to manufacture, launch, and operate space 
systems. 
• Emerging space powers are those actors 
actively developing their capabilities in all 
three sectors of space activity. They may still 
be developing capacity in certain areas, but 
are progressing toward comprehensive 
capability. 
• Niche spacefaring actors have chosen not to 
develop comprehensive space capabilities or 
do not (yet) have the intent or resources or 
required to develop such capabilities. 
• Consortia, such as the European Space 
Agency (ESA) or the partners in the ongoing 
International Space Station (ISS) effort 
undertake many space activities. 
• Space entrepreneurs are pursuing a range of 
new private space ventures such as space 
tourism or space mining activity. 
• Free riders are space beneficiaries that use at 
least some product or service created by 
spacefaring activity. Due to growth in the 
efficacy and ubiquity of spacefaring activity, 
these space beneficiaries comprise a very 
broad category that includes nearly every 
actor in the modern world. 
 
In describing spacepower, the unique aspects of 
space as an operating environment and of 
spacefaring activity as a set of human endeavors 
are evident. A few insights from this section 
include: 
 
• Metaphors from other domains, sea, air, and 
land, do not necessarily apply. 
• Perspectives and motivations vary among 
actors, categories of actors, and among 
sectors. Consider the primary drivers in each 
of the space sectors: civil space as destiny and 
discovery driven; commercial space that is 
profit driven; and security space, which is 
threat driven. 
• Harmonization among space actors, categories 
of actors, and among sectors is difficult to 
achieve. 
 
Spacepower and the International System 
 
Spacepower has an emerging role in the 
international political system, and at the same 
time the nature of that system influences how 
actors might perceive and use spacepower. 
Spacepower to date was shaped primarily by the 
Cold War context in which it matured. As the 
international system exhibits changes over the 
next fifty years, the nature of spacepower can be 
expected to change with it. 
 
Realist and Liberal Perspectives 
 
Associating the word power with space activity 
connotes in many a realist interpretation of human 
behavior, yet both the realist and liberal 
perspectives are present in those advocating and 
developing spacepower strategies. It is useful to 
consider varying assumptions that might affect an 
actor’s notion about the role of spacepower in the 
international system. The table below briefly 
highlights some of these assumptions and 
prescriptions generally associated with traditional 
realist and liberal perspectives.7 
                                                
7This chart was derived from a number of sources. 
See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International 
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History  
(New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005); Hans 
Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, Seeing the 
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While certainly there are more complex 
explanations of the international system, this 
simplistic look at the two major perspectives goes 
a long way to understanding the tension points in 
many spacepower debates. The realist would tend 
to view space as another domain for great power 
competition, and ultimately conflict. The liberal 
view in its most progressive form sees space as a 
venue for the evolution of the human species to a 
higher order destiny; but at a minimum holds that 
maintaining space as a sanctuary provides the best 
guarantee of stability in space. 
                                                                               
Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security, 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books,  2006); and 
Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-First 
Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2006). 
 Realism Liberalism 
Assumptions about human 
behavior: 
Pessimistic Optimistic 
Unit of analysis: Individual states International system 
Principal actors in international 
system: 
States exclusively; great power states 
primarily 
States primarily, but increasingly 
diverse set of supra- and sub-
national actors 
State behavior determined by: External power calculations Internal characteristics 
Modern world affairs driven 
mainly by: 
Security competition Democratization and economic 
growth 
The main goals of foreign policy 
should be: 
Increasing power to guarantee 
security and survival 
Democracy and economic growth 
The primary instrument is: Hard power Soft power 
Concerned with: Relative gain (zero-sum) Absolute gain (mutual benefits) 
International system should be 
optimized to provide: 
Security Stability 
Treaties, alliances, and 
international institutions merit: 
Less faith Strong support 
Interdependence creates: Vulnerabilities Opportunities for cooperation 
Best chances of success in world 
affairs comes from: 
Benign hegemony by a great power 
acting as a Leviathan 
Liberal democracies working 
together multilaterally 
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These competing viewpoints vie for influence in the decision processes of spacepower actors. Applying the 
realist and liberal lenses to spacepower yields the following insights shown in the next table. 
 
 
 Realism Liberalism 
Human behavior in space: Will mirror human behavior on Earth Can transcend terrestrial disputes 
Principal actors in space: Spacefaring states Spacefaring states; consortia; non-
state entities; private enterprise 
State behavior in space 
determined by: 
Power calculations Domestic goals and needs 
Spacepower optimized for: Security Stability 
Spacepower is maximized 
through: 
Space dominance Space as a sanctuary  
Space as a venue is inherently: Competitive Cooperative 
Rules sets should guarantee: Freedom of access Common heritage of mankind; 
peaceful uses of outer space 
Means to achieve: Space control Legal frameworks 
Interdependence in space 
creates: 
Vulnerabilities; cascading effects Opportunities for cooperation; 
stability 
 
 
The Current Paradigm of Spacepower in the 
International System 
 
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty defined the initial 
principles for space activity and these principles 
describe the dominant paradigm of the 
international community regarding spacepower:8 
• Space is the province of all mankind– a 
“global commons.” 
• Space is to be used for peaceful purposes. 
• All states have an equal right to explore and 
use space. 
• International cooperation and consultation are 
essential. 
• Signatories retain ownership of their space 
objects and bear responsibility for their space 
                                                
8Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 27 
January 1967; entered into force October 10, 
1967. 
activities, including and damage inflicted on 
another state’s space objects. 
 
Although most, if not all, spacefaring actors 
ascribe to the principles of the Outer Space 
Treaty, a number of issues have arisen to 
challenge the dominant paradigm: 
 
• Definitional problems. The terms “peaceful 
uses” and “common heritage of mankind” 
have widely varying interpretations among 
space actors. 
• Sovereignty and property rights. Economic 
development in space under the current 
paradigm is stunted by lack of legal definition 
concerning these issues. 
• Prospects of weapons in space. Concerns 
over possible deployments of ASATs and 
space-based missile defense systems present 
serious problems for those desiring space to 
retain a “weapons-free” status. 
• Pursuit of self-interests. As more actors enter 
into the space domain, there may be a growing 
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tendency to pursue unilateral interests rather 
than adhere to established norms. 
 
International Security in Space 
 
The space political environment is still in its 
infancy, and it is unclear how the balance between 
purely national and global interests will be 
managed. A reframing of the current paradigm 
may be required to accommodate the changing 
nature of space activity. States will likely seek 
alternative arrangements in space as they perceive 
greater security vulnerability. Some alternative 
ways that states may choose to enhance security 
or stability, either individually or collectively, 
include: 
 
• Pursue unilateral strategies. 
• Apply a balance of power approach. 
• Develop alliance-based security arrangements. 
• Establish “rules of the road.” 
• Establish frameworks for cooperation and 
interdependence in space. 
• Negotiate arms control or other legal 
restraints. 
 
From the standpoint of international security, one 
can identify an optimal condition of enduring 
stability in the space domain. Its attributes would 
include: 
 
• A norm of unfettered access to space as a 
feature of amicable inter-state relations. 
• A solid measure of protection, through 
individual or collective measures, against the 
aggressive or capricious acts of spoilers. 
• A situation in which the real or perceived 
vulnerabilities among space actors are 
minimized. 
 
Ultimately, creating a condition of enduring 
stability in outer space will hinge upon how 
tensions between national interests are addressed 
and whether there emerges over time a convergent 
perception of what actions tend, on balance, to 
strengthen or undermine stability. If enduring 
stability is not the primary goal of major space 
powers, then the prospects for military 
competition and conflict will increase. 
Enhancing the International System 
 
In a stable environment, space can enhance and 
strengthen the international system. The economic 
and sociocultural imperatives discussed earlier 
suggest the importance of maintaining space as a 
domain for wealth creation and for solving 
problems of humankind. Spacefaring actors 
should consider adopting cooperative approaches 
in space to address some of issues of global 
concern: 
 
• Energy scarcity. 
• Global climate change. 
• Space situational awareness. 
• Space debris. 
• Defense against Earth colliding objects. 
• Material resource scarcity. 
• Extra-terrestrial property regimes. 
 
The ability to forge collective action on these and 
other issues will enhance understanding, 
confidence building, and sharing of knowledge 
that will contribute to the stability of space as a 
regime and to its effectiveness in enhancing 
human prosperity. 
 
Sociocultural Spacepower 
 
Space has been described as a “global commons,” 
a term which suggests a medium or domain that 
exists for the common good of all. Global 
commons are “natural assets outside national 
jurisdiction, such as the oceans, outer space, and 
the Antarctic.”9 There is no international standard 
as to what constitutes a global commons, and 
consideration of such varies widely. In addition to 
the oceans, outer space, and the Antarctic, some 
areas that are considered include: the atmosphere, 
telecommunications (electromagnetic spectrum), 
information, culture, and the environment. The 
idea that space would remain a province for 
cooperation is based on two interrelated principles 
that have been established as international norms: 
                                                
9Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in 
Methods, Series F, No. 67, (New York: United 
Nations, 1997), stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp? 
ID=1120 (accessed 4 August 2007). 
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(1) the peaceful purposes of outer space; and (2) 
the “common heritage of mankind” (CHM).  The 
terms “peaceful purposes” and “common heritage 
of mankind” set forth social expectations that 
space should be used for the common good. 
 
The public persona that satisfies these socio-
cultural expectations can be found in the civil 
space activities of space exploration and space 
sciences. For current and emerging space 
superpowers, its “space program” in the public 
eye will be synonymous with its ability to explore 
beyond the Earth and unlock the secrets of the 
universe. Such a capability proves a state’s 
technological prowess and single-minded ability 
to achieve its lofty goals. Indeed, becoming a 
space superpower is about vying for superpower 
status on the larger stage. Two general principles 
can be derived from the limited history of civil 
space activities: 
 
• Prestige is the primary motivation for 
developing a civil space program. 
• Spacefaring societies seek to extend their 
cultural values into space. 
 
Civil space activities can be categorized into four 
main areas of current or future emphasis: (1) 
space exploration; (2) space science; (3) 
environmental security (both Earth and space 
environments); and (4) human habitation. In 
looking at these areas, the following can be 
derived: 
 
• Space exploration attracts states and societies 
that have expansionist traditions, expansionist 
aspirations or both. 
• Space science is a strategic asset in that it 
ensures technological independence cultural 
identity, supports a science-based society, and 
demonstrates capability and vision. 
• Space provides an opportunity to solve 
common global problems through common 
global solution. 
• Space settlements may one day be the key to 
the survival of the species. 
 
Civil space activities must balance supporting 
national interests while advancing global interests. 
Of all the sectors, civil space activities are most 
likely to be cooperative in nature to achieve the 
goals of such programs, yet the programs 
themselves are subordinate to an actor’s broader 
goals. 
Economic Spacepower 
 
Spacepower both influences and is influenced by 
an actor’s economic power. Space applications 
have enabled globalization, created opportunities 
for development, and enhanced the global nature 
of the economy. In its current state, spacepower 
enables other economic enterprises. The potential 
for creating wealth from space suggests the 
likelihood of expanding development and 
economic competition at some point in the future. 
The point at which that potential is realized is 
greatly dependent on the factors that shape 
spacepower. 
 
Spacepower has been a major, if often 
underappreciated, factor in enabling the 
globalization trend of the last twenty years. The 
explosion in communication and information 
technology was made possible through the global 
view of Earth-orbiting satellites. For developing 
areas of the world, space assets offer ways to 
better manage natural resources and extend 
services to remote populations. Additionally, 
space applications have played a major role in 
economic development. 
 
• Telecommunications from space can be used 
to collect or distribute information from 
dispersed territorial entities. 
• Space-based navigation facilitates the 
management of global fleets enabling the 
rapid movement of goods world-wide. 
• Earth observation and remote sensing play a 
role in the design and implementation of new 
land infrastructure, the management of crops 
and natural resources, the enforcement of 
agricultural policy and environmental treaties, 
and the mitigation of natural disasters. 
• Meteorological satellites greatly improve 
forecasting and monitoring of extreme 
weather conditions and the ability to mitigate 
their effects. 
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The Commercial Space Industry 
 
The commercial space industry includes both an 
upstream segment, which includes manufacturers 
of space hardware and providers of launch 
services, and a downstream segment of satellite 
operators and providers of space-enabled products 
and services. Currently, the commercial space 
industry is focused almost exclusively from Earth-
orbiting applications. The key characteristics of 
space-based activities that bear on the commercial 
space industry include: high risk; high-cost 
research and development; complexity of new 
technologies; economies of scope; dual-use nature 
of the technology; long gestation and durability of 
space assets; long value-added chain; and 
economies of scale downstream.10 
 
The current economic paradigm is to use satellite 
technology to create wealth from space. Space 
service include: satellite telecommunications; 
satellite subscription and retail services; 
interactive broadband; global positioning, 
navigation, and timing (PNT); and commercial 
Earth observation. 
 
The future economic paradigm will be to create 
wealth in space. Additionally, economic 
enterprises will not be limited to Earth’s orbital 
plane. Eventually, wealth creation will occur on 
other planets and celestial bodies as well as in 
deep space. The timing of such activity is again 
dependent on the set of interrelated shaping 
factors. Some of the applications likely to create 
wealth in space over the next fifty years include: 
space tourism and adventure (orbital and sub-
orbital flights); in-orbit servicing; space 
manufacturing (e.g., pharmaceutical products and 
new materials developed in microgravity); energy 
from space. (e.g., space based solar power 
systems to provide Energy to Earth.); and 
extraterrestrial mining. (e.g., mines on the Moon 
to harvest Helium-3 or mining near Earth objects 
                                                
10Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD), Space 2030: Exploring the 
Future of Space Applications, (Paris: OECD, 
2004). 
for minerals). The ability to develop these markets 
depends requires: 
 
• Significantly reduced access costs. 
• Favorable economic environment. 
• Safety and security of space assets and 
humans in space. 
 
A robust and vibrant space economy is highly 
dependent on a number of factors. A review of 
those factors yields the following insights: 
 
• The economic paradigm will eventually shift 
from creating wealth from space to creating 
wealth in space. New markets will develop 
that could radically alter the outlook for 
economic development in space. 
• Technology is the most significant factor 
shaping the commercial space industry. 
Radical technological improvements, 
particularly in space access, will produce 
profound changes in what can or cannot be 
accomplished in space. 
• The high costs of current space activity 
require heavy research and development 
efforts and assumption of risks beyond the 
scope of most space entrepreneurs. Sustained 
involvement of governments will be required 
to mitigate this risk in the near term. 
• From an economic perspective, space should 
be a domain free to the pursuit of economic 
goals. The economic “global commons” 
approach is viewed differently from the 
sociocultural context that suggests all 
development benefits should be shared. 
• Stability of the space-enabled information 
infrastructure is essential to continued global 
economic growth and vitality. Conflict, or the 
threat of conflict, would have serious effects 
on information flows vital to the global 
economy. 
 
Security Spacepower 
 
Notions of security in space (and through space) 
vary markedly based on the perspectives of 
diverse actors, a broad range of challenges and 
threats, and the nature of various space activities 
themselves. Space activities enable economic 
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security by enhancing the value of global 
economic interdependency, while reducing the 
vulnerabilities of singular actors. Human security 
can be advanced through such activities as: space-
based telemedicine; infectious disease control; 
and enabling expansion of economic development 
in rural areas or those areas previously 
inaccessible to basic services. Environmental 
security can be enhanced through global 
monitoring of the Earth and solar system. Energy 
security may be achieved by those that are able to 
tap into a potentially unlimited source of solar and 
other forms of power in space. 
 
While space has a role in each of these security 
areas, spacepower is often thought of in the 
context of national security as it enhances the 
ability of spacefaring nations to compete and 
thrive in an anarchic international security 
environment. The use of the terms “power” and 
“spacepower” are most closely associated with the 
notion of power as accorded to the state. While 
there clearly are many other forms of power 
wielded by many different types of actors in and 
through space, this project assumes that the state 
will remain the dominant form of power broker 
for the foreseeable future. Thus, it is important to 
consider the how spacepower relates to national 
security. 
 
States and other actors tend to focus on pursuing 
their own interests. Space capabilities enhance the 
ability of an actor to gain economic, political, or 
military power relative to those that do not 
possess spacepower. Space confers strategic, 
operational, and tactical advantages because it 
provides a global view of the terrestrial 
environment in which competition and conflict 
currently takes place. In the future, space actors 
may seek to control key “geographic” regions of 
space (e.g., libration points, lunar antipodal 
points, preferred earth/lunar orbits) to gain 
strategic advantage for exploiting resources or 
establishing space lines of communication. 
 
Depending upon how it perceives its national 
interests, a space power may pursue security in 
several basic ways: it may seek to maintain a 
favorable status quo; it may seek to expand its 
power to increase or close a perceived gap relative 
to other space powers; or it may seek to limit or 
constrain the power of other space actors. A 
spacefaring state will have two main concerns 
with regard to security and its space capabilities: 
(1) how to use space capabilities to provide for, 
support, and enhance the overall security of the 
state or related actors (security through space); 
and (2) maintaining the security of space 
capabilities themselves, both military and non-
military (security in space). 
 
Space is an operationally distinct medium. 
Spacepower, however, is not strategically distinct; 
it is part and parcel of an actor’s ability to 
influence human (and perhaps natural) events 
regardless of where they occur. Spacepower may 
provide strategic advantage on earth or in space. 
 
Security through space implies the use of space 
assets to enhance the security posture of an actor 
or set of actors on Earth. Space capabilities may 
be used by an actor to prevent conflict and ensure 
stability through: 
 
• Transparency. The ability to “see” 
capabilities as they are developed and events 
as they unfold reduces uncertainty and 
provides strategic warning. 
• Deterrence. The space-based reconnaissance 
complex plays an important role in providing 
warning as well as command and control for 
nuclear forces. 
 
Conversely, a state may use its space assets to 
enhance terrestrial warfighting capability through: 
 
• Force enhancement. Space forces greatly 
enhance the capability of air, land, and sea 
forces through PNT, command and control, 
and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR). 
• Force application. In the future, actors may 
develop ways to apply force directly from 
space to generate combat effects on the 
terrestrial battlefield. Defenses may also be 
deployed in space to deter and protect against 
ballistic missile attacks. 
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Security in space concerns the protection of space 
assets themselves, whether used for military or 
civilian purposes. States, particularly those with 
strategic advantage, will seek to maximize their 
freedom of action in space. In order to do so, an 
actor may seek capabilities in the following areas: 
 
Transparency. Space situational awareness 
(SSA) is essential to identifying potential threats 
in space. Equally important is transparency over 
potential adversaries ground based activity as it 
relates to space. 
 
Protection. The fragile and vulnerable nature of 
space assets, particularly commercial and civil 
assets, suggests that protection measures be 
considered early in the design cycle of space 
systems. Military forces may be called upon to 
protect civilian assets. 
 
• Denial. The ability to negate adversary space 
capabilities, through such means as ASAT 
programs, may permanently or temporarily 
shift advantage in space. 
• Space control. Space control is a combination 
of protection and denial strategies. An actor 
desiring freedom of action in space may also 
wish to limit its adversary’s freedom of action 
to remove a perceived threat. This requires 
maximizing both protection and negation 
capabilities (e.g., defensive and offensive 
counterspace). 
 
A number of security challenges and dilemmas 
arise as actors pursue individual interests in space: 
 
• Space assets are fragile and vulnerable. 
Should space become a contested 
environment? The fragility and vulnerability 
of space systems make them attractive targets 
and complicates the ability to defend in space. 
• The lines between civilian and military 
space assets become blurred. Systems 
deployed in space have the ability to be used 
for more than one purpose. Commercial 
communications satellites carry a large portion 
of military communications and can become 
vulnerable to attack in a conflict scenario. 
• Capabilities designed to enhance security 
through space may reduce security in 
space, and vice versa. For example, space-
based missile defenses may enhance 
protection against ballistic missiles, but they 
themselves become a strategic target and open 
the possibility for conflict in space. 
• Achieving the economic and sociocultural 
potential of space requires enduring 
stability in the domain. Individual or 
unilateral strategies to expand power, limit 
adversaries’ power, or maintain freedom of 
action in space may threaten overall stability 
of the system. 
 
Spacefaring states will pursue security strategies 
in space based on their degree of reliance on space 
capabilities, perceived vulnerabilities both in and 
from space, and the perceived behavior of other 
actors. The following behavioral models may be 
observed as actors seek to meet their security 
needs in space: 
 
• Space dominator. A domination strategy can 
only be attempted by a comprehensive 
spacepower with a highly advance military 
capability. A space dominator is likely to be 
highly reliant on spacepower to achieve its 
objectives in both in space and on Earth, and 
at the same time may feel a certain amount of 
insecurity due to the vulnerability and fragility 
of its space assets. Such a strategy would seek 
to increase its relative power vis-à-vis other 
space actors to enable freedom of action to 
pursue its interests in and through space. The 
dominator sees space as the ultimate high 
ground, and perceives a strategic advantage to 
dominating certain key regions of space, either 
for military or economic advantage. Such an 
actor would also seek to deny any competitor 
access to these areas or other areas that would 
diminish the dominator’s relative advantage. 
The risks associated with such a strategy 
include high cost of pursuing technologies, 
miscalculation, potential for arms race, and 
asymmetric responses by other actors. Space 
dominators would feel challenged by another 
space dominator, constrainers, or spoilers. 
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• Space protector. Space protection is an 
alternate strategy that might be employed by a 
highly reliant, highly vulnerable space power. 
The aim of the protector differs in that it seeks 
only to protect its ability to benefit from space 
without regard to other actors. In other words, 
the protector seeks to maximize the absolute 
benefit it derives from space without concern 
of relative gain over others. A protection 
strategy would maximize capabilities such as: 
SSA; passive or active satellite protection; and 
operationally responsive space. At the same 
time, this strategy risks providing a window of 
opportunity to a competitor to advance its 
position relative to the protector. A protector 
would feel threatened by a space dominator or 
a spoiler, or an actor moving to one of those 
strategies. 
• Constrainer. An actor with more limited 
space capabilities might adopt a constraining 
strategy to limit relative gains by other actors. 
A constrainer would likely be less reliant on 
space than a more comprehensive space 
power, but may feel threatened by increasing 
gains by others. Arms control and legal 
restrictions are favored in this type of strategy 
as they are used to constrain the power of 
other actors. The object of this constraining 
behavior is likely to be a perceived space 
dominator or a possible spoiler that develops 
asymmetric capabilities. While attempting to 
constrain certain actors, this strategy might 
inadvertently allow other actors to gain 
primacy. 
• Spoiler. Like a constrainer, a spoiler may be 
at a relative disadvantage with regard to other 
space actors, but this disadvantage is likely to 
be more strategically significant, particularly 
in times of crisis or war against a 
comprehensive space power. A spoiler would 
seek to employ asymmetric power, such as an 
ASAT capability to mitigate this vulnerability. 
Spoilers are most likely to arise in reaction to 
a space dominator or protector. The spoiler 
risks miscalculating the response of its object 
and may find itself as the target of retaliation. 
• Collaborator. A collaborative strategy may 
be employed by an actor who does not feel a 
direct threat from the space capabilities of 
other actors, and wants to avoid direct security 
competition in the future. It will seek to 
protect its absolute gains in space through 
collective security arrangements and 
collaboration in other areas. The collaborator 
seeks interdependence with other space actors 
to avoid conflict. It may align with a 
dominator, protector, or constrainer and may 
feel threatened by a different dominator or 
spoiler. 
• Free rider. Free riders seek to minimize their 
security profile and depend on the protection 
of the system or of others. They tend not to be 
in direct competition with other security actors 
and seek to maximize the absolute benefits 
they derive from their space activities. 
 
Ideally, stability is best achieved when all actors 
pursue strategies that seek only absolute gains 
from their space activity, rather than relative gains 
in power vis-à-vis other space actors. Protectors, 
collaborators, and free riders are compatible with 
mutual gains by other actors. Dominators, 
constrainers, and spoilers look to enhance their 
own spacepower or constrain or deny the power 
of others and therefore, cause more perturbations 
in the system. The more asymmetry that is 
introduced among actors, the more unstable the 
situation. For instance, two dominators in the 
system may create security problems for each 
other, but may create a stable system as each one 
checks the other. Nonetheless, a dominator 
challenged by a spoiler can lead to conflict as a 
spoiler sees a narrow window of opportunity for 
courses of action. Moreover, as perceived security 
needs change, so will the strategies employed. As 
one actor perceives a change by another actor, it is 
likely to adapt if that change creates more 
vulnerability or offers new opportunities to gain 
relative advantage. 
 
Summary 
 
The development of spacepower theory is an 
ongoing process. As the world develops new 
technologies, employs new ways of using space, 
and develops new frameworks for regulating it, 
the impact of space will continue to evolve. 
Spacepower theory provides the opportunity to 
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influence this process in a way that maximizes the 
benefits of space for the global society. The future 
of humankind will be written by the thought and 
action of society as it ventures into the universe. 
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Summer Space Seminar 2007 
 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
Space Policy Institute, George Washington University 
 
Colorado and Washington, DC, May – June 2007 
 
 
The Summer Space Seminar 2007 proffered two 
principal goals: (1) to foster an education and 
interest in the interdisciplinary areas of space with 
the intent to develop space professionals now or 
in the future; and (2) to develop a network of 
relations across future civil, commercial, and 
military space professionals that will likely 
emerge from the participants in the Seminar. 
 
In regard to the first goal, the Seminar exposed 
participants to the breadth and depth of space 
activities in the civil, military, and commercial 
areas. The seminar covered a number of topics: 
(1) space technology, space physics, space 
weather, planetary sciences, space law, space 
policy, space management, space history, space 
economics, and human space exploration in the 
civil area; (2) national security space, including 
the role of space in bringing effects to the 
warfighter, Air Force space professional 
development, Air Force space history, and space 
power in the military area; and (3) space 
commercial development in the satellite and space 
launch industries. The relationships among these 
topics were explored across a number of 
perspectives. To illustrate, participants were first 
exposed to the technology and science of space 
activities, followed by discussions on the political, 
legal, economic, and social aspects that influence 
the development and application of the various 
civil, commercial, military space activities. 
 
The Seminar was successful in recruiting a 
diverse set of participants. The program brought 
together students from the United States (U.S.) 
Air Force Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. 
Military Academy, George Washington 
University, and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology helping to lay a foundation for a 
future space policy community in the military, 
civilian government, and private sectors. 
For some in the group the seminar was their first 
exposure to the role and importance of space, for 
others it exposed them to other areas that affect 
space beyond technology and science like policy, 
law, and economics, and for others it served as 
useful forum for further professional development 
given that several of the participants worked, or 
are currently employed, as space professionals. 
Given this diversity among participants, a great 
deal of learning and socialization took place 
among the group that will serve to meet the 
second goal in future years. 
 
Northrop Grumman has agreed to support a 2nd 
Summer Space Seminar planned for May 2008. 
 
Ambassador Roger Harrison and Dr. Eligar Sadeh 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
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China Working Group: China, Space, and Strategy 
 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University 
 
Keystone, Colorado, June 2007 
 
Chinese advances in its space program in recent years 
has led to a growing international interest in the 
implications of Chinese programs in the civil, 
military, and commercial space sectors. This 
workshop, sponsored by the United States (U.S.) Air 
Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies and the Air University School of 
Advanced Air and Space Studies, brought together a 
community of experts and policy-makers to discuss 
the implications of current and future Chinese space 
developments on space policy and law, in particular 
the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted in 
January 2007. 
 
Thirty-five individuals attended the workshop, 
including, among others, Major General Armor of the 
National Security Space Office, Dick Buenneke of the 
State Department (State), Tom Reich representing the 
East Asia Bureau of State, Hong Yuan of the Center 
for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies in 
Beijing, Wu Chunsi of the Shanghai Institute for 
International Studies, Dean Cheng of the Office of 
Naval Analysis, who acted as a translator when need 
for the Chinese nationals, and representatives from 
Europe, aerospace companies like Lockheed Martin, 
and leading academic scholars and consultants in 
space policy and space law. The one-day workshop 
focused on both military and commercial aspects of 
the U.S.-Chinese relationship in space. It was 
conducted under Chatham House rules, which forbid 
citing specific comments made by the participants. 
 
In general, it was my impression from the statements 
made during the day, as I said in my summation at the 
end of the session, that the U.S. side was leaning well 
forward, ready to engage more actively at any sign 
that the Chinese were willing to be forthcoming. 
There was little to sign of a positive response from 
the Chinese side, although there was a statement to 
the effect that, in the “opinion” of the speaker, there 
will be no further ASAT tests of any kind, at least 
through 2012. It is safe to say that U.S. officials at the 
meeting were skeptical about this assurance. 
Of note, was the revelation that the Chinese scholars 
viewed U.S. actions the past decade with much 
suspicion and even threatening to China’s national 
interests. In this regard, the Chinese nationals directly 
pointed to the U.S. unwillingness to cooperate with 
the Chinese in civil and commercial space, U.S. 
actions like the “inadvertent” bombing of the Chinese 
embassy during the war in Kosovo, and the emerging 
doctrine of counterspace operations in the U.S. that is 
also reflected in the 2006 Bush national space policy. 
It was mentioned by the Chinese scholars that these 
events encouraged the Chinese to undertake a path to 
developing comprehensive space power capabilities. 
The ASAT test of January 2007 conducted by the 
Chinese was viewed internally as routine test along 
this path 
 
The Chinese scholars also emphasized the importance 
of language. For example, the talk of “transparency,” 
which is an important idea that U.S. officials stress to 
the Chinese, as the word is translated into Mandarin, 
has overtones of espionage, and therefore, would not 
elicit a positive response. This pointed to the need for 
more involvement by Chinese linguists in formulating 
our policy statements on China space; one term 
suggested at the workshop was “clarity of intent.” 
 
On the question of Chinese decision-making, the 
Chinese nationals emphasized that the Peoples 
Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) reported up separate communication 
channels to the Supreme Council and that there was 
no direct communication between the two entities. 
Further, the thinking among the Chinese scholars was 
that the PLA is quite insular and there was not enough 
attention paid to the international implications of the 
Chinese ASAT test. The implication is that the test is 
not something that the MFA would likely not have 
suggested. 
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There seemed as well to be a consensus that the U.S. 
reaction to the ASAT test had been relatively 
moderate, that the US was ready for more dialogue, 
and that by “transparency” in our policy statements 
what seemed to be meant was a desire for more 
clarity of intent in space on the part of the Chinese. In 
my conversations with Mr. Yuan, I suggested that as a 
gesture of goodwill the Chinese might want to host a 
similar Space Working Group meeting next year. He 
responded that it would be a useless exercise, since 
the Chinese participants would not dare to speak 
frankly at such a meeting. Finally, the America 
military participants emphasized that they had a 
policy directive in the Bush Space Policy to push for 
greater engagement, including with the Chinese, on 
space issues, and that this is what they intended to do. 
 
The Chinese scholars conveyed that it is in fact the 
Chinese willingness to demonstrate space power that 
creates opportunities for dialogue with the U.S. The 
key is that the U.S. does not, and thus needs to, view 
China as a “legitimate” power. Moreover, the Chinese 
nationals stated that China desires to be a responsible 
player in world affairs. 
 
This workshop was second annual China Working 
Group meeting and the first to include Chinese 
nationals and the U.S. State Department. The meeting 
represents a possible channel for discussions, what is 
being called by State Track 1.5 as distinct from Track 
2. It also strengthened the Eisenhower Center’s 
working relationship with State, our contacts in China 
and with the Chinese community, and our 
relationships among scholars and think-tanks. 
 
 
Ambassador Roger Harrison and Dr. Eligar Sadeh 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
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Future of Space Commerce Workshop: 
Reducing Risks and Fostering Partnerships – 
Synergies between Civil, Military, Commercial, and New Space 
 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
Futron Corporation 
NASA Ames Research Center 
 
Breckenridge, Colorado, August 2007 
 
 
The Future of Space Commerce Workshop brought 
together participants from the civil, military, 
commercial, and new space sectors, and relevant 
academic, consulting, business, and financial 
organizations to discuss and explore how risks 
associated with space commerce development can be 
reduced, and to examine synergies to strengthen and 
advance partnerships between the sectors. The 
workshop was hosted by the United States (U.S.) Air 
Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies in cooperation with Futron 
Corporation and NASA Ames Research Center. 
 
A number of topics were addressed at the workshop. 
These topics included: availability of private money 
and finance; government and private sector 
technology drivers; political and legal framework; 
and environment. The session on private money and 
finance addressed a number of issues that ranged 
from: business planning, capital markets, government 
contracting, venture capital, “angel” investors, 
realistic return on investment, markets for products 
and services, cost or affordability, government 
procurement or purchasing of commercial services, 
prizes for technology innovation, subsidies, tax 
benefits and credits, loans, and government corporate 
ownership models. 
 
The technology drivers part of the workshop focused 
on technology transfer, heritage systems, low cost 
technical innovation, in-house expertise, contracting-
out issues, technical personnel and workforce, and 
reliability and responsiveness of technical systems. 
Following this session, the one on politics and law 
looked at safety regulations, licensing processes, 
export controls, transfer of intellectual property 
rights, and patent protection. Finally, the session on 
the environment examined issues related to space 
commerce and space situational awareness, space 
traffic management, and orbital debris. 
 
Summary of the Discussions 
 
• There is growing dependence between the 
different space sectors- civil, military, and 
commercial. Space in many ways is at a cross-
road in all these sectors. The key issue is how to 
move forward into a “new” space age driven by 
space commercial activity (see Addendum 1). 
There is a strong case to be made that space is in 
the national security interests, but a much weaker 
case is to be made that space is in our national 
economic interests. In the U.S. national security 
trumps commercial space leading to policies, like 
export controls, that undermine space commercial 
development. In addition, there is little 
understanding of the pervasiveness of space in 
many commercial activities and transactions. 
• Of concern to fostering such a new space age, is 
to shift the paradigm on how humans view space. 
This shift needs to better consider human-
space/space-terrestrial connections that will drive 
space commercial activity. 
• A key question to address is why invest in 
commercial space? Clearly, there are markets, but 
the ideas need to be accessible and realistic as to 
ROI considerations. The key issue with 
commercial space is not technical risk per say 
(though single point failure problems can be an 
issue for space launch in particular), but the issue 
of financing and ROI. 
• The issue of risk cuts across a number of factors 
from technical ones related to development and 
innovation, political and legal ones largely 
concerning the regulatory environment, and 
business and market risks. Space commerce is 
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characterized by a misallocation of risk versus 
reward (as in ROI). There is also less tolerance for 
risk as it is in many ways being “regulated” out of 
the way of doing business. 
• There needs to be some attention toward 
developing possible “disruptive” technologies that 
could dramatically change the space commerce 
paradigm. “Experimentation” in space in such 
areas as smallsats and partnerships with both 
private space companies and non-space 
companies is important in this regard. NASA is 
interested in fostering private space commerce. 
Examples include: the NASA COTS program, 
Space Act Agreements with New Space 
companies, and non-space partnerships with 
Goggle, Microsoft, Sun, and Biotech firms. 
• Much of the success in commercial space exists in 
the Satcom sector where the many of the key 
players are not seen or perceived as “space” 
companies. The fact is that many industries are 
enabled by space assets. Value-added services 
making use of remote sensing and GPS data are 
important examples. There are rapidly growing 
markets that will continue to consume such 
services. 
• There are a number of constraints on the 
emergence of this new space age. This includes: 
issues of innovation as many programs and 
projects are locked into funding and acquisition 
patterns that cannot be easily changed or 
modified; the lack of political and public support 
for many space initiatives due to programs and 
projects that are over-budget and over reasonable 
development times; and the U.S. export control 
regime, namely ITAR, that posits barriers to 
international trade and partnerships that 
characterize much of space commercial activity. 
• The basis for positive change to these constraints 
entails political leadership and vision, better 
management systems and organizational 
approaches to overcome budgetary and 
development time issues, and addressing 
workforce issues. 
• There is a general misconception that space law, 
in particular international space law, is prohibitive 
to space commerce. This, in fact, is not the case. 
International space law simply places the state as 
the responsible party for any commercial 
activities that may take place under its legal 
jurisdiction. 
• Space commerce is undergoing radical change 
due to private space activities that will lead to 
operational space ports to support private human 
spaceflight. The U.S. federal government, through 
the FAA-AST, is working to foster a positive 
regulatory environment that allows for private 
space activities to grow and prosper. 
• Education and workforce issues where viewed as 
critical ones for space commerce development. 
Where will space commerce get the next 
generation technical workforce? High-percentages 
(more than 50% in some cases) of STEM graduate 
student in the U.S. are foreign nationals. Given 
this fact, there is a need to address export control 
concerns (e.g., ITAR) to better learn from foreign 
nationals (e.g., facilitate technology transfer). 
Other approaches could involve making better use 
of off-the-shelf technologies. Clearly, there is a 
need to emphasize a national commitment to 
STEM education at all levels. 
• There is a strong consensus that the U.S., export 
control regime, ITAR, needs to be modified. 
ITAR has a direct effect on space commerce (see 
articles in this issue of the journal) and U.S. space 
and defense industrial base. ITAR also affects 
government agencies as much as those on the 
commercial side of space. 
• The U.S. is at disadvantage in the global space 
business due to ITAR and the clear demarcations 
that are drawn in the U.S. between government 
space and commercial space. This latter issue 
limits the range of approaches that the U.S. could 
take to better foster space commercial 
development. 
• The space environment is another key issue that 
affects space commerce. There is a mission cost, 
for example, to mitigate environmental dangers, 
like orbital debris proliferation. There are as well 
issues related to scarcity of resources and their 
efficient use, such as spectrum allocations. 
International standards are a key towards 
addressing many of the space environmental 
issues and challenges, and also necessary for 
space business to exercise due diligence in their 
safety and liability concerns and obligations. 
• Space traffic management is another issue that 
requires some resolution as there is currently no 
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U.S. government policy on this or any set of 
international standards (“rules of the road”) on 
this issue. This is of concern as apace is more 
crowed with more government and commercial 
players. 
• Related to the space environmental issues is how 
to bets hare data (space situational awareness) 
between governments and with space commercial 
entities (see summary report herein on Space 
Situational Awareness workshop). 
 
A summary of the synthesis discussions that took 
place at the workshop is provided in the table below. 
The synthesis discussion focused on what works in 
space commerce, what does not work, and what are 
the ways forward to better develop and foster space 
commerce. 
 
What Works Does Not Work Ways Forward 
Economy depends on space assets / 
critical economic enabler 
Workforce issues Develop space-based 
infrastructure (government lead) 
Commercial satellite operations Export controls (ITAR) Reform ITAR 
New space players / new operational 
modes and ways of doing business 
Space manufacturing not a 
realistic business 
Reduce cost of doing space 
business 
Stable funding for space commence Cost-plus contracting  Aim to get cost-plus contracting to 
no more than 15% of the way to 
do business / move more to fixed-
pricing contracting model 
Emergence of prizes to encourage 
innovation (see Addendum 1) 
Space is branded with NASA and 
not with commercial activity 
Non-traditional partnerships 
More willingness for risk-taking (New 
Space) 
Barriers to entry / economies of 
scale, politics as in ITAR 
Leadership and vision on space 
commercial development 
Concentrated private ownership / 
availability pf private monies 
Low tolerance for risk (heritage 
space companies) 
Delivering what is promised 
(budget and development time 
issues) 
Space business ideas are more realistic 
(ROI issues) / better business planning 
and execution 
Over regulation of space 
commerce (issue with Federal 
Acquisition Regulations) 
Evolve legal regimes to meet 
challenges of space commerce 
 
 
Addendum 1: Envisioning Space Commerce 2010 – 2030 
 
Molly Macauley, Senior Fellow Resources for the Future 
 
Perspectives 
 
(1) “But for now, in spite of my usual optimism, I 
must say that I do not see any ready examples of 
stand-alone business successes in space. All must 
count on government orders to supplement their 
commercial business.” John L. McLucas, Space 
Commerce (Boston, Harvard University Press), 1991, 
p. 213. 
 
(2) “If we ever see cities on the moon or Mars – the 
kind of thing science fiction once promised so 
enticingly – I’m betting that the lion’s share of credit 
will go not to NASA but to 21st century rocketeers.” 
Glenn Reynolds, reviewing Rocketeers by Michael 
Belfiore in The Wall Street Journal 28-29 July 2007, 
p.11. 
 
(3) “Given NASA’s politicization, we should hope 
that the space industry evolves as aviation did – 
transitioning from ponderous government-run 
projects to mostly private-sector activities attuned to 
customer needs. That raises the question: Could 
entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos 
eventually put NASA out of business? Perhaps, but 
not for the next couple of decades – space has 
colossal economic barriers to entry. Given that NASA 
is sure to be around for a while, taxpayers should 
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insist the space agency be reconfigured to produce 
tangible benefits for all of us {earth observations and 
asteroid monitoring}. With any luck, private space 
enterprise will eventually find success and begin to 
exert competitive market pressures on the government 
space program.” Gregg Easterbrook, “How NASA 
Screwed Up,” WIRED, June 2007, pp. 154-155. {} 
added. 
 
Space Commerce 
 
Early Years (1960s–1980s) 
 
• COMSAT raised its first capital by way of an 
oversubscribed $200 million stock issue, but 
failed to raise money for a direct to home satellite 
television service several years’ later. 
• RCA, Western Union, GE, AT&T, GTE, Hughes– 
all had relatively easy access to capital. 
• Smaller companies (American Satellite, Direct 
Broadcast Satellite Corporation, Orion Satellite 
Corporation) had much more difficult access. 
• Among early navigation suppliers, Qualcomm 
leased Ku-band transponders and used equity and 
funding from Goldman Sachs. Geostar required 
dedicated satellites and had more difficulty 
(Gerard O’Neill and Wheat First Securities 
provided initial funding).  
• Orbital Sciences had private financing and 
venture capital; sold part of the company to 
Hercules (which provided the rocket motors); then 
went public in 1990. 
 
Middle Years (1980s–2007) 
 
• Deregulation here and internationally 
(telecommunications satellites). 
• Mergers and acquisitions in aerospace (from 76 
companies in 1980 to 5 in 2007). 
• Venture capital. 
• Return of prizes. 
• Return of the industrialist. 
• Emergence of space access as commodity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coming Decades (2007–2030) 
 
• Relatively few mergers (1998 – attempted merger 
between Northrop Grumman and Lockheed 
Martin failed to obtain government approval). 
• Acquisitions? (Increase in ownership share from 
40% to 100% of Scaled Composites (builder of 
SpaceShipOne) by Northrop Grumman. 
• Will capital markets, government policy, 
industrialist interest be favorable to space 
commerce? 
• Will responsibility for and funding of Earth 
observations for environmental monitoring 
evolves to another agency? 
• What will happen to federal funding of space 
activities with the arrival of financial challenges 
of entitlements programs (Social Security and 
Medicare)? 
 
 
Government (Taxpayer) Financing and Space 
Commerce 
 
Tax-Based Incentives 
 
• Tax credits (most notably, the R&D tax credit). 
• R&D expensing. 
• Some previous legislative initiatives: 
 
Space Tourism Promotion Act 2001 - H.R. 2443 
- sought to stimulate the development of space 
tourism by means of guaranteed loans, tax credits, 
establishment of a "straightforward and 
predictable regulatory structure.” However, US 
government space vehicles and the US modules of 
the space station could not be used by anyone 
except officially permitted visitors. Sponsored by 
Rep. Nick Lampson (D-TX). 
 
Zero Gravity Zero Tax Bill  2003- H.R. 914 – 
would exclude space-related income from gross 
income for calculating income taxes for 10 years, 
except for income from space-based 
telecommunications, remote-sensing, and space 
launch companies currently in business. Would 
provide $100 million in tax credits for 
investments in new space enterprises. No capital 
gains tax on the sale of the stock for a period of 
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10 years. Sponsored by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher 
(R-CA). 
 
Invest in Space Now Act 2003 - H.R. 2177 – 
would provide tax credits to investments in 
qualified new space launch vehicles. The sliding 
scale would drop from 50% of the value of the 
stock in 2002 to zero after 2010. Sponsored by 
Rep. Ken Calvert (R-CA) and Rep. Solomon Ortiz 
(TX). 
 
Spaceport Equality Act 2003 - H.R.644 – would 
allow commercial spaceports, like airports, to be 
financed with bonds exempt from federal tax on 
their interest payments (much like tax-free 
municipal bonds). Sponsored by Rep. Dave 
Weldon (R-FL.). 
 
Competitive Bidding Processes 
 
• Grants and contracts (prize is a commitment to 
procure). 
• Prizes (typically ex ante, or “inducement prizes” 
as distinguished from ex post awards). 
 
Use of government-owned, government-operated or 
contractor-operated laboratories or other research 
facilities 
 
State or local government concessions (such as 
financing spaceports) 
 
Other forms of government involvement indirectly 
(but perhaps significantly) affecting financing 
 
• Oversight of mergers and acquisitions. 
• Intellectual property protection. 
• Legislative and regulatory provisions. 
• National security concerns (such as those 
addressed by International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations- ITAR). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industrialists, Other Champions, and Private 
Capital 
 
Industrialists 
 
Esther Dyson, an investor in Constellation Services, 
ICON Aircraft, Space Adventures, XCOR, and Zero-
Gravity Corporation, writing in Space News, 14 May 
2007: “an illustrious crew of pioneers:” 
 
• Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Space 
Exploration Technologies Corp and founder of 
PayPal. 
• Vern Raburn, CEO of Eclipse Aviation (which 
produces very light jets) and formerly at 
Microsoft, Symantec, and Lotus. 
• Jeff Bezos, founder of Blue Origin and still at 
Amazon, which he also founded. 
• Jeff Greason, founder of XCOR and formerly 
with Intel. 
• Ed Iacobucci, president and CEO of air taxi 
operator Dayjet Corporation and founder of 
Citrix. 
 
She goes on to comment in Space News: 
 
“While investors are starting to take note, they remain 
nervous. The challenge for these start-ups right now is 
that investors want to invest in the third round. They 
want someone else to take the risks so they can come 
in when the price has been beaten down and the risks 
have been overcome. …This is indeed what happened 
with FedEx. As venture capitalist Rick Stowe recalls: 
‘The third-round FedEx investors were most – but not 
all – of the first- and second-round investors. The 
only new ones were (lawyer) Bill Hewitt and 
management other than (founder) Fred (Smith). The 
third round ($3.9 million for two-thirds of the 
company) was one of history’s best deals, but we 
couldn’t sell it to anyone who wasn’t already mired in 
the company. The upside was a little murky at the 
time!” 
 
Examples not on Dyson’s list: 
 
Paul Allen, cofounder of Microsoft and investor in 
Scaled Composites (builder of SpaceShipOne and 
winner of the $10 million Ansari X Prize in 2004. 
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• Sir Richard Branson, founder and owner of over 
350 companies including Virgin Records and 
Virgin Atlantic Airways and founder of Virgin 
Galactic, which plans to license the technology 
behind SpaceShipOne. 
• Robert Bigelow, real estate developer and 
developer of the Genesis inflatable space station 
structures. 
•  
Space News, 25 June 2007 
 
“In 2006 approximately 234,000 angel investors in 
the US invested $25.6 billion in 51,000 deals across 
all industries. Total seed-stage angel funding for new 
space ventures, however, amounted to at most $10 
million spread over approximately 10 deals, which 
were sourced entirely from individual investors… 
The disparity in these figures clearly demonstrates 
both the absence of an educated and space-savvy 
angel investor community, as well as a pressing need 
for companies to show potential investors better 
business models and more experienced management 
teams.” 
 
“U.S. venture capital investment in 2006, in contrast, 
reached $25.8 billion, and was spread over slightly 
more than 3,000 deals with no known investments in 
core space infrastructure startups.” 
 
“Traditional definitions of ‘New Space’ and 
‘alt.space’ tend to emphasize high-risk Earth-to-space 
and space-to-space applications, such as space 
tourism, rocket launchers, on-orbit refueling facilities, 
on-orbit servicing and space solar power. These 
definitions ignore the wider expanse of lower-risk 
space-to-Earth and Earth-to-Earth startups such as 
telecommunications, Earth observation, navigation 
and mapping, telemedicine, space-themed attractions, 
and many other mainstream applications. …superior 
investment prospects due to track record of successful 
exits that are well understood by the mainstream 
investor community around the globe.”  
 
Note on the Jargon 
 
The “technology startup financing pipeline” includes: 
(1) “pre-seed” and “seed-stage,” early stage where 
angel investors play a role; and (2) “venture” stage, a 
somewhat later stage– with slightly more certain exit 
strategies. 
Background Information 
 
Examples of inducement prizes sponsored by private 
sector: 
• Auto races (achievements in speed, durability, 
aesthetics, and economy) – Publishers, 
industrialists. 
• Aviation (distance, speed, endurance) – 
Publishers, industrialists. 
• Ansari X-Prize (26 teams, 7 different countries, 
estimated $100 million of private R&D spending 
for $10 million prize). 
• Archon X Prize for Genomics ($10 M to map 100 
human genomes in 10 days to advance 
personalized preventative medicine) – X-Prize 
Foundation. 
• Virgin Earth Challenge ($ 25 M to remove 1 
billion metric tons of carbon for 10 years; $5 M at 
start of removal and $20 M at end of 10 years; 
financed by Richard Branson). 
• The Grainger Challenge Prize (($1.0 M, 
$200,000, and $100,000 for design and creation of 
a point-of-use water treatment system for 
developing countries) – The National Academy of 
Engineering and the Grainger Foundation. 
 
Examples of inducement prizes sponsored by 
government sector or government and private sectors: 
• Chronometers (longitude)– Royal Navy, London 
merchants, and commercial ships’ captains (three 
prizes for varying degrees of accuracy; first place 
about equal to US $3.1 million in today’s dollars). 
• Alkali– French Academy of Sciences. 
• Canning– Napoleon’s Society for the 
Encouragement of Industry. 
• Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program – sponsored 
by US Environmental Protection Agency and 25 
electric utilities (winner (Whirlpool) never 
received full allotment of prize money). 
• The Automotive X Prize (AXP) (build a 100 mile 
per gallon vehicle – funding not yet attained as of 
August 2007)– X Prize Foundation, other 
foundations, nongovernmental organizations, 
government agencies. 
• DARPA Grand Challenge. 
• DDR&E Prize (various amounts to solve 
problems of military interest; current offering is 
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$1 M, $.5 M, and $.25 M for a wearable poser 
system)– The 2007 NDAA Defense bill. 
• NASA Centennial Challenges  
 
Challenge Date Challenge Name Purse Allied Organization 
Oct 13-21, 2007 2007 Beam Power Challenge $500K The Spaceward Foundation (non-NASA link) 
Oct 13-21, 2007 2007 Tether Challenge $500K The Spaceward Foundation (non-NASA link) 
Oct 26-28, 2007 Lunar Lander Challenge $2M The X PRIZE Foundation (non-NASA link) 
2008 (Date TBD) Astronaut Glove Challenge $400K Volanz Aerospace Inc./Spaceflight America (non-NASA link) 
2008 (Date TBD) 2008 Regolith Excavation Challenge $750K 
California Space Education & Workforce Institute 
(CSEWI) (non-NASA link) 
2008 (Date TBD) 2008 Personal Air Vehicle Challenge $300K 
Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency (CAFE) 
Foundation (non-NASA link) 
Expires Jun 1, 2008 
Moon Regolith Oxygen 
Extraction (Moon ROx) 
Challenge 
$1M California Space Education & Workforce Institute (CSEWI) (non-NASA link) 
Abbreviations: 
CAFE = Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency Foundation 
CSEWI = California Space Education and Workforce Institute 
Moon ROx = Moon Regolith Oxygen 
Source: centennialchallenges.nasa.gov (accessed July 2007) 
 
 
Challenge Date Challenge Name Winner/Purse Allied Organization 
Aug 4-11, 2007 2007 Personal Air Vehicle Challenge  
Vance Turner / $100K Vantage Prize  
Dave and Diane Anders / $50K Noise Prize  
John Rehn / $25K Handling Qualities  
Vance Turner / $25K Shortest Runway Prize  
Vance Turner / $25K Efficiency Prize  
Dave and Diane Anders / $15K Top Speed 
First Prize  
Vance Turner / $10K Top Speed Second 
Prize 
Comparative Aircraft 
Flight Efficiency (CAFE) 
Foundation  
(non-NASA link) 
May 11-12, 2007 
2007 Regolith 
Excavation 
Challenge 
None/$250K 
California Space 
Education & Workforce 
Institute (CSEWI)  
(non-NASA link) 
May 2-3, 2007 2007 Astronaut Glove Challenge Peter Homer/$200K 
Volanz Aerospace 
Inc./Spaceflight America  
(non-NASA link) 
Oct 20-21, 2006 2006 Beam Power Challenge None/$200K 
The Spaceward 
Foundation 
Oct 20-21, 2006 2006 Tether Challenge None/$200K 
The Spaceward 
Foundation 
Oct 20-21, 2006 2006 Lunar Lander Challenge  None/$2M 
The X PRIZE 
Foundation 
Oct 21-23, 2005 2005 Beam Power Challenge None/$50K 
The Spaceward 
Foundation 
Oct 21-23, 2005 2005 Tether Challenge None/$50K 
The Spaceward 
Foundation 
Source: centennialchallenges.nasa.gov (accessed July 2007) 
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Comparing Government-funded Prizes, Contracts, and Grant 
 
 
 
 
Pros 
Risk borne by innovator not taxpayer  
 
Subsidizes final output or product not inputs 
 
Lower administrative costs 
 
Leverage non-financial incentives (prestige, 
media spotlight) 
 
Lower barriers to entry for small innovative 
companies 
 
Information gleaned about technology state-of-
the-art in event of non-winner 
Possibly more appropriate for basic research 
(risk shared with researcher who must “publish 
or perish”; knowledge gained from research may 
be quickly and widely shared)  
 
Possibly more appropriate for very high-cost 
projects 
 
Pre-proposal and other interim 
competition/review (“prize-like” elements) can 
reduce principal-agent information asymmetry 
 
May reduce duplicative research 
 
 
 
Cons 
Difficult to “size” the prize – depends on ‘value’ 
to nation 
 
Up-front liquidity constraint 
 
Less suited if innovators cannot bear all the risk 
(or very high-cost projects) 
 
May lead to excessive duplication of effort 
during competition 
 
May reward “first past the post” prioritizing 
speed rather than quality 
Government susceptible to cost estimation and 
cost-overrun  problems related to principal- 
agent situation 
 
High entry barriers 
 
Less appropriate for applied technology research 
 
Susceptible to Congressional earmarking 
• Issues with government sponsorship: Likely to require Congressional appropriation; multi-year funding; 
need to convince competitors that government will not renege; if no one wins, is agency budget reduced or 
can funding be reprogrammed; desirable to have information on benefits to taxpayer of the technological 
advance in order to “size” the prize. 
• Some researchers suggest that the contestants themselves propose the size of the prize, as they are better 
informed about costs and the likelihood of success- Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale, “Optimal Design of 
Research Contests,” American Economic Review 93(3): 646-671 (2003). 
• Sources: Based on Richard G. Newell and Nathan E. Wilson, “Technology Prizes for Climate Change 
Mitigation,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 05-33 June 2005 (table 1); Molly K. Macauley, 
“Advantages and Disadvantages of Prizes in a Portfolio of Financial Incentives for Space Activities,” Space 
Policy 21(1): 29-39 (2005) 
 
 
Towards a Space Commerce Future with Prizes? 
 
• Could move beyond NASA to include NSF, 
NIST, DOE, etc, if broader than space influence 
but would then face complexity of oversight from 
multiple Congressional committees  
• The 2004 Aldridge Commission’s report (“A 
Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover”) 
outlines one of the possible ways the U.S. could 
establish a prize for lunar settlement: 
• “...the Commission suggests that… as an example 
of a particularly challenging prize concept, $100 
million to $1 billion could be offered to the first 
organization to place humans on the Moon and 
sustain them for a fixed period before they return 
to Earth.” 
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Space Based Solar Power Workshop 
 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
National Security Space Office 
 
Breckenridge, Colorado, September 2007 
 
 
Preventing resource conflicts in the face of 
increasing global populations and demands in the 
21st century is a high priority for the United States 
(U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD). All 
solution options to these challenges should be 
explored, including opportunities from space. 
 
In March 2007, the National Security Space 
Office’s (NSSO) Advanced Concepts Office 
presented the idea of space based solar power 
(SBSP) as a potential grand opportunity to address 
not only energy security, but environmental, 
economic, intellectual, and space security as well. 
First proposed in the late 1960s, the concept was 
last explored in NASA’s 1997 “Fresh Look” 
Study. In the decade since this last study, 
advances in technology and new challenges to 
security have warranted a current exploration of 
the strategic implications of SBSP. For these 
reasons, NSSO sponsored a no cost Phase 0 
Architecture Feasibility Study of SBSP during the 
spring and summer of 2007. 
 
Unlike traditional contracted architecture studies, 
the report (executive summary is shown below, 
see http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/ 
nsso.htm) was compiled through a collaborative 
approach that relied upon voluntary internet 
discussions by more than 170 academic, 
scientific, technical, legal, and business experts 
around the world. These discussions were 
highlighted in a workshop sponsored by NSSO 
and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies. 
 
The results of the workshop led to the 
development of an interim assessment that 
contains significant initial findings and 
recommendations, which provide pause and 
consideration for national and international 
policy-makers, business leaders, and citizens 
alike. It appears that technological challenges are 
closing rapidly and the business case for creating 
SBSP is improving with each passing year. Still 
absent, however, is an appropriate catalyst to 
stimulate the various interested parties toward 
actually developing SBSP capability. 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Consistent with the U.S. National Security 
Strategy, energy and environmental security are 
not just problems for America; they are critical 
challenges for the entire world. Expanding human 
populations and declining natural resources are 
potential sources of local and strategic conflict in 
the 21st Century, and many see energy scarcity as 
the foremost threat to national security. Conflict 
prevention is of particular interest to security-
providing institutions such as the U.S. DOD, 
which has elevated energy and environmental 
security as priority issues with a mandate to 
proactively find and create solutions that ensure 
U.S. and partner strategic security. 
 
The magnitude of the looming energy and 
environmental problems is significant enough to 
warrant consideration of all options, to include 
revisiting the SBSP concept that was first 
invented in the U.S. almost 40 years ago. The 
basic idea is very straightforward: place very large 
solar arrays into continuously and intensely sunlit 
Earth orbit (1,366 watts/m2), collect gigawatts of 
electrical energy, electromagnetically beam it to 
Earth, and receive it on the surface for use either 
as base-load power via direct connection to the 
existing electrical grid, conversion into 
manufactured synthetic hydrocarbon fuels, or as 
low-intensity broadcast power beamed directly to 
consumers. A single kilometer-wide band of 
geosynchronous Earth orbit experiences enough 
solar flux in one year to nearly equal the amount 
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of energy contained within all known recoverable 
conventional oil reserves on Earth today. This 
amount of energy indicates that there is enormous 
potential for energy security, economic 
development, improved environmental 
stewardship, advancement of general spacefaring 
activities, and overall national security for those 
states that construct and possess SBSP capability. 
 
NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy have 
collectively spent $80 million over the last three 
decades in sporadic efforts studying this concept 
(by comparison, the U.S. Government has spent 
approximately $21 billion over the last 50 years 
continuously pursuing nuclear fusion). The first 
major effort occurred in the 1970s where 
scientific feasibility of the concept was 
established and a reference 5 gigawatt design was 
proposed. Unfortunately 1970s architecture and 
technology levels could not support an economic 
case for development relative to other lower-cost 
energy alternatives on the market. In 1995-1997 
NASA initiated a “Fresh Look” Study to re-
examine the concept relative to modern 
technological capabilities. The report (validated 
by the National Research Council) indicated that 
technology vectors to satisfy SBSP development 
were converging quickly and provided 
recommended development focus areas, but for 
various reasons that again included the relatively 
lower cost of other energies, policy-makers 
elected not to pursue a development effort. 
 
The post-9/11 situation has changed that calculus 
considerably. Oil prices have jumped from $15 
per barrel to more than $100 per barrel in less 
than a decade. In addition to the emergence of 
global concerns over climate change, American 
and allied energy source security is now under 
threat from actors that seek to destabilize or 
control global energy markets as well as increased 
energy demand competition by emerging global 
economies. Our National Security Strategy 
recognizes that many states are too dependent on 
foreign oil, often imported from unstable portions 
of the world, and seeks to remedy the problem by 
accelerating the deployment of clean technologies 
to enhance energy security, reduce poverty, and 
reduce pollution in a way that will ignite an era of 
global growth through free markets and free trade. 
Senior U.S. leaders need solutions with strategic 
impact that can be delivered in a relevant period 
of time. 
 
In March of 2007, the NSSO Advanced Concepts 
Office presented this idea to the agency Director. 
Recognizing the potential for this concept to 
influence not only energy, but also space, 
economic, environmental, and national security, 
the Director instructed the Advanced Concepts 
Office to quickly collect as much information as 
possible on the feasibility of this concept. Without 
the time or funds to contract for a traditional 
architecture study, the Office turned to an 
innovative solution: the creation of an open 
source, internet-based, interactive collaboration 
forum aimed at gathering the world’s SBSP 
experts into one particular cyberspace. Discussion 
grew immediately and exponentially, such that 
there are now 170 active contributors as of the 
release of this report (October 2007); this study 
approach was an unequivocal success and should 
serve as a model for DOD when considering other 
study topics. 
 
Study leaders organized discussions into five 
groups- (1) a common plenary session; (2) science 
and technology; (3) law and policy; (4) 
infrastructure and logistics; and (5) the business 
case- and challenged the group to answer one 
fundamental question: Can the U.S. and partners 
enable the development and deployment of a 
SBSP system within the first half of the 21st 
Century such that if constructed could provide 
affordable, clean, safe, reliable, sustainable, and 
expandable energy for its consumers? Discussion 
results were summarized and presented at a 
workshop in Colorado during September 2007 
hosted by the U.S. Air Force Academy 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies. 
 
Over the course of the study several overarching 
themes emerged: 
 
• The SBSP Study Group concluded that space-
based solar power does present a strategic 
opportunity that could significantly advance 
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U.S. and partner security, capability, and 
freedom of action, and merits significant 
further attention on the part of both the U.S. 
Government and the private sector. 
• The SBSP Study Group concluded that while 
significant technical challenges remain, space-
based solar power is more technically 
executable than ever before, and current 
technological vectors promise to further 
improve its viability. A government-led proof-
of-concept demonstration could serve to 
catalyze commercial sector development. 
• The SBSP Study Group concluded that SBSP 
requires a coordinated national program with 
high-level leadership and resourcing 
commensurate with its promise, at least on the 
level of fusion energy research or 
International Space Station construction and 
operations. 
• The SBSP Study Group concluded that should 
the U.S. begin a coordinated national program 
to develop SBSP, it should expect to find that 
broad interest in SBSP exists outside of the 
U.S. Government, ranging from aerospace and 
energy industries, to foreign governments, 
such as Japan, the European Union, Canada, 
India, China, Russia, and others, to many 
individual citizens who are increasingly 
concerned about the preservation of energy 
security and environmental quality. While the 
best chances for development are likely to 
occur with U.S. Government support, it is 
entirely possible that SBSP development may 
be independently pursued elsewhere without 
U.S. leadership. 
• Certain key questions about SBSP were not 
answerable with adequate precision within the 
time and resource limitations of this interim 
study, and form the agenda for future action. 
The fundamental tasks/questions are: 
identification of clear targets for economic 
viability in markets of interest; identification 
of technical development goals and a roadmap 
for retiring risk; selection of the best design 
trades; and full design and deployment of a 
meaningful demonstrator. 
 
The study group determined four overarching 
recommendations: 
• Recommendation #1: The study group 
recommends that the U.S. Government should 
organize effectively to allow for the 
development of SBSP and conclude analyses 
to resolve remaining unknowns. 
• Recommendation #2: The study group 
recommends that the U.S. Government should 
retire a major portion of the technical risk for 
business development. 
• Recommendation #3: The study group 
recommends that the U.S. Government should 
create a facilitating policy, regulatory, and 
legal environment for the development of 
SBSP. 
• Recommendation #4: The study group 
recommends that the U.S. Government should 
become an early demonstrator/adopter/ 
customer of SBSP and incentivize its 
development. 
 
Several major challenges will need to be 
overcome to make SBSP a reality, including the 
creation of low-cost space access and a supporting 
infrastructure system on Earth and in space. 
Solving these space access and operations 
challenges for SBSP will in turn also open space 
for a host of other activities that include space 
tourism, manufacturing, lunar or asteroid resource 
utilization, and eventually settlement to extend the 
human race. 
 
Because DOD would not want to own SBSP 
satellites, but rather just purchase the delivered 
energy as it currently does via traditional 
terrestrial utilities, a repeated review finding is 
that the commercial sector will need the 
government to accomplish three major tasks to 
catalyze SBSP development. The first is to retire a 
major portion of the early technical risks. This can 
be accomplished via an incremental research and 
development program that culminates with a 
space-borne, proof-of-concept demonstration in 
the next decade. A spiral development proposal to 
field a 10 megawatt continuous pilot plant en 
route to gigawatts-class systems is proposed. The 
second challenge is to facilitate the policy, 
regulatory, legal, and organizational instruments 
that will be necessary to create the partnerships 
and relationships (commercial-commercial, 
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government-commercial, and government-
government) needed for this concept to succeed. 
The final government contribution is to become a 
direct early adopter and to incentivize other early 
adopters much as is accomplished on a regular 
basis with other renewable energy systems 
coming on-line today. 
 
For the DOD specifically, beamed energy from 
space in quantities greater than 5 megawatts 
electrical has the potential to be a disruptive game 
changer on the battlefield. SBSP and its enabling 
wireless power transmission technology could 
facilitate extremely flexible “energy on demand” 
for combat units and installations across an entire 
theater, while significantly reducing dependence 
on vulnerable over-land fuel deliveries. SBSP 
could also enable entirely new force structures 
and capabilities, such as ultra long-endurance 
airborne or terrestrial surveillance or combat 
systems to include the individual soldier himself. 
More routinely, SBSP could provide the ability to 
deliver rapid and sustainable humanitarian energy 
to a disaster area or to a local population 
undergoing state-building activities. SBSP could 
also facilitate base “islanding” such that each 
installation has the ability to operate independent 
of vulnerable ground-based energy delivery 
infrastructures. In addition to helping American 
and allied defense establishments remain relevant 
over the entire 21st Century through more secure 
supply lines; perhaps, the greatest military benefit 
of SBSP is to lessen the chances of conflict due to 
energy scarcity by providing access to a 
strategically secure energy supply. 
 
Despite this early interim review success, there 
are still many more questions that must be 
answered before a full-scale commercial 
development decision can be made. It is proposed 
that in the spirit of the original collaborative 
SBSP Study Group charter, that this interim report 
becomes a living document to collect, summarize, 
and recommend on the evolution of SBSP. The 
positive indicators observed to surround SBSP by 
this review team suggest that it would be in the 
U.S. Government’s and the nation’s interest to 
sponsor an immediate proof-of-concept 
demonstration project and a formally funded, 
follow-on architecture study conducted in full 
collaboration with industry and willing 
international partners. The purpose of a follow-on 
study will be to definitively, rather than 
speculatively, answer the question of whether all 
of the barriers to SBSP development can be 
retired within the next four decades and to create 
an actionable business case and construction 
effort roadmap that will lead to the installation of 
utility-grade SBSP electric power plants. 
Considering the development timescales that are 
involved, and the exponential growth of 
population and resource pressures within that 
same strategic period, it is imperative that this 
work for “drilling up” versus “drilling down” for 
energy security begins immediately. 
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Improving Our Vision II: Building Transparency and Cooperation 
 
Workshop on Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing 
 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies 
World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information 
Secure World Foundation 
 
London, United Kingdom, October 2007 
 
 
This was the second workshop to bring together a 
range of stakeholders to discuss global needs and 
capabilities for Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA). The first workshop was held in September 
2006 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This 2006 
workshop was sponsored by the Eisenhower 
Center for Space and Defense Studies and the 
World Security Institute’s Center for Defense 
Information. The 2006 workshop report can be 
found at the following internet site: 
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/SSAConference_screen.
pdf. 
 
The goal of the SSA workshops are to bring 
together the full range of stakeholders interested 
in SSA– from practitioners to users of data, 
representatives of industry, the military, the 
scientific community, international organizations, 
and the satellite-tracking community– to discuss 
how needs are changing, what improvements in 
capabilities can be achieved in the near- to mid-
term future, and how various stakeholder 
communities might better interact to draw on each 
other’s strengths. 
 
The specific goal of the 2007 SSA workshop was 
to explore, and potentially forward, areas of 
possible transatlantic cooperation and partnership 
to improve SSA data sharing. Space surveillance, 
estimating orbits of satellites in near Earth space 
for varied purposes, including collaborative 
operations, debris management, and more 
effective communication, environmental 
monitoring, and data gathering operations were 
emphasized. In addition, the workshop looked at 
how informal or formal international regimes 
might help underpin or forward improved SSA 
data sharing. More than sixty technical experts, 
management principals from industry and 
government, and respected policy, law, and 
international relations luminaries participated. 
 
Participation included, among others, policy 
makers and technologists from many countries 
and international organizations, including: 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
France, Canada, the United States, the European 
Space Agency, and the UN Committee for the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. While many of the 
presentations were primarily informational, areas 
of consensus during discussions appear to have 
emerged around the potential for building 
informal processes for international data exchange 
that could improve SSA. In addition, all 
participants expressed their dedication to ensuring 
robust SSA to safeguard current and future space 
operations. A full conference report is expected to 
be published in 2008, and there is interest in a 
follow-on workshop in 2008. 
 
The conference was conducted under a modified 
Chatham House Rule, in which prepared 
statements and presentations are attributable to 
their authors, but comments and opinions 
thereafter are not. Presentations are available by 
request at a Google group site 
http://groups.google.com/group/ssa-workshop-
series?hl=en. 
 
A summary of the discussions that took place at 
the workshop is provided below. 
• Phase II of the Commercial and Foreign 
Entities (CFE) program was stressed that will 
include SSA data sharing on maneuver 
notification, debris mitigation, end of life 
management, and respect of protected regions. 
• French space policy was discussed that 
emphasizes freedom of access and security of 
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satellites, while accounting for legitimate 
defense interests. This emphasis serves as the 
strategic guidelines for European space 
collaboration that have been applied for 
Galileo and the Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES). The 
GRAVES space surveillance radar was also 
described. It is operated by the French Air 
Force. 
• It was stated that Germany still relies on the 
United States Air Force (USAF) SSA TLE 
data. At the same time, Germany’s FGAN and 
TIRA space surveillance sensors were 
described, and it was suggested that the 
European Space Operations Center (ESOC) 
located in Germany, which provides satellite 
control for the European Space Agency 
(ESA), serve as a European SSA center. 
• The Globus II space surveillance radar, 
controlled by the Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment, was offered for SSA 
collaboration and sensor calibration. 
• A number of European workshop participants 
declared that Europe must have independent 
SSA. It was recognized that SSA data 
provided by the U.S. is not exhaustive enough 
or responsive enough, yet concomitantly 
Europe could not do the job alone. Many 
European participants were also adamant of 
the European need to validate U.S. 
information (i.e., Europe must independently 
characterize sources of data), questioning the 
credibility of orbit information provided by 
the U.S. 
• The resulting actions to date aimed at an 
independent SSA capability in Europe 
include: ESA forming a civil-military space 
forum and an SSA user group; and European 
Cooperation for Space Standardization 
(ECSS) conducting SSA technology 
development studies. Europe aims to develop 
SSA architecture for tracking, imaging, and 
space weather. The ESA Management Council 
will undertake a data sharing policy. It was 
noted that European SSA is an essential 
element of European commerce and society 
and does not require a business case. 
• Participants stated that there are clear and 
present dangers to space activities that 
necessitate more robust and enhanced SSA 
data sharing. The principal issue is how to 
make space activities safer and more secure, 
given that weaponization of space was viewed 
as a potential obstacle to SSA data sharing. 
• Analogies were drawn with rules of the road 
(codes of conduct) at sea and open skies, and 
how such rules fail to apply in space. The key 
insight was that rules or codes must be 
technically based and that the debate should 
not be conducted only from a legal point of 
view as is the tendency today. 
• It was stressed that international standards 
serve as one of the best ways for more robust 
and enhanced SSA international collaboration. 
Of note, is that there is no world wide forum 
to distill top-level SSA data requirements. 
Although there is uniform agreement on the 
need for SSA data sharing, requirements have 
not been consolidated. 
• It was suggested that NATO serve as a vehicle 
for combined space capability on SSA. 
• Ways in which to better integrate orbital 
debris and space weather data into SSA data 
sharing were discussed. Some ideas included: 
real time space weather feeds; and debris 
observation campaigns (e.g., each observer 
provides his data to the other observers, who 
could independently combine the 
information). 
• Space surveillance capability, a range of 
sensors, a space catalog, world wide coverage, 
ownership of a class of data, services like 
collision avoidance, and operational capability 
and experience were all viewed as essential 
elements of a nation’s space presence. 
• The USAF TLE process was criticized with 
the requisite need of better collaborative 
collision avoidance to be put in place. 
• A number of potential models for SSA data 
sharing were discussed. This includes: broad 
data exchange approaches; maritime data 
sharing in NATO; advancing USAF 
approaches; “neighborhood watch” for space 
threats as part of a voluntary code of conduct; 
space traffic management; and a space safety 
organization. 
• UNCOPUOS was seen as NOT the right place 
for SSA initiatives. 
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• Insurance of space activities were viewed as 
potentially driving greater diligence with 
collision avoidance, since insurance 
underwriters recognize the difference between 
good and bad space operators. 
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